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Abstract 
This work is interdisciplinary in orientation and brings together American theatre (and 
culture) and contemporary ethical philosophy. I am introducing the French philosopher 
Emmanuel Lévinas and his theory of Self and Other to an analysis of contemporary 
American drama—a mode of approach that is new to the discipline of theatre studies. 
Lévinas’s insights are particularly relevant to the concerns of the 21st century and how we 
might rethink relationships and values. My work looks at contemporary American plays in 
terms of nationalism, gender politics, racial dynamics and ecological issues.  I contend that 
these playwrights are attempting to go beyond conventional views on such matters and are 
modeling a sort of Lévinasian ethic in their works, one informed by an honoring of difference 
and a responsibility for the Other.  
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
One of the primary moments of inspiration for this study occurred when I attended a 
production of Mary Zimmerman’s play Metamorphoses (produced by Louisiana State University 
in the fall of 2006). In viewing Zimmerman’s reworking of Ovid’s texts, which posed questions 
of myth and science for a contemporary audience, I was greatly stirred and prompted to consider 
basic questions of how people look at the world, how people relate to one another and to the 
natural environment.  My thinking on these questions was further inspired by my encounter with 
the scholar Silva Benso and her analysis of the co-existence and interplay of mythos and logos. It 
was at this point in my coursework (and with the writing of Benso) that I learned of the 
philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas and his unique ideas about the relationship between Self and 
Other. These various influences led me to look at the world through a new lens and caused me to 
re-evaluate the contemporary Western value system and its fundamental components, namely, 
those of logos, reason, and domination, that are central to its reasoning. I began to think of the 
role that theatre plays in this process as we examine and envision the world. Should theatre seek 
to “copy” reality or “re-create” an alternate reality for us to model? 
In bringing these questions to recent American drama, I gave particular attention to Putlizer 
Prize plays after 1995 as indicators of concerns and issues confronted by noted dramatists of the 
American theatre. In these works I found a preoccupation and fascination with  issues of Self-
Other relationships—subjects central to the work of Lévinas—and how they were expressed and 
explored through dramatic means, how philosophical issues were brought to a  more personal 
level. This reading made me wonder how such plays might lead to a reconsideration of ethics, a 
rethinking of the top-down political totality, as Lévinas proposes. I looked for tendencies of an 
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alternative ethics and ideas in these plays that might call for a questioning of politics as Lévinas 
had hoped. Given that much contemporary theatre is of an  experimental nature, and that many  
contemporary American dramas give embodiment  to a reconsideration of the Self-Other 
relationship (in a political totality), this project takes theatre as a lab for testifying to a new 
ethical relationship—a dialogism between violence and love. Bringing this aspect to light shows 
how theatre is grappling with issues fundamental to how we see ourselves (how theatre addresses 
issues central to recent ethical theory), and how the characters and events depicted on stage 
might point to an ethical pathway into the 21st century.                                    
Focus and Aims 
This project is inspired by Lévinas’s theory of Self and Other and aims to examine the 
possible new understandings of Self-Other relationships represented in contemporary American 
drama. Lévinas’s epistemological and ontological reworking of Self-Other relationships is a 
provocative innovation in philosophical thinking. Unconvinced that reason alone can bring out 
the best in humankind, he challenged Aristotle’s legacy to Western philosophy in that he threw 
out the problematic assumption that equates epistemology with ontology. Taking into account 
pressing issues like ecology, nationalism, gender, and race, my study highlights Lévinas’s 
understanding of epistemological and ontological modes that reveal Self-Other dynamics in a 
new light. Lévinas’s ethical consideration of Self-Other relationships points to a collapse of a 
human-center, the ”I”- centered mindset, and in turn encourages a re-examination of these 
enduring issues. 
Attention to Lévinas also offers a new way to consider issues that may indicate a critical 
impasse or exhaustion. He sheds new illumination on identity politics in particular, which 
flourished throughout the late twentieth century, where Self-identity is demarcated in terms of 
nation, gender, sexuality, race, religion, class, region, etc. While identity politics helped to 
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elevate a multiplicity of identities, and carry on the revolution of deconstructing a despotic norm, 
it arguably reinforced the conventional Western Self-Other model characterized in terms of a 
dominant Self and an oppressed Other. The individual is valued in terms of  a collective--of 
nationality, gender, race, culture, etc.--instead of being valued on its own basis. However, such a 
view does not account for cross-category outreach or a responsibility not based chiefly on self-
interest. On the other hand, Lévinas’s alternative theories of Self-Other offer us a fresh 
perspective that redefines subjectivity and invites us to re-examine the relationship between Self 
and Other in terms of interdependence and responsibility. 
In bringing Lévinasian insights into conversation with recent American drama, this project  
will examine Self-Other relationships in a number of late twentieth and early twentieth-first 
century plays and will focus on four basic areas of concern:  1) Politics: this section aims to 
explore the idea of “The Third,”1 which informs Lévinas’s notion of justice and the totalization 
of politics; 2) Motherhood and Interpersonal relationships: this section chiefly emphasizes 
ethical responsibility, which Lévinas terms the “first philosophy,” on an interpersonal level; 3) 
Race relations: this chapter explores how Lévinas’s notion of Self and Other might shed light on 
contemporary race theory; 4) Human-environment and human-animal relationships: this final 
section draws on Lévinas’s ideas of “face” to examine relationships between humans and the 
environment as well as humans and animals.  
In sum, contemporary American dramatists have been exploring and articulating issues and 
problems that confront the world, as it moves into new alignments and social/economic orders. 
This project investigates the outlooks of key American playwrights, with an eye toward how 
their plays embody elements that reflect a Lévinasian viewpoint, a view that may offer helpful 
insight and guidance as we move into a twenty-first century future. 
                                                            
1 For Lévinas, the “third person” marks the initiation of politics. 
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Background and Contexts 
Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995) 
While Lévinas was first known as the translator and introducer of Edmund Husserl’s ideas 
of phenomenology into France, he received a traditional Jewish education in Lithuania; the 
influence of Talmud only became evident in the later stage of his `philosophical thinking. After 
the age of eighteen, he studied philosophy in Germany (where he met Heidegger) and later 
studied phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. He then became one of the first French 
intellectuals who paid attention to these two famous philosophical figures. His later estrangement 
with Heidegger was due to Heidegger’s Nazism, and many of his main publications indicate a 
rejection of a Heidegger’s thinking. 
Lévinas’s philosophy can be seen as a break from traditional Western rationality or 
Metaphysics, which he terms “ontology.” He proposes that the Other can not be reduced to an 
ontological understanding, and cannot be treated as an object of the Self (without violence). For 
him, philosophy is not the “love of wisdom” as the Greeks indicated, but the “wisdom of love,” 
because the ethics that explores Self-Other relationships should be at the fore. In other words, his 
notion of ethics is not the traditional one, a system that comes after the individual forms its 
subjectivity. Ethics instead contributes to the process of constructing the Self, making the Self 
aware of its responsibility toward the Other during the Self-forming process. The Other only 
reveals its alterity through the Face that demands the Self to prostrate and bow before it.  
 Lévinas’s major works on the Self-Other relationship include De l'existence à l'existant 
(Existence and Existents,1947), Le Temps et l'Autre (Time and the Other,1948), Totalité et infini: 
essai sur l'extériorité (Totality and Infinity,1961), Humanisme de l'autre homme (Humanism of 
the Other,1972), and Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence,1974).  
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Contemporary Problems and Concerns 
According to recent global warming reports released by NOAA (The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration) in 2007, coastal areas of Taiwan will one day be submerged under 
ocean water 6 to 25 meters deep. The report notes that the cities I grew up in will be under water, 
and the mountains I used to climb will become islands. During my first year in the United States 
(2005), I witnessed the ecological and environmental crisis brought on by Hurricane Katrina, an 
event whose impact, destruction, and aftermath continues to be heavily debated in media 
discourse, especially with regard to its alleged connection to global warming. Environmental 
change not only endangers human existence, but also that of animals and the ecological balance 
of nature as a whole. While discourses about global warming vary, with some believing the 
world will be destroyed within 100 years, and others minimizing this outlook as another trendy 
issue that will soon wane, such discussion presents humanity with fundamental questions. How 
do humans ethically engage the world around them, in terms of personal, political, and 
ecological relations? And how can humanity balance these relationships in a sustainable way?  
If the will-to-power and the pleasure principle act as the chief drivers of human activity, 
what are the prerequisites for collective happiness? Can the achievement of such collective 
happiness include happiness for the individual? Can collective interests fairly include those of 
the individual? Is a balance between the two possible? For instance, recent and unusual 
fluctuations between flooding and draught in Taiwan are believed by some to be yet another 
indication of the accumulating effects of global warming, making this issue a practical matter 
(instead of an abstract philosophical debate). What then should the Taiwanese people do? If they 
choose to abruptly halt all industry and transportation so as to prevent further emissions of CO2, 
the economy will stagnate. If measures are not taken, however, it appears the island will 
ultimately suffer increasing inundation by rising sea levels.  
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Consequently, interests of environmental groups and those of industry groups are in conflict 
with one another. Not only do ecological issues influence and further problematize Self-Other 
relations (and ultimately human existence), they also reveal conflicts and tensions between 
opposing ideologies, races, and nations aggravated by economic competition. For instance, in 
order to speed up consumption, tons of low- quality products are manufactured. As consumption 
increases, inferior product quality requires inevitable replacement—which further increases 
production, as business tries to keep up with demand. While this dynamic might lead to 
economic prosperity in some regions, that prosperity is only temporary. Such a manufacturing 
cycle often ignores its impact on the local environment. Underlying this dilemma lies a long-
term fundamental question of the Self’s2 relation to its world. 
All these pending issues waiting for resolution seem to be beyond the scope and efficacy of 
the epistemological mode that has dominated the world (at least the Western world) for 
thousands of years. Western egoism has a long traditional since Plato. It argues for a reason-
centered ego in the conception of individuals and communities, and places ethics and morals 
under the aim of realizing a more prosperous “Self.” This outlook also introduces the 
significance of defining and fulfilling the “Self” in Western civilization. This model is also at 
work in the theories of identity politics  of the late 20th century: striving for a more just society (a 
functional ethics), human beings turned to the discourses of gender, sexuality, nationality, race, 
religion, etc. in the search of “true identity” (the Self). While these are the categorical traits that 
people have little control over,3 the discourses of identity politics that ask for equal treatment fall 
into the conventional ethical frame, that is, the ethics that come after the forming of subjectivity 
                                                            
2 The “self” here refers to humankind, specifically egoism and its epistemological model. 
3 This idea is from a debating board that I think is helpful. (Bikerdad )  
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and instilled into people through educational means. What our contemporary situation may 
require is a new way to think about selves and others, and a new way to understand ethics. 
Lévinas and the Western Philosophical Tradition 
At this critical moment, Lévinas’s notion of ethics between Self and Other can seem to 
provide a glimmer of hope. Lévinas occupies a unique status in the tradition of Western 
philosophy, specifically concerning his views on rationality. Since Plato argued that only 
rationality can lead to knowing the world, Western philosophy has honored the foundation of 
logos. In Plato’s ideal state of human existence, as outlined in The Republic, the rationality of 
philosophers ultimately brings people to the good and the truth. Each individual functions as a 
part to contribute to the wellness of the whole. His student Aristotle consummates the kingdom 
of rationality with his notion of teleology, emphasizing a human-centered world perspective. 
According to Aristotle, humans must exercise reason in order to realize their innate purpose, the 
achievement of happiness. Aristotle equates “how to live” (through reason) with “the purpose of 
living” (happiness). He believes that through reason humans can find a harmonious manner of 
life (happiness).  
 This traditional rationality established in antiquity reached an important 
conceptualization in Heidegger,4 who situated reason within the temporal structure of Being/ 
Dasein5 in his Being and Time. While both Heidegger and Lévinas contemplated the problem of 
human existence, their approaches to the resulting ethical dilemma and its possible solutions 
differed. For Heidegger, we can only know Being (the status of all existence) through beings 
                                                            
4 Heidegger actually diverges from the traditional philosophy in his dissent regarding the conventional priority on 
the “present” and how this temporal understanding determines the interpretations of beings. However, his renewed 
interpretation of Being was again attacked by Levians as self (human)-centered. 
5 In “The Absent Foundation: Heidegger on the Origin of Rationality,” Jussi Backman notes that the idea of reason 
was brought up in Heidegger’s lecture course Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik (1928; esp. GA 26: 135–
285), the essay “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (1929), and the lecture course Der Satz vom Grund (1955–56). This 
article is under review and prohibits quote.   
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(individual human beings/objects). Created things (beings), i.e., crops, buildings, any piece of 
furniture, etc. reflect people’s own consciousness. People need to make their own instruments in 
order to avoid reducing their existence to a mechanized one. Ultimately he yearns for a peasant-
like lifestyle in which humans create that which they need.  
However, for Lévinas, Heidegger does not go far enough in challenging the Western 
philosophical tradition and its fundamental reliance on reason. He insists that Heidegger’s idea of 
Being, that the essence of things would come forward within the fourfold,6 is itself a rational 
deduction that assumes the “I” knows “the Other” (the essence of things). This demonstrates that 
Heidegger still places the Other under “me.”  
In terms of time, Lévinas does admire Heidegger’s disapproval of a traditional ontological 
understanding of “time,” which renders it one of the (concrete) objects. The attempt of Western 
epistemology to grasp “time,” initiated by Aristotle, is another instance of defining the essence 
and attributes of “time,” reducing it to the domain of ontology. According to Aristotle, the 
attributes of time are: 1) the priority of future, 2) the irreversibility of time, and 3) its infinity 
(Chanter TDFLH, 27). However, although Lévinas applauded Heidegger’s insight in 
overthrowing the traditional Aristotelian concept of time, specifically its attribute of “infinity,” 
he also identifies a problem with Heidegger’s notion of “Dasein,” which for Lévinas is still 
confined within the discourse of the Same.  
Though Heidegger does not believe “time” can be categorized in ontology, his argument 
primarily pivots on the length of human lives (death) and its focus in the world of the human. It 
is because human life has a limit that makes the “infinite of time” invalid. In other words, if 
                                                            
6 Heidegger influenced and inspired Lévinas. Heidegger believed humans do not exist alone in the world. 
Interrelationships between humanity and its environment cannot be reduced into a one-dimensioned ideology, such 
as pragmatism. What Lévinas dislikes is that Heidegger still posits human in the center of other things. This can lead 
to violence from the self (human-centered perspective) toward the Other.   
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“time” is not there to be conceived, perceived and used by human (lives) then it does not exist. 
Time ends as human lives end. For Lévinas, this precedence of ontology over ethics informs the 
“long tradition of pride, heroism, domination and cruelty” (TTO, 103). 
Lévinas’s penetrating insight concerning the way humans “know” the world reveals the 
problem of ontology: humans do not pay much attention to the relation between themselves and 
Others, but subjugate Others under their own power of knowing/knowledge. Humans determine 
the relationship between the Self and Others through the mode of ontology. This insight is 
revealed not only through Lévinas’s rejection of time (future) as an ontological entity as 
mentioned above, but also through his notion that ethics is the first philosophy.  
For Lévinas, the relationship of Self and Other has been understood as a set of hierarchical 
tiers dominated by a human-centered perspective, one that asserts its hegemony only within the 
territory of human knowledge, or rationality (the operations of knowledge). Traditional ethics is 
situated within this rationality, but Lévinas has a different definition. He approaches ethics by 
proposing that humans break the fortress of rationality and reconsider the relationship of Self and 
Others. In other words, ethics should precede rationality.  
This shift in ethics is best illustrated through identity politics within post-colonial discourses. 
Simone Drichel observes “that postcolonial studies as a field appears to be plagued by a guilty 
conscience—a persistent anxiety over its potential complicity with colonialism” and argues that 
“this guilty conscience reveals a largely overlooked ethical dimension in a field that derives its 
raison d'être from political, not ethical, concerns” (20). Ethics brought about by such political 
correctness and incorrectness is strategic and likely to stagnate.  
Indeed, Lévinas is “useful” if we consider that identity politics reveals some evidence of 
exhausting itself. In an interview, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak notes that she has been “deeply 
troubled by identity politics” (Yan 430) because people get to know other parts of the world 
- 10 - 
 
through a cartographic position instead of a face-to-face encounter. Her Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present also explores the disappearance of post-
colonial studies and a new academic focus on globalization. Does this shift foretell a new 
framework of ethics and foresee the limits of identity politics? 
Spivak’s thoughts seem to mark a dilemma in contemporary identity politics, paralleling 
Lévinas’s concerns. Emphasizing the importance of ethics and Self-Other relations, Lévinas 
asserts that identity alone does not account for human subjectivity.  In uprooting identity politics, 
he destroys the traditional ethical framework established by other philosophical figures, which he 
believes brings about violence upon the Other. For Levians, ethics is the first philosophy. What 
then is the relationship between ethics and politics?  
  The Western philosophical tradition has emphasized “reason” and “rationality,” viewing 
it as a construction of human subjectivity and the ultimate goal of humankind. Reality, and 
ontology as a whole then, is based upon reason and teleology, as the primary component of 
ethics. That is, traditional morality, or ethics, is contingent on the reality that teleology and 
reason construct. This placement of ethics within ontology is what Lévinas challenges. For him, 
traditional ethics is overly enmeshed in a political framework. Violence is practiced in the name 
of ethics, and for the order of a peaceful society. Thus, to obtain a new set of ethics, or a new 
first philosophy, it is necessary to examine traditional ethics and divorce it from ontology.  
For Plato, ethics is enshrined within politics.7 Following him, Aristotle reinforces 
reason/logos as human teleology, under which everything is subjugated and justified.8 The 
                                                            
7 Plato pursues a harmonious cosmic order which he envisioned in Republic, that is, politics can be said to be 
realization of “the good,” which is also the goal for individuals to pursue. Since morality and ethics must be 
contained in a political order led by leaders with reason, they must be enhanced and maintained within the fortress 
of logos. For Plato, politics and reason are tools that discipline individuals in order for them to carry out their moral 
supremacy. Structurally, it is a top-down effect, making interpersonal ethics one of the tiers that benefit from 
political good.  
8 For Aristotle, all things/creatures exist to carry out their teleology. In the case of humans, reason is what 
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Hobbesian view of politics is reflected in this political context. Hobbes’ proposal that everything 
should submit to those in power (i.e., humanity) grounds the Western political tradition that 
Lévinas later defies. In the eighteenth century, Kant asserts that reason cannot be justified 
without empiricism, further contextualizing ethics within this “reason-oriented” tradition. For 
him, ethics refers to “right” action that conforms to justifiable reasoning.  
Later, the nineteenth century witnessed the prevalence of utilitarianism, which was entirely 
consequentialist.9 The good/bad or right/wrong judgment of an action depended on its fruit, 
instead of its motivation. Happiness is equivalent to pleasure, which is equivalent to the 
avoidance of pain. Therefore actions that bring about a pleasant result are considered good and 
ethical. 
What links these ethical philosophies mentioned above is that ethics is considered a 
consequence of a defined subjectivity. This subjectivity can be applied on both a personal and 
collective (i.e., political) level. What constitutes “subjectivity,” as illustrated above, is “reason” 
(i.e., logos). However, Lévinas’s theory totally undermines such a reason-centered subjectivity. 
Instead, he claims that the finite subject is constructed as part of the infinite Other. His idea of 
ethics situates the subject as subjugated to the holy Other, held as a hostage. A subject is only 
complete in its subjectivity when it is in relationship with an Other. 
Instead of a top-down influence from the collective (i.e., political) to the individual, Lévinas 
proposes an ethics with a rippling effect. He does not agree that a politically sanctioned 
rationality is the only way to contest another political totality. This would only lead to war, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
distinguishes humans from animals, and it is the only tool that can lead to happiness (as the teleology of humankind). 
Ethics is a part of science that contributes to construction of a good human society. The primary aim of ethical 
education is therefore to help humans realize their maximum potential ability to reason, so as to further pull humans 
away from their animality.  
9 “A  (purely) consequentialist ethical theory is a general normative theory that bases the moral evaluation of acts, 
rules, institutions, etc. solely on the goodness of their consequences, where the standard of goodness employed is a 
standard of non-moral goodness.” (“Consequentialist Ethical Theories.” ) 
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which is not a solution at all. Instead, he proposes a move away from an “an-archical, ethical 
relationship with the Other to the totalizing realm of politics with his phenomenology of the third 
person, the Third” (Simmons). As the ego is forced to respond to more than one “Other,” and has 
to decide which one to deal with first, the matter shifts from an ethical realm to a political one.  
The basis of Lévinas’s theory renders problematic Western philosophy’s preference for  the 
Greek idea that “human peace is awaited on the basis of the True” (BPW, 162). A peace formed 
on the basis of truth would force multiplicities to come to consensus with unities; foreigners 
would be assimilated into a certain consensual ideal. Carried to a political extreme, this 
conception would lead to an empire that teaches universalism (BPW, 163). 
What Lévinas envisions is a face-to-face ethics that would eventually exert its influence 
from the individual to the political (collective) level. It is obvious then that Lévinas’s notion of 
ethics is different from conventional morality, in the sense that it is about the way humanity 
constructs its consciousness—via subjectivity. Self, or consciousness, is born as “the presence of 
the third party in the proximity of the one for the Other and, consequently. . . The foundation of 
consciousness is justice and not the reverse” (Lévinas BPW, 169). So long as individuals can 
envision a network reflecting “the wisdom of love,” then old political structures cannot stand. 
Instead, they will undergo a positive change. 
Within his framework, Self-Other relationships apply to various contexts of politics, 
interpersonal relationships, and human-environment relations. The rejection of a Self-centered 
political rationality, inherent in the Western philosophical tradition,--which Lévinas condemns, 
is pertinent today, as we face human/environment problems (global warming, animal extinction), 
gender issues (women as the “Other” in Lévinas’s definition are creatures subjugated by men), 
and national subjectivities (should one country subjugate another country to ensure its own 
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happiness?). These issues require a new form of ethics in consideration of human sustainability. 
After all, humanity does not exist alone.  
Among Lévinas’s ideas I have found these elements particularly helpful: the third, the face, 
time, the Other, feminine, etc. Though these notions all emanate from the Self-Other relationship, 
they are terms derived from different contexts. In the next section I will specify the dimension of 
each term that is particularly helpful and relevant to different chapters. 
Definitions 
1) Violence 
For Lévinas, violence occurs when individuals are subsumed into the Same. When everyone 
submits to a universal idea, for instance, a perfect order of hierarchy is established. This can be 
seen clearly in the violence of the state (Levians BPW, 23). The terrible nature of the violence is 
especially revealed when force joins with reason and the rhetoric of its necessity. In other words, 
the self-consciousness that emanates from reason, that has long been deemed as the only 
authentic grounds for subjectivity, carries an essential violence. 
Lévinas condemns the violent relationship the Self imposes on the Other, a relationship 
rooted in traditional epistemology, which then colors all other possible contexts. Lévinas states 
that “violence is to be found precisely outside of the world where Reason and Philosophy reign” 
(TI, 25). Hence, to seek truth, through reason and philosophy, is no way to expel violence but to 
ensure and enact it. Therefore, the presupposition that seeking “truth” is humanity’s destiny—
one that brings about peace, happiness, etc.--- is brought under critique. In the process of 
reaching for the spectre of “truth,” what do we do to the Other?  
2) Love 
Lévinas’s notion of Love can be understood in this passage in Otherwise than Being: 
“Consciousness is born as the presence of the third party in the proximity of the one for the 
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Other. . . the foundation of consciousness is justice and not the reverse. . . to the extravagant 
generosity of the for-the-Other is superimposed a reasonable order. . . of justice through 
knowledge, and philosophy here is a measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-Other 
of peace and proximity, and is like the wisdom of love” (TI, 169). 
Traditionally, subjectivity is a priori, perceiving the world with reason. Spatially, 
subjectivity is like a spider that pre-exists its own web. The subjectivity/the spider’s world ends 
at the limit of its net. The net is a symbol of reason (a model of epistemology) that leads the 
spider to understand and make sense of “its world” (the net itself). Every line of knowledge, 
politics, and philosophy is composed with rationality and is interwoven to compose a net world. 
However, Lévinas proclaims that for humankind, the (epistemological) net comes before the 
spider is born. The spider/Self comes to realize its own subjectivity through understanding its 
relationship with the net, and the relationship between the net and the outside world. In other 
words, for Lévinas, consciousness, subjectivity or the constitution of “Self,” comes from the 
relation with the Other, instead of the other way around, as modern epistemology assumes. So 
the function of philosophy should lead us toward alternative possibilities of the Self-Other 
relationship and a striving for love, instead of the “love of wisdom” that embodies a desire for 
accumulation (of knowledge for instance). In a nutshell, it is most wise to explore love between 
Self and the Other. 
The Field of American Drama  
The relationship between individuals and their society, albeit played out in many different 
contexts: public vs. private, men vs. women, individuals vs. collectivity (such as politics, religion, 
nationality), is one of the main topics explored in contemporary American theatre. In A Critical 
Introduction to Twentieth-Century American Drama, C.W.E. Bigsby points out: “The theater is 
the most public of arts, it offers the opportunity of acting out anxieties and fears which are born 
- 15 - 
 
in the conflict between private needs and public values” (1). This stance echoes the focus of 
Public Issues, Private Tensions: Contemporary American Drama, edited by Matthew C. 
Roudane, which points out that individual issues can often be read as a metaphorical threat from 
a larger discourse/institution—for example, “rape” can be read as “personal and social terrorism, 
humiliation, hostility, and degradation” (12).  
The dialogism between the collective and individuals derivatively brings about the issues of 
repressed selves and minority discourses. In Creating the Self in the Contemporary American 
Theatre, Robert J. Andreach indicates that the second half of 20th century witnesses relatively 
more diverse representations in U.S. culture. For instance, women’s theatres and other minority 
theatres (i.e., race) have thrived in this time, and the individual’s search for cultural location 
replaces the former search of the individual for its “soul” (47). This endeavor has been 
understood as the search for “identity.” And indeed, following the ‘60s, identity politics has 
taken on a dominant, orthodoxical position in theatre and cultural activity (and cultural studies), 
serving as a central frame of reference in assessing various societal and existential issues.   
However, theatre studies evidences a turn after September 11, 2001. As Anthony Kubiak in 
Agitated States points out: “The attack was designed especially for us. Its scale, the choice of 
targets, the sheer spectacular impact of the images seemed . . . constructed with a distinctly 
American theatricality in mind . . . The images powerfully echoed the history of the American 
disaster and action film…” (2). The attack itself posed a “violent indictment of who we are, a 
people of the spectacle, blind to the theater of it all” (3) as “the Others . . . understood us in a 
way we do not yet understand ourselves” (2). Apparently if “who we are” is solely constructed 
by my own perception, without the involvement of the Other’s view, then that construction is at 
stake.  
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With this stance posited, this project will appropriate Lévinas’s theory of Self and the Other 
in the examination of contemporary American drama. Each chapter focuses on one or more 
aspects of his ideas, with accompanying terminology, relative to the relationship between Self 
and Other. Among other things, this project looks at justice, the Third, politics, motherhood, 
responsibility and the face, as well as materiality, pain and suffering. In his condemnation of the 
belief that “only political rationality can answer political problems,” Lévinas illustrates how the 
“order of the state rests upon the irreducible ethical responsibility of the face-to-face relation” 
(BPW, 160). He envisions a transformational shift from interpersonal relationships (the face-to-
face encounter) to those on a larger scale (i.e., collective, national, etc).  
The core of Lévinas’s concern centers on “ethics,” which he proposes to reconstruct in light 
of the politics/horror of the holocaust. In his outlook, the influence of politics trickles down to 
individuals. Like Heidegger, Lévinas also rejects this top-down influence (from politics to 
individual) and proposes a reverse—from being to Being (Heidegger) and face-to face encounter 
to Politics (Lévinas). He disagrees with Heidegger, whom he thinks still upholds a violence of 
Self toward the Other.  
Outline of Chapters and Issues 
1) Intimate Ethics and National Politics 
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been hotly debated in the US, the dialogism 
between Self and Other, on an individual or national/collective level, invites a timely exploration 
of the relationship between ethics and politics. If ethics is put after politics, in the way the 
Western totalitarian state justifies the necessity of war, this, for Lévinas, is only a reduction of 
ethics to politics. In the introduction to Lévinas’s short essay “Peace and Proximity” written in 
1984, the editors indicate how Lévinas’s ethical thinking can be well applied to politics: 
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“Lévinas begins his analysis with the statement of the domination of a peaceful order of society 
is constituted in opposition to the threat of the war of all against all” (BPW, 161)10. 
Tony Kushner’s Angels in America alludes strongly to the Cold War era and dramatizes how 
that a hostile mentality and conservative political discourses can threaten homosexuality and its 
related political consciousness. This first chapter thus examines Kushner’s work and explores 
how Kushner, like Lévinas, suggests a bottom-up model of (individual) ethical influence on 
politics in the anticipation of a new model of (prophetic) politics. The totalitarian politics of the 
play, touching upon numerous arenas, from gender issues to medical practices, give occasion to 
cite Lévinas’s fundamental concerns, as Kushner espouses outlooks in sympathy with Lévinas. 
Kushner received many awards for the play, such as Tony Awards for Best play in 1993 and 
1994, and the Pulitzer Prize for Drama in 1993. New York Times theater critic Frank Rich called 
it “a searching and radical rethinking” of American political drama and “the most extravagant 
and moving demonstration imaginable” (“Angels in America by Tony Kushner”) of the artistic 
response to AIDS. Hence, I have chosen this play for its exploration of the dialogism of ethics 
and politics. 
I will focus on the idea of Self and Other that has been prevalent since WWII in American 
political discourse. Angels in America strongly evokes the problematic dualism between “Self” 
and “Other” in its criticism of politics, the horror of an unknown plague (AIDS), the enemy 
(communist), and, above all, the exploration of how bodily politics relate to political operations.  
2) Human Relations and the Face of the Other 
This chapter will employ Lévinas’s idea of “face” to examine human/ environment / animal 
relationships in contemporary American drama. As current issues of global warming and the 
                                                            
10 Basic Philosophical Writings is edited by Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi. The 
editors offer introduction to each Lévinas’s different writings. However, there is no specification of the author of 
each introduction. 
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excessive emission of CO2 loom large, the relationship between humans and the environment 
becomes ever more critical. Since the Enlightenment, scientific knowledge has labored to 
understand nature and keep it in check. Nature has thus taken a passive role, as an inexhaustible 
resource for human exploitation. However, ecological issues that the world faces today 
challenge/refute this model of understanding nature and require a further reconsideration of the 
old model. 
One of the controversial aspects of Levians Self-Other theory is his ambiguous attitude 
toward animals. Do animals warrant the unconditional priority of the Other that Lévinas 
proclaims? Or are they, as traditional philosophy presupposes, the representation of “Human 
Other” as creatures without “reason”? 
 The entangled relationship between humans and animals can been seen from many aspects: 
animals as Symbols/Totems, animals as pets (replacing human accompaniment) , animals as 
creatures for humans to imitate, and, last but not least, animals as food, etc. The conference of 
The Ecology and Culture Area of the Popular Culture/American Culture Association in April 
2009 characterizes the human/animal connection in this way: “American culture has had a rather 
schizophrenic relationship with the natural world. The Puritans bequeathed the dark view of 
nature as a howling wilderness filled with beasts—including Native Americans—intent on 
menacing civilized humans. From Thoreau, on the other hand, comes the notion that nature or 
wildness is the tonic for the ills of civilization” (O’Shaughnessey). 
In Lévinas’s terms, the environment, i.e., nature, reveals a “face” beyond human knowledge 
and poses a dilemma that logos cannot easily conjure away. Therefore it is urgent to reconsider 
relationships between humanity, the environment, and all other creatures that share the 
environmental landscape we call nature. In this chapter, I will explore Edward Albee’s The Goat: 
Or Who is Sylvia? (2000). Lévinas will prove helpful in both his notion of “face” and his idea 
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that “philosophy reminds us of what is passed over in the naivety of what passes for common 
sense” (Critchley 7).  
As a three-time Pulitzer Prize winner, Albee ruthlessly examines the modern condition in a 
variety of aspects. The Goat is a daring piece, interrogating human existence through the issues 
of adultery, bestiality, homosexuality, etc. Theresa J. May points out that “The Goat explodes 
species taboos by offending our sense of absolute difference, illuminates the role of human 
desire in the commodification of nature…” (“Beyond Bambi” 98). What May terms “absolute 
difference” is what Lévinas holds as the “face.” The commodification of nature itself also 
demonstrates the violence Self imposes onto the (nature) Other.  
3) Human Relations and the Face of the Other 
This chapter explores the notion of “race” and “ethnicity” in David Henry Hwang’s works 
The Sound of Voice, The Bondage, Face Value and Yellow face.11 As a prominent Asian- 
American playwright, Hwang has been characterized as a mouthpiece (as he depicted himself in 
Yellow face) for voicing the relationship between East and West, and many of his plays feature 
the exploration of the concept of “race.”  
Analyzing his many “race” plays, this chapter aims to contextualize Hwang’s notion of race 
in Western epistemology. (The Sound of Voice exemplifies an interaction between different 
epistemological models and is one of the Hwang plays that is not directly about race—though his 
treatment of epistemology bears upon racial imaging.)  Lévinas’s early work Time and the Other 
will serve as the main theoretical source I will rely on in the analysis of traditional Western 
epistemology. In this work Lévinas demonstrates the difference between his notion of time and 
that of Heidegger. In The Sound of Voice, various historical views are reified in gender 
                                                            
11 Face Vale has never been produced. Hwang incorporated material from this work into his next play, The Yellow 
Face.  
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differences. The man represents the Western, dominant, and progressive historical view, 
demonstrated in the linear viewpoint of time, while the woman serves as an alternative view—
i.e., the Eastern, subjective, and regressive historical view demonstrated in the non-linear 
viewpoint of time. Lévinas’s argument about the extension of traditional philosophy’s boundary, 
dominating subject-object relations, will be a great facilitator in understanding the 
epistemological model reflected in this play.  
Using The Sound of Voice as a point of entry into Hwang’s other “race plays,” I then 
analyze how Hwang’s critique of race issues from his epistemological reflection. This feature is 
especially evident in his recent work Yellow Face, which functions as a critique of practices of 
multiculturalism. 
4) The Female and Desubjectification 
This chapter will explore alternative understandings of womanhood, motherhood and 
parenthood through analysis of Paula Vogel’s And Baby Makes 7 and Hot ‘n’ Throbbing. Vogel 
is a prominent and prolific playwright, whose works feature a major concern with gender issues, 
such as alternative sexuality, alternative parenthood, etc. Though she often chooses to 
theatricalize difficult issues like sexual abuse and/or incest, “violence” remains a constant motif 
in her work. Hot ‘n’ Throbbing (1994), for instance, is a work that witnesses a man abusing his 
wife. It is through this issue that I bring her dramaturgical themes and Lévinas’s ideas together. 
One of the most illuminating ways to understand f Lévinas’s Self/Other relationship can be 
found in an investigation of motherhood—a state that illustrates the “other in the same” and 
suggests an inescapable responsibility toward the Other. The Leviansian model thus offers an 
insightful vantage point for analyzing Vogel’s And Baby Makes 7 (1986), a play in which Vogel  
depicts a non-traditional motherhood, one that interrogates traditional notions of the nursing 
figure. 
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Noting how female narratives operate with patriarchal discourse, this chapter first discusses 
Hot ‘n’ Throbbing as an example of her dramatic methodology (attempting to disrupt patriarchal 
discourse through parody and non-conventional narrative technique). After this analysis, I 
discuss her And Baby Makes 7, which demonstrates Vogel’s effort in desubjectification and 
envisions the possibility of an alternative female subjectivity. 
Theoretical Scope and Influences 
This project relies heavily on Lévinas’s theories. In my exploration of his notion of alterity I 
will involve his major texts, namely, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. In the 
former work Lévinas advances his idea of alterity in his discussion of, among other things, 
justice, social relations, materiality and bodily enjoyment, and the irreducibility of face-to-face 
encounter. In the latter, he further analyzes the conception of Other in the domain of language.  
I will also examine his early work, specifically Time and the Other, in which he elaborates 
on the relationship between time, death, the Other, and the feminine. His work following, 
Otherwise than Being: God Who comes to the Idea (1982) and the article “Diachrony and 
Representation,” extends the spectrum of Other to the absolute alterity of God. Although I do not 
discuss theology in any of the chapters, these works will provide an important reference in the 
theoretical framework of this project.  
In terms of my critique of Western rationality, Luc Brisson’s How Philosophers Saved 
Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology has proved helpful. In the exploration 
of myths and philosophies, Brisson argues that “to acknowledge the limits of reason does not 
lead to irrationalism” (3). This is a statement that accords with Lévinas’s defiance of totalitarian 
politics, as both scholars deconstruct the binary of rationality and irrationality in mythology.  
Some Lévinasian scholars I rely on are Alfonso Lingis, Richard Cohen (translator of Time 
and the Other), and Tina Chanter. As a matter of fact, I learned of Lévinas through Lingis, 
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whose article “Appetite” was my first exposure to Lévinasian theory. Lingis translated Lévinas’s 
major works Totality and Infinity and Otherwise Beyond Essence. His own work has a fairly 
strong Lévinasian color. For instance, Alexander E. Hooke has examined the notion of “we” as a 
“collage” rather than a “collective” in Alfonso’s thinking. Richard Cohen is another noted 
Lévinas scholar in the US. His introduction to the translation of Lévinas’s Time and the Other is 
a clear and detailed chronology of Lévinas’s thinking.  
I also have conducted research on scholars who deal with similar topics. Toumayan’s 
Encountering the Other provides some useful debate on “difference” from Heidegger through 
Lévinas to Blanchot. Kosky’s Lévinas and the Philosophy of Religion seeks an alternative 
notion/discourse of God/religion after Nietzsche and Heidegger’s denouncement. By tracing the 
genealogy of philosophy that heralds the death of God, Kosky tries to locate Lévinas in a 
philosophical tradition and hence examine his notion of ethics as the first philosophy. Through 
Lévinas’s notion that a subject is constructed through responsibility rather than consciousness, 
Kosky argues that this topic could be extended to religious behaviors, such as martyrdom and 
sacrifice. 
Bergo’s Lévinas Between Ethics and Politics asks where ethics is located. Is it occupied 
within or beyond the transcendental position? That is, is ethics something concerning ontological 
status or does it render our daily life secondary? Addressing advanced students of philosophy, 
Bergo analyzes Lévinas’s notion of being-responsible-to-the-Other through different 
methodologies. Our responsibility to the Other as a family member (still in the “Self” realm) 
does not need explanation. However, responsibility to the Other as a stranger needs interpretation 
in order to launch this statement into the empirical realm. This is a shift away from 
phenomenology and toward hermeneutics, and Bergo’s task in the book is to analyze whether or 
not this really provides ground upon which we can understand why we need to subject the Other. 
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1) Intimate Ethics and National Politics 
In the exploration of Kushner’s political views and ideas of historical progression, I 
consulted many critics’ works, such as Atsushi Fujita’s “Queer Politics to Fabulous Politics in 
Angels in America: Pinklisting and Forgiving Roy Cohn,” David Krasner’s “Stonewall, 
‘Constant Historical Progress,’ and Angels in America: The Neo-Hegelian Positivist Sense,” 
David Savran’s “How Angels in America Reconstructs the Nation,” Oona Eisenstadt’s “Anti-
Utopianism Revisited,” and so on. Such scholars help situate Kushner in current political and 
ethical conversations. 
Daryl’s “Cold War Science and the Body Politic: An Immuno/Virological Approach to 
Angels in America” also inspired my thinking. This essay examines the cultural, medical and 
political background stemming from the Cold War to the 1980s, thus highlighting the 
interconnectedness of interdisciplinary discourse. In my independent studies work carried out in 
the summer of 2007, I conducted a project on medicine and literature under the course of Health 
Communication. In the project, I wrote three papers examining the history of medicine, all of 
which I think fit into the Self-Other discourse: “Socialism and Inoculation in Shaw’s The 
Doctor’s Dilemma and Its Preface,” “Could Theatre be another Laboratory? Reflections on 
Theatre of Cruelty in Social Medical Context,” and “In the Search of Self: the Self-Other 
Relationship in Tony Kushner’s Angels in America.” 
In this chapter I chiefly focus on Lévinas’s concept of bodily sensation as the origin of 
ethics and how this insight brings about a different understanding of politics and the interplay of 
Self and institution.  
2) Human Relations and the Face of the Other 
The scholarly and intellectual aspects of this chapter primarily involve two organizing 
focal points: 1) the genealogy of Western philosophical views on the definition of human-ness 
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and the distinction between the human and non-human; and 2) contemporary reflection on the 
use of animals and how a rethinking of the animal-human relation may lead to a new ecological 
awareness.  
In “Animalizing Performance, Becoming-Theatre: Inside Zooësis with The Animal 
Project at NYU,” Una Chaudhuri and Shonni Enelow describe the project they conducted that 
explored the overlap between theatre and animal studies. Jennifer Parker-Starbuck’s “Becoming-
Animate: On the Performed Limits of Human” develops Donna Jeanne Haraway’s ideas of 
cyborg (Simians, cyborgs, and women: the reinvention of nature) and explores the distinction 
and interrelationship between the triangulation of human, animal and cyborg (technology). 
Through such an exploration Parker-Starbuck foregrounds the ethical significance of modern 
performance. Since Lévinas believes technology can promote ethics, such recent scholarship 
enlivens discussion pertaining to the boundaries of the human, the animal, and the technological.  
In this chapter, I will also include scholarship questioning whether Lévinas does/can 
include different species in his theory of unconditional love for the Other. Though Lévinas 
claims that a dog in the concentration camp was “the last Kantian in Nazi Germany,” in his essay 
“The Name of a dog, or Natural right,” he still uses animals mainly for symbolic meaning, within 
a human language order. Articles which address this issue include but are not limited to Barbara 
Jane Davy’s “An Other Face of Ethics in Lévinas,” and Theresa J. May’s “Beyond Bambi: 
Toward a Dangerous Ecocriticism in Theatre Studies.” This scholarship helps contexualize the 
analysis of this chapter, which primarily uses Lévinas’s notion of the Face to explore the 
relationship between the human and non-human worlds.  
3) Cultural Differences and Epistemology 
The source I found most useful in this chapter is Dorinne Kondo’s About Face: 
Performing Race in Fashion and Theater, which focuses on Asian-American Theatre; her work 
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highlights performitivity as a central component in understanding race and gender. This book is 
particularly related to my research in that it specifically centers on Hwang’s work to illustrate her 
argument and approach.   
I also found scholarship helpful that explores multiculturalism and identity politics, such 
as Rey Chow’s Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading, wherein she argues that 
multiculturalism risks charges of fascism in its essentializing nature. Other important sources 
include Josephine Lee’s “Tokens?: The NYC Asian American Experience on Stage,” and Ban 
Wang’s Reimagining Political Community: Diaspora, Nation-State, and the Struggle for 
Recognition. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History 
of the Vanishing Present also proves useful in that she explores the problematic aspects of post-
colonial studies and the rising academic focus on globalization. 
  In this chapter I employ Lévinas’s notion of “time” in the discussion of traditional 
Western epistemology to illustrate an East/West divide. The Self-Other relationship embedded in 
such an epistemology informs his understanding of knowledge and ethics. This Self-Other 
relation has been highly important in formation of racial and ethnic identities and the 
understanding of otherness in a Western outlook. 
4) The Female and Desubjectification 
             This chapter grounds itself in the history of the American feminist movement and its 
theatre. In the chapter’s discussion of narrative, self and adulthood, Lisa Guenther’s The Gift of 
the Other: Lévinas and the Politics of Reproduction provides much insight. The argument of the 
chapter rests heavily on key Lévinasian insights. My analysis of f Hot ‘n’ Throbbing utilizes 
Lévinas’s idea of “existence without existents” to explain Vogel’s methodology of 
desubjectification. Lévinas’s metaphorical usage of “motherhood” and his tension between the 
“virile ego” and the “effeminization of ethics” serve as important theoretical components for my 
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discussion of And Baby Makes 7. The scholarship of David Savran proves particularly helpful in 
situating Vogel’s plays in the context of American theatre and in understanding the aims and 
effects of her unique theatrical methods. 
Methodology 
 The method that I will employ to conduct this dissertation mainly involves bringing 
together an exploration of play texts with various theoretical insights offered by Lévinas. I will 
also contextualize these discussions within the 21st-century present, as a way of highlighting 
significant social, political, and ethical problems that will inform the future. Several of Lévinas’s 
theoretical notions will be appropriated in order to explore the significance of the plays and their 
cultural contexts. In other words, instead of just giving a review or analysis of Lévinas’s 
theoretical works, the project primarily focuses on how Lévinas is helpful in shedding light on 
emergent issues that contemporary playwrights have grappled with. This task will be 
accomplished through close readings of the plays, coupled with scholarly criticism on the plays, 
interviews with the playwrights, production and/or performance reviews, and so on. In respect to 
the philosophical component of the study, I will also bring in other philosophers and scholars 
who converse with Lévinas on common concepts, such as nationalism, time, (animal) ethics, etc.  
The project can be seen as partly modeled on Staging Philosophy: Intersections of Theater, 
Performance, and Philosophy, edited by David Krasner and David Z. Saltz, which considers 
theater and philosophy as kindred disciplines.  In short, the dissertation finds points of 
convergence between recent American drama and Lévinas’s writings. The work highlights the 
continuing human conversation about being and belonging and the boundaries of humanity.   
Contribution of the Project  
 Widely applied to various disciplines, Lévinas’s ethical theories mark a turning point in 
the reconsideration of human relations in this era of globalization. We have witnessed how the 
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domination of science over human civilization has seemed to have brought neglect to the ethical 
relationship in modern society. Science fosters individualism, which then leads to the diminished 
value of community. Instead of seeking a way to balance science/individualism (the love for 
wisdom) with group value (the wisdom of love), the present day has seen ethics subjugated. 
However, given the condition of humanity today, one finds that many issues, such as 
international relationships, economic development and environment protection, gender issues, 
globalization and diaspora, etc., present great and complex problems that the pursuit of wisdom 
alone simply cannot solve.  
 Given this background, my project explores the philosophical aspect of contemporary 
theatre in the matters of ethics and politics, the female and desubjectificaton (new subjectivity), 
race/social groups, and the human and non-human. Theatre is a not only a strong medium for 
voicing social, political and cultural issues, but also a unique cultural laboratory that examines 
and explores new possibilities of human relationships/ethics. As an effective vehicle to 
communicate and testify to human relationships in a time that witnesses rapid change (of people, 
capital, cultures), theatre plays a crucial role in exploring a new model of ethics. Such 
examination can help us to know “who we are,” can help us rethink our understanding of the 
relations between the human and non-human others, of this particular juncture in our history.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
 
Chapter Two: 
Intimate Ethics and National Politics 
 
The nose is really a sexual organ. . . . Smelling. And tasting.  
First, the nose, then the tongue. . . They work as a team, see.  
The nose tells the body – the heart, the mind, the fingers, the  
cock--- what it wants, and the tongue explores, finding out  
what’s edible . . .  (Angels in America, Part II: “Perestroika” 17) 
 
In an era of globalization that witnesses mass migrations, intercultural encounters, and 
rapid flows of capital,  issues about human rights and the status of individuals (inside and outside 
of nations) loom large, demanding new attention to the matters of ethics and law/justice, and the 
interplay between the two. As Plato correctly recognized that “one's interpretation of law will 
necessarily influence the interpretation of ethics, and vice-versa” (Herrera), a consideration of 
the relationship between ethics and law becomes even more intricate; such investigation begs the 
question as to which precedes, law or ethics. And how do appeals to either inform the treatment 
of individuals in a world where cultures and social boundaries are experiencing ever greater 
challenge?   
Traditionally (specifically for Kant), law functions as an external constraint on behavior, 
while ethics is viewed as more of an internally- imposed set of constraints. While ideally laws 
should be the embodiments of ethics, functioning as an outside force to carry out ethical 
principles of humanity, many times laws function in opposition to ethics. For instance, laws may 
allow or even protect unethical behaviors yet punish morally good behaviors.  
It is hardly deniably that “legal systems should ultimately be compatible with ethics,” as 
Hogan writes: “[this] is not to say that law should force everyone to adhere to some particular 
morality. . . [but law] should not contradict a core of fundamental moral principles” (1). 
However, with some forms of moral understanding, such as individualism or utilitarianism, more 
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and more modern societies have abandoned the supposedly outdated ethical ballast and have 
given greater emphasis to law and its regulations.  For Lévinas, the primary emphasis should be 
on the ethical, that is, the fundamental relationship of responsibility between the Self and Other. 
In his view, law and politics, which come from the introduction of the third, are always an 
imposition and challenge to the primary ethical relation, always a form of compromise. 
What Lévinas urges then is caution. We should not downplay the role ethics plays in human 
interactions and should be wary of systems of jurisprudence/politics—in such systems, which are 
a necessary compromise, too much emphasis can be given to the practice and governance of 
power, to the application of law in a dispassionate and universal manner (which overlooks and 
diminishes the primary ethical relation of the Self-Other). If justice is a concept that involves fair 
treatment for all people (in a group) based on the core value shared within the group, such a 
system—though seemingly something to praise—may be abdicating its ethical obligation (which 
involves a face to face encounter with the particular).  While  Hogan points out that “[even] 
theorists who tend to separate legal and moral concerns do not commonly see them as 
intrinsically opposed or irreconcilable” (1), the opposition or compromise between law and 
ethics appears as a central concern for Lévinas, and a matter of  crucial significance in an era of 
globalization. 
Acclaimed as the most important contemporary American playwright, Tony Kushner first 
came to prominence during the early 1990s. His most praised work, Angels in America: A Gay 
Fantasia on National Themes, won many accolades, including the Pulitzer Prize, the Tony 
Award, the New York Drama Critics Circle Award for Best New Play, among others. Since then 
he has been embraced by the media, critics and academics, securing his position among 
America’s most iconic dramatists —Eugene O’Neill, Tennessee Williams, Arthur Miller, 
Edward Albee, etc. (Fisher: TKNE, 1).  
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The tension between ethical relations and political judgments informs Kushner’s plays, 
especially his acclaimed Angels in America.  Angels in America12 may be somewhat daunting for 
its audience, as the play confronts the viewer with images of feces and blood, with instances of 
betrayal, with numerous political rants, and with the strange arrival of the supposedly ethereal 
but incarnated angel. The play includes a broken rubber, a funeral, and a strong sense of disease 
and decay at the end of the twentieth century. The characters whirl about, amid different 
historical and political scenarios, experiencing great confusion and great desire.  These figures 
embody a conflict between the political and the ethical, a conflict born by a deep hunger— for 
sex, security, satisfaction, contentment, stability, revolution, for answers of questions not yet 
posed. The play offers a dyspepsia of viewpoints, of liberalism, Mormonism, Reaganism, 
McCarthyism, etc. The character Roy in this play spews invectives when Joe raises ethical 
questions about politics; Roy characterizes politics as follows:  
ROY.  Un-ethical. Are you trying to embarrass me in front of my friend? . . .    
This is…this is gastric juices churning, this is enzymes and acids,     
this is intestinal is what it is, bowel movement and blood-red meat— 
this stinks, this is politics, Joe, the game of being alive. And you  
think you’re…what? Above that? Above alive is what? Dead! In the  
clouds! You’re on earth, goddamnit! Plant a foot, stay a while.   
(I: 1228) 
Indeed, politics operates as the key term of the play. Through bodily suffering, coupled with 
rants about ideological politics, Kushner depicts an array of social and personal problems; the 
status quo experiences a hunger (expecting politics can solve everything), and the characters of 
                                                            
      12 Angels in America was “broadcast as an HBO-TV mini-series (premiering on December 7 and 14, 2003) over 
ten years after its Broadway production.” (Fujita 112; ed. James Fisher) 
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the play feel both dread and expectation. The play suggests that politics (from above) may prove 
insufficient, that person-to-person relations may offer the best hope for humanity, relations best 
described as the ethical. .  
Kushner: A Political Playwright    
The title of Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes demonstrates that 
the play concerns at least two central themes, as Steven F. Kruger points out: “it is an 
intervention in American politics that comes from a specified identity position and that depends 
somehow upon fantasy” (Qtd. in Geis 151). Regarding the identity issue, Kushner complicates 
the matter  by bringing in a variety of identity attributes/labels--sexual identity, racial identity, 
and gender identity, and so on. In the play we also witness how religion can play an important 
role in defining a person’s identity. Kruger suggests such a complicated portrayal of “identity” 
indicates that “Angels in America does not raise an identity position like gaynessas the sufficient 
basis for a political movement. We might indeed see the play as in part a response to criticism. . . 
of an identity politics that fails to recognize the multiple determinants of identity” (Qtd. in Geis 
153). 
Aiming to overthrow identity politics,13 that is, to investigate alliances not based 
exclusively on identity determinates, Kushner and the effect of his plays are often hard to 
categorize. Some label him a “gay dramatist,” while others, following literary critic Harold 
Bloom, claim him to be a “theological playwright.” Perhaps it is most suitable to name him a 
political dramatist, though to qualify the meaning of “politics.”  Clearly Kushner seeks a new 
politics, one that highlights humanitarian concerns, which includes matters that pertain to gender 
identity, religion, and so on. Literary critic James Fisher describes him as “one for whom gay 
                                                            
      13 Atshushi Fujita also argues that queer theory shatters the solidity of identity (Fisher TKNE: 124). David 
Savran notes: “Angels valorizes identity politics; it offers an anti-foundationalist critique of identity politics” (Bloom 
16). 
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rights is a central personal and political concern, and one for whom religion and questions of 
faith and spirit are critically important” (UTK: 2). While the term “politics” can cover a wide 
swath, ranging from “racial and gender identities, to social oppression, to an actual discussion of 
a political ideology” (Miyagawa 180), Kushner’s works touch upon all of these elements, and his 
dramatic outlook is expansive In this light, we see Kushner responding to one of the key critical 
issues of contemporary America, that is, how to forge a vision of inclusivity and tolerance, 
without appeal to traditional categories of belonging or ideological membership. 
 One finds a number of strands of thought and aesthetic postures in Kushner’s plays; on 
the one hand, his work exhibits outlooks that reflect back to other American dramatists, though 
his method also demonstrates less polemical elements. One of the core tensions in his plays 
concerns the relation between political program or policy (a politics from above) and the micro-
politics, or the person-to-person relations that usher up a kind of politics from below. 
Kushner’s works at times appear as a confluence of myriad voices, echoing the political 
playwrights of earlier times. He is often compared to Clifford Odets and Arthur Miller, 
“American dramatists with overtly liberal political sensibilities” (Fisher UTK: 4). Yet his writing 
also reflects the influence of European modernists, such as Henrik Ibsen, George Bernard Shaw, 
and above all, Bertolt Brecht, who inspired Kushner’s Marxist-inclined critiques (Fisher UTK: 4). 
In this regard, Kushner’s plays highlight the importance of history and the dialogism between 
present and past. The dilemmas of humanity, for Kushner, are situated in a material historical 
context, and the insights drawn from historical analysis illuminate human relations on the 
concrete, day-to-day level.  As many critics have noted, “his broad knowledge of history 
enriches the questions at the heart of his drama” (Fisher UTK: 8), and in this regard, Kushner’s 
plays are historical examinations, placing political struggles and the turmoil in the lives of his 
characters in a particular historical context.  
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Like Miller, Kushner is politically progressive, proffering voices “raised in opposition, 
calling for resistance, offering critical scrutiny and lamentation” (Kushner, “Kushner on Miller”). 
However, characters in his plays appear to be more pessimistic than those in Miller’s. If Miller’s 
oppositional voices stem from characters’ disillusionment with a political mythology, such as 
Willy Lowman’s disenchantment with the American dream, Kushner’s characters suffer from a 
bleaker kind of cynicism. In Angels the characters know that political slogans and pontifications 
are lies, but they have no way to stop those lies. They are burdened more than Willy in the sense 
that political manipulations are conducted on a more deliberate and irresistible level. 
However, like Miller, Kushner focuses on the influence of the “righteous” community. In 
Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, the supposed sinfulness of Salem women, and by extension that of 
John Proctor, triggers profound reactionary forces. The figures of religious and political authority 
seek to isolate and punish those perceived as deviant. In Angels, we also note a preoccupation 
with the deviance and sin, that is, the sinfulness of bodies—bodies inflicted with plague (AIDS) 
and sexual/racial identification.14 Without question Kushner follows in Miller’s footsteps, in that 
both draw attention to the coercive forces of a reactionary America.  And both are aware that 
politics and policies on the macro-level have profound influence on individual lives. 
While one can identity an affinity between Kushner and Miller, one that emphasizes 
broader social forces and the significance of ideology and governmental controls over 
expressions of difference, Kushner also demonstrates a kinship with an American dramatist not 
widely considered political, that is, Tennessee Williams, a writer more known for his lyrical 
realism than for any class critique or revolutionary posturing.  Certainly Williams’ sympathy 
with outsiders and the marginalized seem present in Kushner’s plays. Fisher emphasizes the 
                                                            
      14 Kushner decries the fact that the Reagan administration did not immediately react to the AIDS crisis. Similarly, 
Cohn refuses to admit himself as a homosexual infected with the HIV. 
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parallels between the two dramatists, writing:  “…[among other writers,] the emotionalism, 
humor, and lyric language of Kushner’s plays is most reminiscent of Williams, as are the 
phantasmagoric elements. . . ” (UTK: 7). Kushner’s likeness to Williams points to a care and 
concern for very specific, even eccentric characters, an attitude toward the figures in the plays 
that values a full, multidimensional inner life (as opposed to a style of characterization that 
utilizes broad strokes and allegorical aspects or functions). Moreover, both Williams and Kusher  
exhibit a fascination with the body, with sensual pleasure and bodily decay.  Both note the 
importance and value of a specific, situated humanity, regarding individuals as more than 
political ciphers at the mercy of an overarching system of hegemonic dominance.  
What one finds in Kushner’s writing, therefore, is a dualistic outlook.  His plays give 
indication of a broad frame, of grand historical frames and political narratives, of larger social 
forces and institutions ordering and coercing individual lives.  Yet his plays also give emphasis 
to the specific and the sensual, the fleeting and the ephemeral.  In some measure his plays 
operate both on the macro and the micro level.  While much criticism on Kushner has privileged 
the broader aspect of his writing, my argument focuses on the micro experiences of his 
characters.  For some Kushner is a rationalist, one who undertakes a dialectical critique of 
history, who thinks in terms of large-scale programmes.  This aspect, for the purposes of this 
chapter, will be characterized as the “political.” This outlook emphasizes systems and programs, 
with the view that change or progress operates systematically, that the dynamic that order daily 
lives and their possibilities work “from the top down.”  
This chapter on Kushner seeks to challenge those critics who highlight the rationalist, 
dialectical aspect of Kushner. Rather, I wish to give emphasis to the micro-engagements in 
Kushner’s plays and his fascination with the body (and rudimentary encounter with the Other).  
In short, I wish to identify this micro-level with the “ethical”—as opposed to the institutional and 
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systematic features of the “political.” And consequently my analysis will give attention to the 
way in which social change and progress may proceed or “work its way up” from the particular 
and the bodily to the systematic and the conceptual. 
This differentiation between ethics and politics is made explicit in the discourse 
surrounding jurisprudence. In its many metaphors and characterizations, the issues of law, 
legality, justice, and judgment invoke grand social narratives but also concern private and 
vulnerable ethical occasions, such as the limits of responsibility in relationships. One may 
consider that Kushner’s two plays each respectively sheds light on the political and the ethical. If 
Part I, Millennium Approaches reeks of ineffectual governance and decaying bodies (via 
disease), and demonstrates a dilemma in contemporary epistemology, how to understand the self 
in relation to the whole (and thereby gives emphasis to the ethical), Part II—Perestroika brings 
to positive light the discussion of how “theory” can propel human progression forward (and 
thereby function on the political level). That is to say, Kushner does not negate the necessity of a 
rationalist dialogism, but rather his work dramatizes the need for a more intimate interplay 
between rationality/politics and bodily pain/ethics. This outlook urges a reconciliation involving 
the term “justice,” between  its more traditional meaning pertaining to the collective and 
ideological level, and the  new possibilities that might come from an  interpersonal ethics. 
Claiming ethics as the first philosophy, French theorist Emmanuel Lévinas proposes an 
understanding of subjectivity in which the subject is generated from bodily sensibility and not 
rationality. This insight can help shed light on Kushner’s viewpoint in Angels; Lévinas’s thinking 
moreover can help explain a relation between the ethical and the political in which the particular 
and the private serve as the point of emanation for a subsequent, broader political construct. In 
this way, it is productive to bring Lévinas into conversation with Kushner.  If contemporary 
playwrights such as Kushner have found that conventional terms and frames of understanding 
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(including identity politics) have reached a sort of exhaustion in imagining new relationships for 
the 21st century, then their dramaturgical investigations may be considered explorations of limits 
and impasses (limits similar to those Lévinas confronted in his philosophy).  In this light, both 
the dramatist and the philosopher of ethics are working in common cause, attempting to 
articulate new understandings of relation and “being together,” in a world of difference and 
under the threat of domination.  
One of the prevailing features of Lévinas’s philosophy involves his critique of philosophy 
itself, especially the tradition of philosophy that has privileged reason and rationality. Lévinas, 
by contrast, gives value to the bodily, to the particular, and to the intuitive. Lévinas stands as a 
point of opposition to the view of Heidegger, especially as the later minimizes bodily presence 
and affect. Complaining that Heideggerean Dasein (that is, the totality of being) is never hungry 
(BPW, 134), Lévinas refutes this view and the handicapped and inferior status given to 
body/sensibility in traditional Western philosophy. In Heidegger’s Dasein it is the rational 
subject that renders all other beings tools that create and support its own existence; for Lévinas, 
the subject is a hungry subject whose needs issue from other beings and who need other beings 
to survive. By ignoring the bodily part, Dasein prioritizes rationality/consciousness and denies 
the idea that the Other initiates and contributes to an individual’s existence. Lévinas argues that 
such a perception traps the body in a historical view that only moves forward, and prioritizes a 
political dialogism that does not center on the human (but pivots on power).  
Indeed the tradition of Western philosophy demonstrates a preeminence of politics over 
ethics, which can be seen from the prioritization of Plato’s “reason/logos” on into the 
Enlightenment. In order to materialize his Republic, Plato imagines a harmonious order where 
politics can realize “the good” (that is, determined by the system and its legislation). Morality 
and ethics, that is, the local and the specific, must be contained in a political order led by 
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reasoned leaders enhancing and maintaining the fortress of logos. For him, politics and reason 
are the tools that assist and discipline the individual in order for the individual to attain any kind 
of moral supremacy. Structurally, it is a top-down effect, making interpersonal ethics one of the 
tiers (lower) that benefit from the political good. Following Plato, Aristotle also asserts a 
teleology that presupposes rationality as the purpose of humanity. The chief aim of ethical 
education therefore is to help humanity realize its maximum ability to reason, so as to move 
humanity away from its animality.  
During the seventeenth century, Hobbes gave further impetus to the privileging of the 
political, that is, to the overarching structure that coerces and controls. For Hobbes, ethics is 
considered in a political context. Hobbes’s proposal, that all humanity—via contractual consent-- 
should submit to those in power, grounds the Western political tradition. Continuing this 
trajectory, in the eighteenth century Kant contextualized ethics within a “reason-oriented” 
tradition. For him, ethics refers to “right” action that conforms to justifiable reasoning. 
Utilitarianism in the nineteenth century further links ethics to action in broad terms, to a 
consequentialist standard--therefore, actions that bring about a pleasant result are good/ethical 
actions.  
What links these ethical philosophies mentioned above is a shared valuation of subjectivity 
as rationally-defined.  This subjectivity can be projected on a personal level as well as on a 
collective (i.e., political) level. In such a view, specific choices and interpersonal encounters are 
regulated or evaluated according to a rationalist, meta-personal frame; it is the larger system that 
determines the “rightness” of any action.  This outlook gives ultimate authority to the frame, 
which precedes any particular individual.  It is against this tradition that Lévinas launches his 
ethical revolution, by proposing an ethics that has an originary—and consequently rippling-- 
effect. He does not agree that rationality (sanctioned by politics) is the only way to contest or 
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debilitate a totalitarian regime. For Lévinas, such an endeavor would only lead to violence, 
which cannot be considered a solution.  
By using Lévinas’s insights, this chapter aims to expose the interconnectedness between 
ethics/body and politics, and to thereby by explore Kushner’s alternative version of ethics. Wary 
of the tension between ethics and politics, Kushner appeals for a new outlook that modifies and 
challenges the modern epistemology of rationality.  Kushner seeks to enable love and its 
utterance of itself.15 He refutes the body as solely a site, as a cipher of power, activated and 
directed by simulating political apparitions. Instead of totally endorsing “the love of wisdom,” 
Kushner affirms the “wisdom of love,” that which identifies bodily politics as the starting point 
for any political and philosophical dialogism.  
This chapter presents two sections. The first will survey Lévinas’s ethical and political 
theory. It will explain the Lévinasian notion of how a subject is formed through bodily sensibility, 
which makes ethics not a virtue but the essence of subject- making. It will then move to a 
discussion of what justice and freedom mean when ethics is set as a priority, before anything else. 
What follows is a theoretical discussion addressing four points: 1) bodily sensibility and 
subjectivity; 2) proximity— the collective subjectivity of humanity; 3) Angels in America and 
Lévinasian politics (The Third); and 4) difficult freedom— the problems encountered when 
imagining ethics and politics through the role of the body. This component will eventually assert 
Lévinas’s ultimate affirmation--that the subject has a difficult freedom, stemming from a total 
subjugation before the Other. 
These second section of the chapter will use the aforementioned concepts to analyze Angels 
in some detail. While there are many and varied criticisms of Angels, this section will focus on 
                                                            
      15 Fisher states: “’Alfread Kazin writes of homosexuality that ’The love that dare not speak its name’ (in the 
nineteenth century) cannot, in the twentieth, shut up’ (Kazin 38), but the emergence of Williams, and those 
dramatists like Kushner following in his footsteps, prove there is much to say on a subject about which the stage was 
too long silent” (Fisher TKNE, 6). 
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Kushner’s historical outlook and his commitment to a rationalist understanding of politics. I wish 
to argue that a richer understanding of Kushner’s plays comes with an awareness of how his 
views on politics works in consort with his valuation of the private and the ethical. In this light, 
Kushner shares in Lévinas’s Judaic heritage, as one who offers a prophetic voice arising from the 
ethical encounter between Self and Other.  
Lévinas’s Understanding of Ethics and Politics: From Body to Ethics to Politics 
While it is generally assumed that Lévinas’s notion of ethics as the first philosophy stems 
from his experience in WWII (as he himself spent time in Nazi prison camps), some argue that it 
was the Cold War that led him to this outlook and conclusion. His ideas about nuclear war 
indeed stand as a good example of how he saw the need for a modern dialogue on politics and 
ethics. As each super-power gave prioritization to the enemy’s destruction during the Cold War 
era, a kind of world-order emerged that hinged on mutual threat. This era thus witnessed a 
politics forged by fear and paranoia, a competition over stockpiling weapons, and the constant 
threat of mutual genocide.  
Nina Tannenwald, a professor of international studies, points out that most Americans 
believed that the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was legitimate and 
necessary, as the means to end WWII, and that the deployment of the weapon evinced a kind of 
“justice” (5). This outlook then led to the arms race and the stockpiling of weapons. The 
rationale operated in this manner: if the killing of my enemy now implies the possibility of my 
own destruction (i.e., nuclear war; the destruction of the whole world), then “my enemy” can no 
longer be defined simply as an Other different from me, to be overcome or defeated. Because the 
killing of my enemy may also endanger my own life, my existence is tied into that of the Other. 
The traditional black-and-white issue of warfare—with the only alternatives being my victory or 
my enemy’s victory—became overshadowed by the development of a weapon of mass-
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destruction, complicating the nature of warfare and requiring reconsideration of the Self-Other 
relationship. 
It is under this circumstance (the appearance of a new and infinitely more destructive 
weaponry), where the ethical issue becomes exigent. Addressing this aspect of the Cold War, 
Professor J. Daryl Charles insists that the stockpiling of such weapons called for a reexamination 
of the “merits and moral substructure of armed conflict” (86-87). 16 In this form of ethical-
political conflict one can identify the generative core of Lévinas’s ethical theory, where the 
element of a fundamental ethical relationship precedes all social, cultural and political alliances 
or identifications. From here then, we can introduce Lévinasian notions of subjectivity, and how 
this subjectivity evokes a new humanity where justice is not simply a matter of relating to the 
Other; the Other is in fact the main reason I exist.  
Bodily Sensibility and Subjectivity 
Lévinas’s outlook demands that one reject much of what is understood as traditional 
philosophy. Lévinas believes that traditional Western philosophy has erred in two ways. First, it 
assumes that any manifestation of the “non-I” exists as an object solely for the Self’s interest. 
This assumption follows the claim that human consciousness is constructed through its own 
epistemological lens vis-à-vis the Other. Second, traditional philosophy has over-valued 
consciousness at the expense of the body. Lévinas defies this traditional priority of consciousness 
                                                            
      16 In his “Between Pacifism and Crusade: Justice and Neighbor Love in the Just-War Tradition,” Daryl J. 
Charles gives many examples of armed conflict and mass-destruction: the exile and enslavement of Coptic 
Christians in Sudan by Islamic fundamentalists; Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and genocidal treatment of its own 
people, notably the Kurdish sector of its population; the starvation of civilians in Somalia; the slaughter of between 
half a million and a million people in Rwanda; genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo; the need for massive humanitarian 
efforts in Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, and Afghanistan; the production of chemical and biological weapons in 
Libya and Iraq; drug trafficking on several continents; the breathtaking rise of maturing, international terrorism; and 
the Talibanization of Afghanistan, Pakistan, portions of central and southeast Asia, as well as northern and western 
Africa.  
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over bodily sensibility, which has too often been considered “inferior, handicapped, or primitive 
approximation of representation” (my emphasis; Peperzak TTO, 162). This privileging of 
representation over bodily sensibility asserts that one’s sensations are conditioned within one’s 
conscious cognizance. If inconsistency occurs, sensation must bow to conscious cognizance. 
Only after distinguishing the Self from the Other, according to traditional philosophy, can we 
have “correct” feelings toward the “non-I.” For instance, if conscious animals are defined as 
machines that do not have feelings, as Descartes asserts, a spontaneous sympathy aroused in the 
sight of animal slaughter is a false feeling, a feeling one should not have. 
Lévinas defies this notion of subjective formation; for him, the subject in fact stems from 
bodily sensation. He claims that the bodily needs to eat the Other precedes the distinctions 
between subjects and objects. So bodies are immersed within the environment/Other. The 
existent’s first encounter with Others is for its own nourishment: “Nourishment…is the 
transmutation of the Other into the same, which is in the essence of enjoyment” (TI, 111)—i.e., 
an energy that is Other becomes an essential construction of my strength, me. However, the pure 
sensational process, albeit enjoyable, conditions the un-free materiality of existents. Without the 
nourishment the Other offers to me, the concept of “Self” does not come to existence.  
The experience/exploration/exploitation of the Other, Lévinas further points out, brings the 
Self enjoyment. Enjoyment is a term Lévinas gives to all bodily sensations. Lévinas explains 
how subjectivity follows bodily enjoyment by noting: “[One] does not only exist one’s pain or 
one’s joy; one exists from pains and joys. Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself 
with its own activity” (TI, 111). 17  In other words, need comes from dependence upon the Other. 
                                                            
      17 Lévinas gives this example: “But if I eat my bread in order to labor and to live, I live from my labor and from 
my bread. Bread and labor do not, in the Pascalian sense, divert me from the bare fact of existence or occupy the 
emptiness of my time: enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my life—it embraces 
them” (Lévinas TI, 111). 
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Need is the primary movement of the Same/Self (TI, 116),18 and hunger registers the material 
needs and capability of being satisfied (TI, 117). Lévinas argues that “it is the relations with the 
Other, inscribed in the body as its elevation, that makes possible the transformation of enjoyment 
into consciousness and labor” (TI, 117).  
To sum up, Lévinas does not agree with the traditional notion that bodily sensation comes 
after epistemology. Having established a subjectivity based on sensibility instead of 
consciousness, Lévinas explains its ethical meanings: firstly, the Self encounters the Other before 
the completion of its own (rational) subjectivity. The Self’s encounter with the Other is 
enjoyable yet passive. As Lois Shawver points out: “…the egoism of enjoyment has the 
possibility of becoming ‘filled’ with sensations” (Shawver). Secondly, the Self-Other encounter 
is a sensational experience (with the Self being passive) and not a rational one. Sensations come 
to me from the outside in, while rationality is generated from the inside out, projecting onto 
objects that are other than the Self as a subject. Therefore the Self establishes a relationship (the 
ethical) with the Other before it constructs its own subjectivity, and before it can establish its 
own epistemological understanding of the environment. Hence by bringing bodily matters into 
subject formation Lévinas heralds the new philosophy that emphasizes ethics over knowledge.  
Proximity—Collected Subjectivity of Humanity 
If bodily sensation constitutes an individual subjectivity, what constitutes collective 
subjectivity, say, humanity? What connects all humans as a species? Imagine looking from an 
aircraft---what constitutes the overall characteristics of a city, say, “Baton-Rouge-ness” from a 
spatial or geographical perspective? The proximity of houses and farmlands that abut one 
                                                            
      18 The term Rosalyn Diprose coins “something under my skin” may well address this notion to a more abstract 
level of Self-Other relationship: “. . . something has made me think it is time to think again. Something has got 
under my skin. Something has disturbed me, made me think. . .” (my emphasis; 121). In other words, my existence 
does not generate the ideas, but instead, the ideas themselves are counted as my subjectivity. It is this experience 
that sets off a movement that extends my world beyond the intimate and familiar. 
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another tell of the rural character of the city. The view reveals a dominant principle behind what 
is represented in the spatial arrangement. 
What Lévinas would like to ask is, what force behind this rural scene ties the community 
together and makes up “Baton-Rouge-ness” or “humanity.” The term “proximity” is key. It 
suggests the ethical relationship among/between one another, and gives a clue to our 
understanding of humanity. For instance, what connects me and my neighbor, what I share with 
my neighbor, what connects my neighbor and his neighbor, and what my neighbor shares with 
his neighbor, and so on, forms an extension of the “humanity scene.” There is a force behind this 
cohering as each single unit goes toward making up a recognizable community. If my neighbor 
and I devour each other, the tie/order that connects us to the formation of this “humanity scene” 
breaks. Under this circumstance, there will be no extension of proximity “A-B-C-D-E---” but a 
phenomenon of “A eating B, or C eating A, hence C becomes A&B” sort of chaos. Hence there 
will be no recognizable “humanity.” 
Lévinas believes the dominant principles that make up the “humanity scene” is 
“responsibility” and “justice.” In Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, he points out: 
“Proximity, difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility. It is a response without a 
question, the immediacy of peace that is incumbent on me” (139). This assertion characterizes a 
passive subjectivity founded on the level of sensation. This responsibility for the Other then 
further carries to the level of justice—one that is not enforced by governmental institutions but 
personal ethics (again operating on the micro rather than the macro level):  
Its [proximity] absolute and proper meaning presupposes ‘humanity.’ One can 
even ask if contiguity itself would be comprehensible without proximity—
approach, neighborhood, contact—and if the homogeneity of this space would be 
conceivable without the human signification of justice before all difference, and 
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thus without all the motivations of proximity of which justice is the term.”                
(my emphasis; Levians OB, 81).  
Hence “proximity” is responsibility and justice (OB, 81)— the common denominator of 
humanity. 
Lévinasian Politics (The Third) 
This justice, founded on responsibility envisioned by Lévinas, is different from justice 
defined traditionally, which is largely delimited by institutional enforcement (i.e., politics). This 
traditional enforcement is carried out by the concept of the Same, thus implying that justice 
comes after rational consciousness instead of existing as an a priori of humanity. A justice 
founded on this basis of the Same is only a shell, or a vehicle for the display of power. It is a 
contested arena for vying powers to further gain dominance and to deflect real human needs, thus 
evoking dangers that annihilate any understanding of ethics that centers on the value of 
responsibility and community.  
It is perhaps helpful here to return to Kushner’s drama. Politics plays an important role in 
both Angels and Lévinas’s thinking. While Kushner is a political playwright, claiming “All 
theater is political…” (Blanchard),19 Lévinas, who proposes much on interpersonal relationships, 
nevertheless appears to be “useless” for political thinking,20 that is, Lévinas advances no kind of 
political programme or specific theories of governance. One of the most intriguing and 
controversial elements of Lévinas’s ethical theories pertains to how politics should be modified 
                                                            
19 “If you don't declare your politics, your politics are probably right-wing. I cannot be a playwright without having 
some temptation to let audiences know what I think when I read the newspaper in the morning. What I find is that 
the things that make you the most uncomfortable are the best things to write plays about” . 
20 “Gayatri Spivak—in her seminar at the School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell during the summer of 2004—
made much the same point: Lévinas's rejection of rhetoric, ethics, and politics, at least as we've understood them for 
two thousand years, and his development of a notion of ‘otherness’ seem to render his thought useless for political 
underlaboring in the world as we know it” (Bernard-Donals 63). 
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in the context of ethics. Instead of negating politics altogether, Lévinas rethinks and overhauls 
this traditional epistemology in a negative way: he realigns the order of politics and ethics. This 
negative operation makes him less a political thinker, but brings him into sympathy with 
Kushner, who situates (and criticizes) politics in the context of personal relationships, ethical 
responsibility and community. As the academic’s attempts to explore the correlation between 
ethics and politics intensified in and around the time of Lévinas’s death in 1995,21 some of 
Lévinas’s political concepts came further into scholarly conversation; such insights and 
terminologies can be helpful in exploring Angels in America. Lévinas’s concept of “The Third,” 
for example, helps one understand  the political problems of modern history and how  politics 
can be envisioned as a consequent that stems  from ethics. 
 For Lévinas, “The Third” becomes a kind of mediating device.  In short, this construct 
pertains to the unresolvable conflict that may appear between Self and Other. The Third refers to 
a third party beyond me and my neighbor. The unilateral responsibility I have toward the Other 
deviates when the third party comes into play. The Third can be a face I saw as I saw the Other, 
or someone who I do not encounter as I meet the Other. It carries anonymity in character to some 
degree, and demands justice. The third thus demands some kind of mediation or intercession 
between the Self and Other; it functions as a secondary application, following the rudimentary 
and fundamental Self-Other interplay.  It is an attempt to make infinite responsibility practical or 
material. While Lévinas envisions a justice based on ethics, there are theoretical and pragmatic 
problems. How can institutionalized justice (Law) judge ethics? In Lévinas’s terms, how can the 
finitude measure infinity?  
                                                            
21 “In the years just before and immediately following Lévinas's death in 1995, ethicists, philosophers, and political 
scientists tried to make sense of the political essays in the context of Lévinas's philosophical thought” (Bernard-
Donals 63). 
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Since the asymmetrical Self-Other relationship breaks (from infinity to finite), a political 
moment comes into being because the Self’s infinite responsibility toward the Other becomes 
delimited. William Simmons characterizes The Third as “a never-ending oscillation between 
ethics and politics” (83). Many doubt Lévinasian theories can ever reconcile ethical-political 
dynamics and wonder about the ultimate goal of this theory.22 However, it should be 
remembered that the ethical is always given priority for Lévinas, that is, the demand for 
responsibility of the Self toward the Other is never exhausted or terminated. Politics follows as a 
tentative and contingent attempt to translate the ethical demand into practical, material relations 
and institutional connections. 
For Lévinas, ethics is always singular. While my relation with the Other is an ethical issue, 
my relationship with The Third, because of its comparability, is an ontological issue. In other 
words, my relationship with The Third is not “infinite,” which ethically speaking is 
incomparable, and can be measured by Law. In Lévinas’s outlook, the ontological comparison 
(Law) makes justice practical and contingent, giving institutional organization to my ethical 
relationship with the Other.23  
                                                            
      22 Michael F. Bernard-Donals writes: “David Campbell, in 1993, noted the affinities between Lévinas's thought 
and that of Jacques Derrida and Simon Critchley, and spoke of the former's political thought as an attempt to 
‘reterritorialize the space [. . .] of responsibility, subjectivity, and ethics’ [Qtd. in Campbell and Shapiro 32] in 
Israel/Palestine. Michael Shapiro, writing in 1997, saw Lévinas as reading time ‘otherwise,’ arguing that the Israeli's 
understanding of national time is radically different from the displaced Palestinian's, thereby working against what 
he calls one of ‘Lévinas's more egregious blind spots,’ namely his failure to understand the rights of Israel's 
dispossessed. Working from a theological perspective, Adam Newton and Marie Baird tie together the philosophical, 
political, and talmudic writing by focusing on Lévinas's notion of the ‘other’ and the ‘neighbor,’ noting that what 
binds the three genres together for Lévinas is the sense that the neighbor and the other are not the same but quite 
distinct national/familial engagements, and that Israeli—and world—politics are vexed by the distinction” (62).  
23 In “Here I am: Illuminating and Delimiting Responsibility” (Lévinas, Law and Politics), Desmond Manderson 
points out that “the legal understanding of our relationship to others was undergoing a radical though poorly 
explicated re-evaluation…Proximity is the key word that connects Lévinas’ss explanation of the parameters of ethics 
to the High Court of Australia’s explanation of the parameters of the duty of care. . . proximity is an experience, 
emotional and bodily, and not an idea” (145-146). He then gives some real examples of the Court’s emphasis on 
proximity that is close to Lévinas’s ideas of infinite responsibility toward the Other. 
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To conclude, because Lévinas defines ethics other than ontologically, his understanding of 
the ethical relation does not conflict with Law/ institutionalized justice. As the idea of The Third 
breaks up Self’s unilateral relationship to the Other, it also opens up space for judgment and for 
the reevaluation of responsibility and justice, as professor Bettina Bergo points out.24 Modern 
politics, however, does not take the ethical aspect into account. It does not honor or begin with 
the primary ethical relation but rather works from the top down—political fiats thus determine 
and govern the micro ethical encounters of daily life. During the time of the Cold War, the 
imperative of containing or conquering the enemy functioned as The Third, the determining 
rationale and standard for evaluating specific ethical encounter.  The Third shifted to an inhuman 
force (the nuclear war). As mentioned earlier, the Cold War followed a politics based on the 
competitive stockpiling of weapons, which complicated the Self-Other distinction and 
relationship. Here, The Third did not denote a person and hence did not open up a space for 
judgment where responsibility could be reevaluated. In Les Imprevus de l’histoire, Lévinas 
writes: “The third partner here is not the third man. It does not assume human form, they are 
forces without faces. Strange return of the natural powers…” (TI, 161). This inhuman Third, 
instead of opening up spaces for judgment, became a parameter for the evocation of threat and 
fear of both my enemy and myself. In other words, fear gradually arose from the (performance of) 
stockpiling of weapons rather than from any real battles-- what warfare meant before. Instead of 
acting as a means for the reevaluation of justice and responsibility, the (inhuman) Third then 
opened up a space for power manipulation, ideological politics, etc. 
As the Cold War era faced an ethical challenge to maintain the delicate balance among 
international power relations, Lévinas’s affirmation of ethics as the First Philosophy became 
                                                            
24 “The image of the court is felicitous, for the tribunal weighs claims and can even ponder its own judgements. This 
space exists because of the Third party. Here questions of responsibility and justice may be evaluated” (Bergo 181). 
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very meaningful. In Lévinas’s 1934 essay, “Reflection on Hilterism,” human struggle is marked 
by a struggle of biological forces of race; while in his 1960 Esprit article, “Principles and Faces,” 
the human struggle is “overshadowed by the inhuman scale of the destructive forces released by 
nuclear energy” (Caygill 70). This shift marks Lévinas’s re-conceptualization of politics and 
highlights the influential role of The Third in mediating the primary ethical relationship. 
 As Lévinas saw human history being propelled not by any human order but by a complex of  
inhuman forces, he became focused on the  reduction of “human politics to an inhuman physics 
or cosmo-politics” (Caygill 71). 25 Human reason, wisdom and responsibility were abdicated, 
given over to an attempt to find a new balance of these implacable inhuman forces. In other 
words, politics was no longer based on humanity but instead shifted to the inhuman. This 
inhuman politics helps account for the emergence of a social order that centers on, among other 
things, ideologies and political correctness.  
Lévinas then began to think about a politics that went beyond ontology, a politics that 
bordered on the prophetic. This prophetic aspect aimed to create “a new set of thematic links 
encompassing infinity, externality, justice and the other” (Caygill 77). Hoping to disrupt the old 
totality, this kind of politics envisioned a seed of the prophetic voice, of ethics and responsibility 
for the Other, to be planted prior to every social order. 
Difficult Freedom 
   Because of the ethical responsibility one holds toward the Other, Lévinas’s notion of 
freedom is different from the modern definition or understanding of the term. The modern idea 
of freedom, a historical concept concatenated by philosophers ranging from Descartes, Spinoza, 
and Kant, to Hegel, Marx, and Sartre, is defined as a state of being opposed to destiny and 
                                                            
25 In the “Spirit of Geneva,” Lévinas describes such a shift in history: “For the first time social problems and the 
struggles between humans do not reveal the ultimate meaning of the real. . . Reason no longer appears in political 
wisdom, but in the historically unconditioned truths anonouncing cosmic dangers. For politics is substituted a 
cosmo-politics that is a physics” (Qtd. in Caygill 71).   
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determinism. Peperzak describes this freedom as thematized by the epic of modernity (TTO, 96), 
a state of being characterized by “selfhood, choice, and rational self-regulation” (TTO, 97). 
Lévinas does not negate the value of a modern freedom that breaks the fetters of social and 
cultural slavery. However, what he contends is that freedom per se cannot be the origin of 
subjectivity; freedom can only come as a consequence, something that instead must follow 
responsibility. Lévinas writes: “…even if you are free, you are not the absolute beginning. You 
come after many things and many people. You are not just free; you are also bound to others 
beyond your freedom. You are responsible for all. Your liberty is also fraternity” (NTR, 85). 
Within such a framework of ethics, prophetic politics is given prominence.  In this outlook 
one notes a big and overflowing Other and a small Self—carried out by the concept of infinity. 
Clearly such an outlook gives no easy answers or applications. Again, Lévinas cannot be made to 
espouse any partisan position. His work is emphatically non-polemic or doctrinaire in any 
particular political sense. In his 1976 lecture, “The Ethical Relationship as a Departure from 
Ontology,” Lévinas asks “whether a theory of social institutions and the state can be developed 
from the ethical categories of ‘proximity’, ‘hostage’ and ‘substitution’…and ‘what difference is 
there between institutions arising from a limitation of violence and those arising from a 
limitation of responsibility?’” (Qtd in Caygill, 129). Lévinas gives no simple response. These are 
questions that lead to his framework of prophetic politics—a politics that does not set out with 
the aim of freedom nor security. The goal of the political is not freedom but ethical responsibility. 
In summary, Lévinas’s ethical theory asserts a fundamental ethical state that stems from a 
subjectivity generated from bodily sensibility and a politics propelled by humanity (instead of 
inhuman force). A sensibility-oriented subjectivity admits the role the Other plays in the 
construction of its subjectivity, and endorses the roles justice and responsibility play in 
maintaining the continuity of humanity. Lévinas’s aspiration for a prophetic politics is shared by 
- 50 - 
 
Kushner and his own political inclination, which aims to illuminate, through employment of the 
Angel as a prophet, that which might lead humanity forward, to a better state of interpersonal and 
national relations.  Depicting the gap between ideological politics and bodily suffering, Angels in 
America presents the dynamics of ethics and politics, as well as the dialogue between (political) 
ideologies and bodily suffering. In his play one sees the injury and oppression that may come 
from ideological assertions, from the commitment to an intractable sense of rule and law.  
Kusher’s play gives attention to the fundamental experience of the bodily, and the intimate 
relations between particular selves groping to find meaningful and responsible relations. It is this 
tension between the particular and the transient (and its ethical dimension) and the broader 
structures of policy and governance (politics) that fuel the play and account for its unusual 
fascination and power. 
Angels in America 
COHN:  “…Love; that’s a trap, Responsibility; that’s a trap too. . .whatever  
      pulls on you, whatever needs from you, threatens you. Don’t be  
      afraid; people are so afraid; don’t be afraid to live in the raw wind,  
                              naked, alone. . . Let nothing stand your way.”   (Millennium, 1226) 
These words spoken by Roy Cohn in the play draw attention to the tension between the 
ethical and the political in Kushner’s work. Many critics have paid attention to the broader 
political implications of the play, finding in Kushner a sort of grand-thinking prophet who 
employs a dialectical kind of reason in considering the broad forces of history and human 
advancement. However, Cohn’s rejection of love and responsibility highlights the very power of 
these concepts, and in an ironic way points to the primacy of such in Kushner’s play—love and 
responsibility operating as a point of ethical contrast to the broader political critique.  
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It is known that Angels is inspired by German-Jewish critic Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on 
the Philosophy of History,” a work that cited  Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Nouvus to convey 
Benjamin’s  view on the movement of history: 
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where 
we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, 
and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it 
has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the 
pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.  
(Kushner in Worthen, 1212) 
 
The critical positions taken on Kushner’s view of historical movement, however, vary a 
great deal.  In “How Angels in America Reconstructs the Nation,” David Savran asserts that the 
work plays out a deep ambivalence “through a host of binary oppositions: heaven/hell, 
forgiveness/retribution, communitarianism/ individualism, spirit/ flesh … rationalism/ 
indeterminacy . . . progress, stasis” (Savran in Bloom 21). Nevertheless, Savran goes on to 
conclude that Kushner is different from Benjamin, and the ambivalence “…turns out to be not 
especially ambivalent after all” (Savran in Bloom 24), as 
 [m]eaning is produced, in part, because these oppositions are constructed as 
interlocking homologies, each an analogy for all the others. . . Binary oppositions are 
always hierarchical. . . Angels is carefully constructed so that communitarianism, 
rationalism, progress, and so forth, will be read as being preferable to their alternatives: 
individualism, indeterminacy, stasis, and so forth.” (24) 
 
In short, Savran wishes to see the play as an endorsement of rationalism and progress. Janelle 
Reinelt goes on to concur with Savran’s view in her article, “Notes on Angels in America as 
American Epic Theater” (Bloom 66).  
Other critics, however, challenge this outlook and take an alternate stance. In “Tony 
Kushner’s Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Charles McNulty notes that  
Benjamin’s vision… seems ultimately far less bleak than either Kushner’s or 
Savran’s wishful idealism. Bertole Brecht’s remark on ‘Theses on the Philosophy of 
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History’ seems peculiarly apt: “[I]n short the little treatise is clear and presents 
complex issues simply and it is frightening to think how few people there are who 
are prepared even to misunderstand such a piece.        (McNulty in Bloom 54) 
 
Progress for Benjamin, in short, was a “debased term primarily because it had become a 
dogmatic expectation” (McNulty in Bloom 54). Benilde Montgomery, in his “Angels in America 
as Medieval Mystery,” is more sympathetic to McNulty’s proposal. He reads Angels in America 
as a medieval cycle play and asserts that it may help “dispel Savran’s suspicion that Kushner is 
as much the victim of Enlightenment categories as are his political enemies” (Montgomery in 
Bloom 123). 
None of the above critical analyses, however, consider the role of body in the binary 
ambivalence that is ubiquitous throughout the play. While Montgomery does mention that 
Angels pivots on Prior Walter as the suffering body, just as Corpus Christi pivots on the suffering 
body of Christ, one finds that there is a positive and a negative role given to the body in 
Kushner’s  play.    
What one sees in these characters is an emphasis on the rational, on self-justifications that 
minimize the particular (and the bodily). Both Cohn and Louis exercise their consciousness 
independent from bodies—Cohn’s denial of his HIV infection, and Louis’ justification of 
abandoning his HIV/AIDS-afflicted lover. They believe their freedom exists independently from 
the body. Therefore, in Angels, these two characters articulate an assertion of “progress” that is 
conceptual (political in the broad sense) and that is bolstered largely at the expense of the body 
(particularly by denying the cumbersome, negative aspect that can accompany bodily matters). 
Consciousness is here encumbered by body, which, seen as standing in the way of progress, 
takes on the qualities of an obstacle. Louis cannot deal with the flesh and death (Millennium, 
1218). He abandons his grandma and Prior because he cannot “incorporate sickness into this 
sense of how things are supposed to go” (Millennium, 1217). Such is one view of progress in the 
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play, one that seeks to abstract, to affirm principles and maxims at the expense of the particular 
and the physical. Hence, as Savran asserts, Angels indeed cries out for change.  However, for 
Kushner, the understanding of change is not necessarily one that derives from the Enlightenment 
tradition, which, after all, does not exclusively define the only means to progress.  
In Angels, Kushner does not only depict the body negatively—conveyed through the 
attitudes of Cohn and Louis; he also affirms a positive expression of physical embodiment. 
Certainly such a positive outlook is conveyed by the deployment of Prior Walter, who gives 
voice to Kushner’s “prophetic politics.” While Cohn is determined to deny his infection, the 
disease, for Prior, functions as a catalyst of transformation and triggers his emergence as a kind 
of prophet. In a Lévinasian sense, the virus eats him, and his self passively reunites with the 
Other. Prior “exists from pains and joys” (TI, 111), and a new Prior spirals out of the imposition 
of his sickness. Furthermore, the fact that Prior is going blind not only brings new political 
meaning to the play but also coincides with a motif of vision and knowledge that operates in 
Lévinas’s works. In sum, such parallels and connections point to a profound sympathy between 
Lévinasian ethics and Kushner’s alternative political aspiration. 
 One key trope in Kushner’s play is blindness, a theme made concrete in the suffering and 
ordeal of Louis. The treatment of blindness in Kushner evinces ethical, and by extension, 
political implications. This element also helps one understand Kushner’s supposed rationalism 
(and commitment to any kind of historical dialectic) Louis’ blindness, in short, activates an 
ethical attitude and qualifies any notion of a grand political overhaul. 
  Lévinas points out that vision has traditionally been understood as the primordial means 
to distinguish the I/subject from the non-I/ object. Vision is associated with light, which 
functions as a marvel that make things appear. It “dominate[s] our contact with things” 
(Peperzak TTO,162), informing an epistemology that aims to grasp and comprehend the world. 
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In “Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Lévinas and Derrida,” Chloë 
Taylor reveals that Lévinas, along with Jacques Derrida, “frequently associates vision with an 
imposition of sameness on the other, and thus as violent in terms of the philosophy of 
differenc. . ..” Hence, Taylor argues that “blindness becomes a trope for Lévinasian ethicality”, a 
mode or status that functions in opposition to rationality and apprehendable objects of 
knowledge.   
Indeed, Lévinas’s concept of there is (“il y a” in French—his own characterization of Dasein) 
brings attention to the void/space contours that objects are set against. In Lévinasian thinking, the 
self must attempt to distinguish itself from the world that is—the fullness of the there is. The Self 
can only emerge in relation to the Other, but the Other exists beyond the reach of light or human 
comprehension. Its exteriority is opposed to the interiority of human knowledge that is 
constructed through vision—a fortress pivoting on human perception and epistemology.  If 
“light” is seen as a means for humankind to understand and grasp control over the world, 
Lévinas is asking people to stop “shedding light on” the Other. The Other, that cannot be 
illuminated through light, will only be taken as the Self’s apparition. We should instead consider 
a new ethics and relationship with “the darkness.”  In short, a truer kind of relation comes 
through blindness, one that avoids the imposition of authority and sameness that comes with a 
reliance on vision. 
This is why Prior has to go blind.26 We are not exactly sure whether Prior is losing his sight 
in the play or not, but certainly his going blind carries more metaphysical weight than literal 
meaning, especially considering the fact that losing sight is a common complication of the HIV 
                                                            
 26 Savran believes that Angels in America “deliberately evokes the long history of Western dramatic literature and 
positions itself as heir to the traditions of Sophocles, Shakespeare, Brecht, and others. Consider, for example, its use 
of the blindness/insight opposition and the way that Prior Walter is carefully constructed (like the blind 
Prelapsarianov) as a kind of Teiresias, ‘going blind, as prophets do.’” (Savran in Bloom 17). 
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infected.27 When he declares: “maybe I am a prophet. Not just me, all of us who are dying now. 
Maybe we’ve caught the virus of prophecy. Be still. Toil no more…I believe I’ve seen the end of 
things. And having seen, I’m going blind, as prophets do. It makes a certain sense to me” 
(Perestroika, 55-56), Prior is referring to those afflicted with the HIV pandemic as prophets. It is 
as if they are saying: “Stop all the vain toiling to ’see,’ but remain calm because a new era of 
darkness is coming. The darkness cannot be penetrated with vision/or knowledge, so stop using 
this old method (i.e., totalitarian politics) to approach the unknown Other/darkness. 
Human beings need not strive to know, but should peacefully and passively wait for the 
unknown darkness. The darkness, however, is not characterized by catastrophe, despair, or any 
sort of doomsday, but a “painful progress” through which those past suffering souls will 
resurrect to repair the fractured ozone layer (the eco- crisis). Totalitarian politics not only fails to 
act for justice, but it threatens to damage nature/Other. Ranen Omer-Sherman, professor of 
English and Jewish Studies, points out, “[in] ancient Judaism, the prophet is not so much a ‘seer’ 
(understood as one who merely predicts the future) but rather an often marginalized outsider who 
critiques society, sometimes anticipating disastrous consequences if society does not abandon its 
pursuit of certain practices”. So Allen Frantzen observes, Prior “moves ahead, not in spite of 
AIDS but rather because of AIDS. The ‘virus of time’ has jolted him out of torpor and Self-pity 
and eventually transforms him into the play's strongest character” (Qtd. in Omer-Sherman). This 
observations suggests that those who suffer from bodily pain (going blind) and secret deaths 
(AIDS) will become the incarnation of the prophets, leading humans to “[long] for what we’ve 
left behind, and dreaming ahead” (Perestroika,144). This walking backwards is a blind walk 
leading to Kushner’s ideal existence. 
                                                            
 27 Kestelyn and Cunningham, in “HIV/AIDS and blindness,” point out: “ocular complications are common, 
affecting 50% to 75% of all such patients at some point during the course of their illness” (208). 
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With the allusion to ancient Judaism, Lévinas and Kushner each point to an interesting 
confluence of suffering people and liberation that bring about a new ethics/justice. If Lévinas 
calls for an ethical relationship with the Other prior to the existence of the Self, Kushner goes 
further in order to extol this posture of “prior”—ethical meaning of community and 
responsibility prior to everything.28 All in all, the danger of a predominance of 
politics/power/theories (__ism)/rationality in Angels argues in keeping with the Lévinasian 
notion of “vision”: the grasping desire to control the world. Both Kushner and Lévinas challenge 
the historical dialogism in Hegeliean thinking that envisions the progress of history, but is 
susceptible to violence brought about by totalitarian politics (i.e., Facism). Whether Kushner 
appeals to a (backward) view of apocalyptic progression or, non-apocalyptical view altogether, 
the bringing together of politics and bodily sensation can function as a rooted focal point for the 
criticism of the (political) status quo. This outlook is shared by Lévinas, who holds that the 
domination of vision and touch is likely to eclipse the significance of ethical relations with 
exteriority.  
It is through the depiction of negative aspects of the body that Kushner exposes his 
dissatisfaction with politics and how it has hijacked ethics. In such a political/historical view, 
love and responsibility are dismissed, and personal relationships are reduced to political tactics. 
The asymmetrical relation between politics and ethics is best illuminated in Kushner’s 
characterization of Roy Cohn. In Perestroika, Cohn laments the passing of a politics that is tough 
but simple: “My generation, we had clarity. Unafraid to look deep into the miasma at the heart of 
the world, what a pit. . .the immutable heart of what we are that bleeds through whatever we 
                                                            
     28 Omer-Sherman: “There is a gravity in our relation to that Face and this gravity Lévinas calls responsibility or 
obligation, a reality in which we are always already obligated to the Other, prior to any action (or failure of action) 
we might perform.”  
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might become. All else is vanity” (82). The simple expansion of a Self, however irrational and 
brutal it might be, is for Cohn a means to bring about a sense of security, the ultimate element of 
desire in the post-war and Cold war era.  
Vile and reviled, Cohn embodies a Cold War political ideology enshrined in violence, 
which acts in the name of historical progress (Moyn 220), and whose top priority is to secure 
empowerment of the Self, to win the competition between it and the Other. This simplicity 
largely plays out in the play’s political dynamics as well as in Cohn’s personal character. It 
reinforces his power, thereby enhancing his brutality by eclipsing the complexities he fears may 
effeminate or weaken his commitment. Alluding to the actual historical figure, Roy M. Cohn,  
served as Senator Joseph McCarthy’s right-hand man., Kushner conflates 1950s McCarthyism 
and 1980s Reaganism in order to suggest a shared political orientation evident in the two 
historical eras. Both periods witness a threatening Other: McCarthyists’ witch hunts for 
communists and the Reagan Era stigmatization of the HIV epidemic. Under such political 
circumstances, the body and ethics are abdicated, if not abducted, from political significance. 
This miscast ratio between politics and ethics further drives human volition away from 
bodily concerns. Known as the gay bashing attorney, the real historical figure Roy M. Cohn was 
actually a closeted gay. In Millennium, however, he refutes his doctor Henry’s conclusion that he 
is infected with HIV: 
Your problem, Henry, is that you are hung up on words, on labels, that you believe they 
mean what they seem to mean. AIDS. Homosexual. Gay. Lesbian. You think these are 
names that tell you who someone sleeps with, but they don't tell you that....Like all 
labels they tell you one thing and one thing only: where does an individual so identified 
fit in the food chain, in the pecking order? Not ideology, or sexual taste, but something 
much simpler: clout. Not who I fuck or who fucks me, but who will pick up the phone 
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when I call, who owes me favors. This is what a label refers to. Now to someone who 
does not understand this, homosexual is what I am because I have sex with men. But 
really this is wrong. Homosexuals are not men who sleep with other men. Homosexuals 
are men who in fifteen years of trying cannot get a pissant antidiscrimination bill 
through City Council?  Homosexuals are men who know nobody and who nobody 
knows. Who have zero clout. Does this sound like me, Henry?  (Millennium, 1223) 
 In this statement, Cohn again desperately holds on to “something simple” for which his 
power-brokering ability is everything. Bodily matters—sexuality or diseases—are reduced or 
erased in the construction of identity. His emphasis on clout reflects his toil in the chiseling out 
his constructed identity from his bodily materiality. Hence, he is not a homosexual man, by his 
own definition, but a heterosexual man who fucks around with men. AIDS is what only 
“homosexuals” contract. What he has is liver cancer.  
Cohn’s over-emphasis on his power-brokering ability is reminiscent of the “neo-Hegelian 
positivist sense,” termed by Louis when he tries to explain away his betrayal.29 Through alluding 
to a totalitarian epistemology, Louis seeks to be unleashed from ethical conscience in his 
abandonment of Prior; he rationalizes his behavior through historical dialogism. Indeed both 
Cohn and Louis share the neo-Hegelian positivist sense, believing that volition decides human 
existence. They negate bodily matters in the name of either clout or freedom, registering a 
perspective of Western philosophy that has long informed the arena of the political.  In “Constant 
Historical Progress, and Angels in America--The new-Hegelian Positivist sense,” David Krasner 
                                                            
      29 Louis confesses to the Rabbi why he had to leave his HIV-infected lover: “Because he has to. Maybe because 
this person’s sense of the world, that it will change for the better with struggle, maybe a person who has this neo-
Hegelian positivist sense of constant historical progress towards happiness or perfection or something, who feels 
very powerful because he feels connected to these forces, moving uphill at all the time…maybe that person can’t, 
um, incorporate sickness into this sense of how things are supposed to go. Maybe vomit…and sores…and 
diseases…really frighten him…” (Millennium 1217). 
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examines Louis’s phrase “neo-Hegelian positivist sense” to illuminate Louis’ purpose in the play. 
His argument essentially centers on Louis, who largely shares with Cohn the demarcation 
between the “personal will to power” and bodies.30 Krasner claims Louis “represents liberal 
Enlightenment [values]. . . [and] ‘rationalizes’ his betrayal, a rationalism owing much to Hegel’s 
quintessential ideas of freedom” (TKNE 99).  He rebels against the material-given (Prior’s 
illness) and “progress towards spiritual contemplation—pure, abstract thought-devoid of 
responsibility to the material, flesh and blood…” (my emphasis; TKNE, 101).  
Drawing on  Kant and Hegel’s notions of freedom, emphasizing volition and striving to 
“make rational actions coincide with a universal (moral) law” (Krasner in Fisher 101), as pointed 
out by Krasner, Kushner illustrates how rationalist maxims lead to a universality of moral codes, 
thus echoing Lévinas in affirming the problematic complicity between politics and philosophy. 
Indeed, the struggle of two competing epistemologies is ubiquitous in the play. On the one hand, 
characters like Cohn, Louis and Joe, who emphasize enlightenment liberalism and democracy, 
are those who avoid, abjure, or dismiss bodily matters. They are also those practically or 
ideologically involved in politics and the law. On the other hand, those who, like Prior, Belize 
and Harper, are trapped in disease, sexuality issues or emotional hunger, are those who appear 
repressed vis-à-vis the rational side of the binary oppositions (i.e., heaven/hell, 
forgiveness/retribution, communitarianism/ individualism, spirit/ flesh, progress/ stasis, etc.) to 
varying degrees. They are also people who explore alternative politics and historical views.  
                                                            
      30 Analysis and representation of Louis varies a great deal. Krasner points out that Mike Nichols’ HBO 
production expunges the line and the paragraph, “reducing the betrayal to an unspecified act of selfishness.” Martin 
Harries and Art Borreca compare Louis and Prior with secular liberalism and a seer. Others, like Borreca think Louis 
rationalizes his betrayal to establish himself as the “dialectical opposite to Prior as prophet”, and further gets to the 
philosophical point that Krasner elaborates on: “[Louis is] a liberal rationalist who subscribes to the myth of a 
progressive, enlightened America but whose interpretation of these ideals is as misplaced as his abandonment of 
Prior is cowardly” (99).  
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Harper and Joe are good examples for illustrating these competing epistemologies. A protégé 
of Cohn, Joe inherits Cohn’s progressive perspective. He simulates a morally good person but 
avoids talking about “bodily matters,” which seriously afflict Harper. Harper, on the other hand, 
is depicted as a valium addict who worries about the ozone hole and dreams of traveling to 
Antarctica. Both Savran and Meisner consider Kushner’s description of Harper a negative image 
of women. Savran points out: “Harper may be crucial to the plays’ structure but she is still 
pathologized, like so many of her antecedents on the American stage. . . With her hallucinations 
and ‘emotional problems’, she functions as a scapegoat for Joe, the displacement of his sexual 
problems.” (Savran 24-25). In her “Messing with the Idyllic: The Performance of Femininity in 
Kushner's Angels in America,” Meisner also shares this view of Harper as supplemental 
character to Joe:  
“Harper's appearance as a sexually thwarted and politically detached female figure 
constructs Joe's emergence, by contrast, as all the more reasonable, brave, and lively. 
The character of Harper could be simply a foil and yet she represents a certain troubling 
female corporeal presence: A "messy" reminder/remainder that problematizes the plays 
for audiences, critics, and even for the playwright himself” (178). 
 
 While both critics seem correct in their analysis of the characterization of Harper, 
attention needs to be drawn to the content of Harper’s “hallucination”—mainly her worries over 
eco issues, her desire to travel, etc.  
HARPER.  I’m going to like this place. It’s my own National Geographic  
          Special!. . . I think I felt her kicking. Maybe I’ll give birth to a baby  
          covered with thick white fur, and that way she won’t be cold. My breasts  
                                  will be full of hot cocoa so she doesn’t get chilly. And if it gets really cold,  
          she’ll have a pouch I can crawl into. Like a marsupial. We’ll mend together.   
                                 That’s what we’ll do; we’ll mend. (Millennium, 1237) 
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Her desire plays out in a geographical dimension; her longing for sex and a baby (production), as 
well as her being a nurturing figure, all work together to abstract her into a motherly (earth) 
presence that is appropriated (scapegoated, in Savran’s words) and ignored. In other words, she 
functions as the mythos that is reduced to the dimension of logos. This status in the play, 
however, need not carry negative connotations. 
Savran also considers Harper’s desire to have babies an aspect of the hysterical darkness of 
femininity authenticated by traditional patriarchal discourse. This reading coincides with Hegel’s 
emphasis on volition, reinforcing the Self/Other binary and affirming a higher position for the 
Self. While Savran has some examples to support this view, his reading appears to be rather 
literal and limited. For example, Savran reasons that Harper’s emotional turmoil, and subsequent 
desire to have babies, is hysterical (Savran in Bloom 25). That observation does not exhaust 
Harper’s meaning or function. 
What Harper says should not be dismissed and judged by the form in which it is presented 
(i.e., hallucination). The form is deemed derogative because of its content, which does not fit into 
the dominant discourse. It is seen as something distorted and disabled. It is indeed, as discussed 
in Savran’s discussion of the binary pair, hierarchical, and Harper is indeed on the repressed side. 
However, Kushner does not champion Joe. Instead he has Harper leave Joe, crushing Joe’s 
sanctimony and selfishness.31 In this sense, Harper too has a prophetic dimension. 
Savran also reasons that Hannah, while depicted as a strong moral character, remains a 
caretaker, an attribute that belongs to women (Savran in Bloom 25). While it is true in practical 
reference, she is also depicted as mending the crisis experienced by Joe and Louis, who represent 
the binary of reason and Self-will. As Belize is also a caretaker, it is arbitrary to reduce Hannah’s 
                                                            
 31 Harper slaps Joe: “Does that hurt? Remember that.” (Perestroika,142) Such action thus indicates that Kushner 
wants the Self to treat the Other with respect, instead of as an object. 
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role to a traditional feminine category. Instead, both Belize and Hannah’s gracious devotion to 
Others seems to carry out Kushner’s ideas of ethics. It also echoes Harper’s declaration:  “We’ll 
mend together. That’s what we’ll do; we’ll mend” (Millennium, 1237). Harper here speaks to a 
problematic politics that has over-valued the ego and dominance.   
If we take the issue further, using the lens of “mythos vs. logos” (this will be discussed in 
Chapter IV), the issues the couple are tackling respectively seem to dovetail into the binary 
embodied in gender contexts. Joe and Harper’s conversation/ ideologies, and their bodies alike, 
never go together. The woman/mythos always appears in a ghastly presence made to appear as 
nonsense in the structure of logos. 
JOE. Wait. For the good. Change for the good. America has rediscovered     
         itself. Its sacred position among nations. . . The truth restored. Law    
         restored. That’s what President Reagan’s done. Harper. Harper. He   
         says: “Truth exists and can be spoken proudly.”. . . we become better.  
         More good. . .  
      HARPER.  But it still seems that way. More now than before. They say the  
                                    ozone layer is. . .  (Millennium, 1218) 
From the perspective of progressive history, any worry about the ozone layer, especially in 
the context of Joe’s possible promotion to the White House, appears impractical. On the other 
hand, a philosophy that tries, through whatever means necessary, to reject material (body) origin, 
which can be unproductive and lead to the discontinuation of the human species, is not 
unproblematic either. Harper’s suffering from sexual hunger and her desire to have children, then, 
discloses relevant metaphorical meanings in this context. So it appears that characterizing Harper 
as a pathological figure actually plays out and fulfills the historical dialogism wherein the Other 
is violently subsumed into the realm of the Self. Her concern about a peaceful order, a healthy 
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eco system, and continuation of humanity is dismissed and derided as a hallucinatory mythos. 
Such characterization reinforces the negligence of bodily matters in traditional Western 
philosophy, and criticizes the enlightenment perspective, where violence is inherited, and 
threatens to hinder the production and continuation of humanity. 
If Millennium portrays Cohn as the embodiment of political clout, Perestroika witnesses the 
recession of that totalitarian politics illuminated by his disease. In other words, through the 
characterization of Cohn, Kushner chronicles his diseased politics staging “a game of being 
alive” (1228), one that hijacks ethics and justice, the a priori that makes up humanity. While law 
concretizes the abstract tie of proximity, what Cohn does, in “breaking the law” and “playing the 
game of being alive,” is to tear apart the old definition of humanity by cutting the bonds that link 
humans in the shared category of humanity. That is, totalitarian politics, as Cohn writ large, 
promises and points to the undoing of humanity. After all, bodies are the bridges connecting the 
Self to the Other. Spatially, they create a proximity that makes humanity discernible. A negation 
of the body (i.e., body/ethics) then leads to the annihilation and dissolution of humanity. In light 
of this, Prior’s sexual encounter with the Angel symbolizes that an alternative politics— the 
prophetic historic movement—may be generated from a primarily bodily enjoyment. 
This vision substantiates Lévinas’s notion that the meaning of Selfness stems from bodily 
enjoyment. It is a hunger that an existent has for the Other. This desire makes the existent eat the 
Other, and construct a Selfness of which Others are a part. This desire/hunger brings an 
unavoidable ethical relationship between Self and the Other (through materiality), and 
determines the Self as materially and essentially un-free.  
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While Savran also argues, “Without desire (for change, utopia, the Other), there could be no 
history” (Savran 23),32 his notion of desire presupposes a complete subjectivity. This view is 
tantamount to the traditional Western epistemology, focusing on the Self’s attempt to subjugate 
the Other, bringing it into its own fortress. Therefore, Savaran’s notion of desire is essentially 
different from Lévinas’s definition of that term. The two notions then represent two drastically 
different epistemologies and definitions of freedom. The freedom Louis rambles on about 
throughout the whole play is, according to Lévinas’s thinking, a freedom that can be pursued but 
is not the origin of human beings. Because the Self is constituted by many Others, its liberty lies 
in its inextricable tie to the communal. So only through the realization of fraternity can the 
existent identify Self-ness. Or, put it in another way, selfhood needs to be reconstructed through 
re-conceiving personal responsibility in terms of community (Others). Since Lévinas’s political 
ideal lies, to some degree, in anticipating the embedding of ethical DNA within subjectivity, this 
approach to redefining subjectivity and bringing transcendence to a communal level, is namely a 
new vision of politics. The practice of any broader political programme must acknowledge the 
ethical, relational imperative at its core. 
Angels shares this Lévinasian view by envisioning a politics informed by ethics. Presenting 
Roy Cohn as an evil character drives this point home. As a powerful political figure, Cohn 
dismisses love and responsibility, even on his deathbed, pushing his protégé Joe to “live in the 
raw wind, naked, alone” (Millennium, 1226).  Cohn prioritizes his political identity over his 
sexual identity in light of power. For him, politics are a game of survival, and ethics is an 
encumbrance, if not a hindrance, to winning that game.  
                                                            
      32  The full quotation goes as: “…the time of ‘progress, migration, motion’ and ‘modernity’ is also, in Prior’s 
formulation, the time of ‘desire,’ because it is this last all-too-human characteristic that produces modernity. 
Without desire (for change, utopia, the Other), there could be no history” (Savran in Bloom 23). 
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Bodily matters also act as the locus of an imposed political force. In short, the power of 
politics trickles down into the personal, ethical realm, inscribing a totalitarian moral and code-
system on bodies. In “Cold War Science and the Body Politic: An Immuno/Virological 
Approach to Angels in America,” Daryl Ogden explores this relationship between politics and 
body politics. He discovers that the early Cold War era also witnessed the formation of the 
medical sciences of immunology and virology, “sciences that would wield inordinate power 
during 1980s in the race to inscribe culturally dominant metaphors on AIDS and homosexual 
sexual practices” (243). Frank Fenner and Frank McFarlane Burnet defined immunology as a 
theory of  how the body’s immunological apparatus distinguished “self” from “nonself” (245) in 
194933; they also adopted “a rhetoric that nearly jumps off the page if read within the terms of 
anti-communist, anti-homosexual political discourses of the post-World War II era” (245)34. The 
history of immunology and virology, as Ogden illustrates in medical discourses and sexuality, 
helped extend a Cold War consciousness to wider institutions of 1950s. One sees how the 
political shaped policy and how political ideology clamped down on “bodily matters.” 
On the other hand, Kushner refutes having ethics dominated by political forces. In “Queer 
Politics to Fabulous: Politics in Angels in America: Pinklisting and Forgiving Roy Cohn,” 
Atsushi Fujita points out that Kushner risks misrepresenting his political message by depicting 
                                                            
33 In 1949 Frank Fenner and Frank McFarlane Burnet published important The Production of Antibodies, which 
helped to lead immunology achieve a theoretical breakthrough commensurate with those already realized by 
virology.  
34 It is read as follows: 1. The basis of our account is the recognition that the same system of cells is concerned both 
in the disposal of effete body cells (without antibody response) and of foreign organic material (with antibody 
response).  2. In order to allow this differentiation of function expendable body cells carry "self-marker" 
components which allow "recognition" of their "self" character.  
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Cohn as evil, which may lead to the impression that Cohn, as a homosexual, is evilness itself. 
Why is that Kushner shows not hate but instead forgives Cohn?35 Fujita argues that Kushner  
“…focuses on aspects of Cohn beyond the [homosexual] stereotypes and questions the 
homophobic discourses that strengthen those stereotypes. . . Because of the prevailing 
view against homosexuality in society, Cohn’s homosexuality and political persona, 
morals, and actions are connected expediently, though these elements should be 
regarded as incidental.”    (TKNE, 120)  
 
By drastically distinguishing the political and the sexual (i.e., bodily) identity, Kushner adds 
sympathetic elements to Cohn’s characterization. Fujita reasons that “Roy Cohn’s sheet of the 
famous AIDS Quilt which commemorates AIDS victims, calls him not only a bully and a coward, 
but also a victim” (TKNE, 120). In other words, through separating Cohn the evil political figure 
from Cohn the repressed homosexual (bodily matters, a forgivable attribute), Kushner forgives 
Cohn.  
This separation of political identity and bodily identity sheds light on Kushner’s vision of an 
ethics that does not pivot on politics—an ethic that brings people back to the elemental 
interaction between concrete bodies. Ethics is not about how a unified power deals with an 
abstract mass (indistinct faces), but how individuals are responsible for other persons. Through 
the lens of politics, Kushner may decry Cohn the attorney, but through the lens of bodily matters 
Kushner empathizes with him (being a repressed homosexual). It is the body that creates a bridge 
between the two human beings and constructs the ethical relationship. Through pardoning Cohn, 
Kushner demonstrates that ethics and morality should be freed from political imposition.  
Louis’ journey from callous traitor to a penitent can be seen as the most explicit textual 
evidence of Kushner’s call for a kind of politics that issues from and honors the ethical. While 
Louis leaves Prior, invoking as justification the “neo-Hegelian positivist sense of constant 
                                                            
35 Fujita’s answer to his interesting question: “Kushner, as a gay and as a Jew, should hate Roy who persecuted gay 
people and Jews in the McCarthy era” (TKNE, 118). 
- 67 - 
 
historical progress towards happiness or perfection” (Millennium, 1217), he does not really gain 
the freedom he seeks; being a heartbreaker brings no liberation. He suffers from self-pity, and 
wanders from strange body to strange body (having sex) in the hope of appeasing his sense of 
guilt. Later he confronts Joe with the famous phrase, “Have you no decency, sir? At long last? 
Have you no sense of decency?”36, and needles him with the many juridical cases Cohn has 
tampered with. It is not until then that he becomes aware of how neo-Hegeliean freedom can be 
masked or twisted by nasty political games, at the expense of justice. As the protégé of Cohn, Joe 
is the best product of this kind of distortion, and Louis then learns that love and responsibility 
proceed neo-Hegeliean freedom. 
 The vision of a politics based on the prioritization of ethics (love and responsibility) is 
asserted by the end of the play. Those stronger/oppressive characters, Cohn, Louis, and Joe, 
repent or die out, and the world is then led by those who suffered but learned to care for the 
Other. At the end of the play, Prior, Louis, Belize and Hannah sit around the Bethesda Fountain 
talking about what role those “big ideas,” i.e., politics, theories or philosophy, should play in the 
making of the world.  
LOUIS.  It’s all too much to be encompassed by a single theory now. 
BELIZE.  The world is faster than the mind.  
LOUIS.  That’s what politics is. The world moving ahead. And only in  
                politics does the miraculous occur. 
BELIZE.  But that’s a theory. 
HANNAH.  You need an idea of the world to go out into the world.     
                                                            
36 This famous statement is uttered in 1954 by Joseph Welch to Senator Joseph McCarthy, “who’d already spent 
years ruining careers and lives with less than sincere (and far less than accurate) accusations of anti-Americanism.” 
This statement “precipitated the downfall of a legendary bully” (Handler). 
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                     But it’s the going into that makes the idea. . . 
. . . 
LOUIS.  As my grandma said, go know.           (Perestroika, 146-47) 
While Louis still anticipates that politics will bring “the miraculous,” he agrees that politics 
cannot be the imperative that drives people’s actions/ethics. It is through living, groping and 
loving that the new theory will come into existence. Such a new politics is envisioned through 
Bethesda the Angel, who heals and blesses those who suffer mentally or physically.  
Kushner’s conclusion echoes the outlook of Lévinas, how the project of DNA 
transplantation of human subjectivity may engender a shift from rationality to ethics: “. . . 
disengage the subjectivity of the subject from reflections on truth, time and being in the 
amphibology of being and entities which is borne by the said’ and then to present it ‘in saying, as 
a sensibility from the first animated by responsibilities’” (Lévinas OB, 19). Caygill explains that 
such “. . . exposition thus disengages the subject from the categories of quality (‘the said’) 
characteristic of ontology—truth, time and being—in order to present it in terms of the modal 
categories (‘the saying’) of ethics—proximity, responsibility and substitution” (133). Through 
the depiction of Louis’ repentance, Kushner provokes us to think on many issues--why we 
should care for Others, and to what degree does our responsibility for Others extend. Such 
questions Lévinas answers with one passage from the Bible: 
“. . . God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, ‘Abraham’:  
and he said, ‘Behold, here I am.’ . . . And Isaac spake unto  
Abraham his father, and said, ‘My father,’ and he said, ‘here  
am I, my son.’ . . . And the angel of the Lord called unto him  
out of heaven, and said, ‘Abraham! Abraham!’ and he said,  
‘Here am I.’                                   (Qtd. in Manderson 145) 
 
The phrase, “Here I am,” registers and implies an ethical responsibility that cannot be 
codified. It is a call from Others that one cannot deny but must obey. Upon the night Louis 
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leaves Prior, their conversation reflects their different attitudes toward how one should measure 
and weigh responsibility. 
PRIOR.  Apartment too small for three? . . . not Louis and Prior and  
      Prior’s disease? 
LOUIS.  Something like that. I won’t be judged by you. This isn’t a  
                crime, just—the inevitable consequence of people who run    
                out of—whose limitations… 
PRIOR.  Bang bang bang. The court will come to order. 
LOUIS.  I mean let’s talk practicalities, schedules; I’ll come over if  
               you want. . .  
PRIOR.  Has the jury reach the verdict? 
LOUIS.  I’m doing the best I can. 
               PRIOR.  Pathetic. Who cares?                     (my emphasis; Millennium, 1231) 
While Louis speaks about the relationship in terms of codified law and judgment, so-called 
practicality, Prior envisions an upcoming ethical “law,” the bond that ties humans together and 
makes humanity a recognizable term. Prior’s notion of ethical law becomes recognizable when 
Louis finds  out that Joe, as Cohn’s acolyte, has been complicit with an epistemology that 
prosecutes “justice” itself. 
In his article “Here I am: Illuminating and Delimiting Responsibility,” Desmond Manderson 
argues that Lévinas’s notion of proximity should be acknowledged and brought into 
jurisprudential practice because “we simply cannot characterize law as the application of ‘rules’” 
(Manderson 147). Kushner makes explicit that, while traditional epistemological discourse views 
morals legalistically, as codes to be asserted and followed,  “what it is to be responsible and 
what it is to judge—are in fact integrally connected,” as Manderson puts it (my emphasis; 146). 
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The intricacies of what it means to be responsible and what it is to judge thus indicate a difficult 
freedom, one that, distinguished from Louis’ previous understanding of that term, recognizes the 
entangled but inseparable relationship between Self and the Other.  
LOUIS.  I want to come back to you. . . I really failed you. But . . . this is   
               hard. Failing in love isn’t the same as not loving. It doesn’t let you   
               off the hook, it doesn’t mean. . . you’re free to not love.   (Perestroika, 14)         
This practice lies in the prioritization of ethics, which Lévinas terms as the First Philosophy, a 
relationship that initiates meanings not from sense but from sensibility. Hence at the end of 
Perestroika, Louis makes “visible scars” (cuts and bruises) for expiation. To cure this diseased 
epistemology that is associated with vision, the prophet (Prior) goes blind to adumbrate a new 
kind of progress. 
 PRIOR.   …I…my eyes. Aren’t any better. (Squints even harder) AZT? . . .  
LOUIS.  These pills, they. . . they make you better. 
PRIOR.  They’re poison, they make you anemic. This is my life, from now  
                on, Louis. I’m not getting “better”.   (Perestroika, 141)  
 This new kind of progress does not envision a future that is getting better and better; 
rather, it first seeks the mending and curing of the suffering souls and depleted 
environment/nature as they currently exist. Such a moment witnesses “the end of the Cold War,” 
and, as Harper murmurs, reveals “a kind of painful progress”: “Longing for what we’ve left 
behind, and dreaming ahead” (Perestroika, 144). 
In conclusion, through the dialogism between bodily sensation and totalitarian politics, 
Kushner not only points out many social issues centering around identity politics but indicates a 
new (prophetic) politics that prioritizes the ethical relationship. Identity politics essentializes and 
highlights a person’s racial/sexual/religious/gender attributes and reduces individual uniqueness 
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before a political dynamic and understanding. In such a structure, where the (essentialized) Self 
denies and persecutes the Other, and where ethics comes only after politics, “clout” becomes the 
only thing that matters. As a person with clout, Cohn can deny those attributes he considers as 
weak, such as his sexuality and his disease (at the expense of his sympathy toward and empathy 
with the Others). In short, the pursuit of clout, or pragmatic power, edges out his humanity. This 
influence of politics on a personal level also reflects wider societal developments, such as  
medical discourse, which empowers some and marginalizes Others. In sum, Prior’s blindness not 
only signals an overthrown of this traditional epistemology (that hinges on the Same) but also 
“envisions” a kind of liberation, a prophetic politics enrooted in the ethical relationship. 
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Chapter Three: 
Human Relations and the Face of the Other in the Plays of Edward Albee 
 
“Did your food have a face?” a poster from the People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals asks (PETA poster). This provocative statement invites consideration of how a bloody 
carcass is transformed into a delicacy: how cows become beef and pigs pork. This line of 
thinking, given the industrialization of our food supply, further challenges one to reflect upon the 
way yards and barns are turned into “animal factories.” Natural habitats are replaced with a 
mechanized world: of assembly lines, conveyer belts, and fluorescent lights witnessing the birth 
and death of “poultry” (John Robbins 53). Likewise, we can ask, “Did your weapons have a 
face?” in the case of China’s panda diplomacy (Liu), and “Did your accessories have a face?” in 
regard to some fashion-conscious socialite’s collection of designer pets (“PETA slams Paris 
Hilton”). In all these cases, animals are reduced to “uses” of human needs, interests, and tastes, 
and whether they might suffer in these assigned roles is not taken into serious consideration. 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida marvels at the capacity of the word “animal” to 
accommodate the myriad interests of human beings. This word suggests a human hubris that 
informs a logocentric epistemology.  Derrida writes: 
Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give […] at the 
same time according themselves, reserving for them, for humans, the right to the 
word, the name, the verb, the attribute, to a language or words, in short to the very 
things that the others in question would be deprived of, those that are corralled 
within the grand territory of the beasts: the Animals.  
                                                   (Qtd. in Chaudhuri “(De)Facing the Animals,” 10)  
 
The deployment of the animal for human ends reflects an assumed superiority on the part of the 
human. English and drama professor Una Chaudhuri reminds us of a surprising fact, that over 
ninety-eight percent of animals— including animals for food and pets alike—are bred for human 
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use. She further points out, rather poignantly, the self-deception experienced by the human self: 
“not only does it tell us that we eat animals much more than we do anything else with them; it 
should also help us to recognize that the self-identification as animal lovers that we perform 
every day in our homes (and on Sundays when we drag the kids around the zoo) is part of a 
paper-thin but rock-hard veneer on an animalculture of staggering violence and exploitation” 
(“(De)Facing the Animals” 10). 
 Beyond the inherent violence of our current regard for animals, our attitudes toward 
consumption and life-style point to broader global problems.  A meat-orientated diet is 
contributing to eco crises, such as global crop shortages (Bradsher) and emissions of CO2. In 
Diet for a New America, John Robbins points out the destructive implications of these practices:  
“It is hard to grasp how immensely wasteful is a meat-oriented diet-style. By cycling our grain 
through livestock, we end up with only 10% as many calories available to feed human mouths as 
would be available if we ate the grain directly. . . we lose over 90 percent of the protein we 
invest as feed in our livestock. . . lose 78 percent of our protein investment. . . lose 88 percent of 
the protein we feed pigs, and 83 percent of our protein investment in poultry” (351). 37    
 Such data highlights humankind’s often callous and illogical use of the natural 
environment. However, our current attitudes and practices reflect a long geneaology of 
subordinating nature to human demands. The imbalanced relationship between humans and the 
environment owes much of its formation to the transformative seventeenth century, the so-called 
“scientific revolution, or the more restricted Newtonian revolution, that took place in the hundred 
years or so between about 1650 and 1750” (Cook 327). This was a time when rational 
                                                            
37 Robbins is “[the] only son of the founder of the Baskin-Robbins ice cream empire, John Robbins was groomed to 
follow in his father's footsteps, but chose to walk away from Baskin-Robbins and the immense wealth it represented 
to ‘...pursue the deeper American Dream...the dream of a society at peace with its conscience because it respects and 
lives in harmony with all life forms. A dream of a society that is truly healthy, practicing a wise and compassionate 
stewardship of a balanced ecosystem.’” (“About John Robbins”)  
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knowledge gained increased stature and importance, thanks to a social environment that 
developed a strict method for assembling, organizing, and interpreting natural phenomenon 
(beyond the reach of our senses).  
 Perhaps the most influential and emblematic figure of this milieu was Sir Francis Bacon, 
who ordered different forms of knowledge and advocated for a reliable scientific method. His 
life and work helped influence and shape this period, where a multi-dialogism of science (natural 
philosophy), technology (the mechanical arts), and commercial capitalism, along with religion, 
formed a potential new mode of knowledge in the service of humankind.38 Bacon’s impact and 
methods were highly important in articulating a relationship between the human and the natural 
environment, one which gave great value to “use” and “control.”  As Carolyn Merchant, 
professor of feminism and ecology, noted in this line of thinking, “A narrative of progress 
emerges in which humanity is able to recover that which was lost in the Fall from Eden, giving 
hope for the betterment of humanity through the control of nature” (149). She points out that 
Bacon’s insistence on controlled experiments, witnessed, replicated and validated by a multitude 
of observers, helped legitimate scientific practice, releasing science, from its traditional 
confinement in the realm of the astrologer and the witch, to the more respected arena of the 
public sphere. This method in effect transformed science from “arcane secrets” to public 
knowledge.  
Not only did this strict method of exploring “the secrets of nature” lay the foundation for 
modern science, Bacon’s methods helped instantiate a new chapter in the human-nature 
                                                            
38 In his Valerius Terminus, Bacon describes in the chapter “Of the Limit and End of Knowledge”: “In the divine 
nature both religion and philosophy hath acknowledged goodness in perfection, science or providence 
comprehending all things, and absolute sovereignty or kingdom. In aspiring to the throne of power the angels 
transgressed and fell, in presuming to come within the oracle of knowledge man transgressed and fell; but in pursuit 
towards the similitude of God’s goodness or love (which is one thing, for love is nothing else but goodness put in 
motion or applied) neither man or spirit ever hath transgressed, or shall transgress.”  
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relationship, one in which the human clearly assumes a position of dominance over the natural 
world. This relationship, moreover, demonstrates highly gendered aspects, with nature cast in a 
submissive role. Bacon writes: “There is much ground for hoping that there are still laid up in the 
womb of nature many secrets of excellent use having no affinity or parallelism with anything that 
is now known . . . only by the method of which we are now treating they can be speedily and 
suddenly and simultaneously presented and anticipated” (my emphasis; 100). Merchant 
underscores the patriarchal feature of Bacon’s work and admonishes his outlook, that is, nature 
as gendered as female held secrets that could be extracted from her womb through “art and the 
hand of man” and that women held secrets that could be extracted through dissection of her 
womb and bosom. Such attitudes were part of an emerging scientific method—the method of the 
constrained, controlled experiment that Bacon's rhetoric inspired and that has endured through 
his legacy (Merchant 147). 
This statement is key to understanding the modern human-nature relationship. Here, 
absolute Otherness gestates within the womb of nature. Accordingly, the human is authorized to 
appropriate, test, and utilize the Other, bringing it into the rational/patriarchal order. The 
processes of knowledge give sanction to violence and utilitarian imperatives. The methods and 
outlooks of Bacon give strong endorsement to a consciousness of use and profit, one that clearly 
evidence a Western “love of wisdom.” 
 This love (of wisdom) not only features violence but also greed. In Wonders and the 
Order of Nature, Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park write: “Bacon sometimes referred to 
natural history as a ‘warehouse,’ one that must be constantly replenished and drawn upon if 
natural philosophy were ever to fathom the secrets of nature” (224). This mindset, along with the 
ascendance of industrial-capitalism that characterized the twentieth century, has brought to the 
present moment an attitude of domination whereby nature has been totally pinned as an object of 
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subjugation and exploitation. The passivity of nature then begs an endless desire for more 
scientific findings, which are all oriented toward greater economic prosperity—more goods and 
more consumption. This imbalance between the status of the human and nature explains the 
situation Robbins points out in Diet for a New America, where we may be eating ourselves to a 
point of global crisis (and human extinction). 
 What one observes in this unbalanced relationship is an ethical breach, that is, former 
understandings of human and the environment offered a more integrated view of human 
interaction with the environment; such a view, and the ethical relation implied therein has been 
broken. When one looks at the roots of key terms, and the relationships signified, one sees an 
emphasis on cohesion and care. It is to be reminded that “[the] words ‘economics’ and ‘ecology’ 
are both rooted in the Greek word ‘oikos’ which means home. Ecology literally means 
understanding home and economics means taking care of, or managing home” (“Lesson 1”). In 
modern times, however, the Western outlook has diminished regard for care and sustainability; 
economy activities assume primary importance and view any connection toward the environment 
through the lens of profitability.  
 While there were preservationists in the early twentieth century who argued on behalf of 
natural spaces, for their value not as sites of raw material for economic development but as sites 
for edification, valued for their aesthetic resources,39 it was not until the 1960s when the 
environmental attitude shifted; many at that time became aware that the daily life of consumerist 
culture brought considerable threat to the health of the environment. In 1962, Rachel Carson 
published Silent Spring, which many historians consider the break-through text of the modern 
American environmental movement. Since then, the environmental movement has gained 
increased stature and influence, focusing on issues of pollution and environmental degradation. 
                                                            
39 See Aldo Leopole’s “Conversation Esthetic”.   
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The movement today has drawn attention to pressing worldwide problems, such as ozone 
depletion, global warming, and so on.  
 In addition to these broader concerns, environmental groups have successfully exercised 
their power and pressured governments to take measures regarding the ethical treatment of 
animals and the protection of natural habitats. Such victories have been hard-won. In the U.S. in 
particular, enforcing such regulations proves a difficult task. Daniel Geary explains how new 
legislation has “overburdened the agency [Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] with 
responsibilities. The enforcement process required the gathering of various types of 
information—scientific, economic, engineering, and political—and the agency needed to contend 
with vigorous adversarial efforts from industry and environmental organizations.” 40 No doubt 
the status of the environment (and the value of animals) remains a contentious issue, with 
varying interest groups competing for advantage.  However, definite steps have been secured for 
the protection of natural environments, and a new consciousness has emerged regarding the 
impact that human activity and industry can have on global health. 
 An investigation into matters pertaining to the human responsibility for planetary health 
invites the introduction of Lévinas and his work, as Lévinas’s understanding of ethical relations 
sheds important light on the power relations implicit in conventional attitudes towards nature and 
its appropriation. While environmental organizations and some governmental enforcement have 
helped institute actions targeting ecological balance, it may be that they are addressing the 
symptom rather than the cause, that is, they only seek to alleviate the “effects” brought about by 
a Western anthropocentric epistemology. The current state of the planet’s environmental health 
demands new actions and new thinking. The avidity of consumerism, of a thorough commitment 
                                                            
40 See Daniel Geary and Bernard D. Goldstein’s “Environmental Movement” and James W. Sheppard’s review of 
“Environmentalism: A Global History.” 
- 78 - 
 
to economic prosperity, has undermined the “oikos,” creating a breach between practice and 
home, between economy and natural resources. This situation and the depletion it has wrought 
begs attention and new strategies. I would argue that ethical seeds need to be planted, that they 
should take deep root in and change our dominant epistemology.  A new ethical regard could 
change the way human beings treat non-humans, the way our daily choices impact the natural 
world. We might come to the realization that humanity cannot survive alone without other 
species; we might cultivate a respect for nature and bow before it, finding that it endows/nurtures 
our lives.  
 In bringing in Lévinas to this discussion on the Self and nature, this analysis underscores 
the importance of his challenge to traditional philosophic viewpoints and his particular 
understanding of the Self and its interior. In Lévinas’s terms, traditional epistemology fosters an 
“interior economy” that registers a dominant principle of bending Others toward the Self. This 
notion of “interiority,” according to Lévinas, determines and characterizes the Self’s (human) 
territory, which results from the subjugation of “exterior reality”—the non-human world. The 
Self thematizes the non-human world under its epistemology, i.e., rationality and consciousness, 
subsuming the Other into the Same by totalizing multivalent meanings into a unified explanation. 
The Self believes this that monopoly brings security and happiness, because every Self has its 
own place secured within its epistemological fortress. In other words, the Self reduces infinite 
possibility (of what the Self does not know) into finite knowledge, through totalization. 
Interiority is tantamount to ontology, affirming a nature of being, existence and reality. For 
instance, the ontological existence of cows and pigs is determined by reference to beef and pork 
(animal ontology dictated by human use/need). Lévinas, however, points out this dominant 
principle as a violent one, that bends and subjugates the Others for the convenience of the Self. 
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 However, the boundary between interiority and exteriority is never as water-tight as the 
Self (human) wishfully believes. There are always moments when the Self loses its rational grasp 
on reality, when beholding the absolute otherness of the non-human. The Face, Lévinas points 
out, functions as a key element in this disruption, breaking the ontological façade. The face 
resists thematization of the dominant Self, and registers a moment of blankness (when one spots 
a person’s face but cannot yet identify it). It is the moment before when one can judge whether it 
is a good look or friendly face, before recall of its resemblance, and before one decides how to 
respond. Detailed introduction of the Face will be discussed in the next section. 
The Other is infinity shown before the finitude of the Self/ consciousness. The Face 
appears when humans are powerless and ignorant before environmental crises, such as in 
instances of DPP pollution or global warming. In losing the power to categorize natural 
phenomena according to Bacon’s scientific method, thus failing to thematize non-humans via the 
unifying effort of exposing nature’s secrets, humans thus lose their rational grasp on reality; they 
are subsequently daunted, doubtful about themselves and their place in the world. In essence, 
when the normal pattern is broken or disrupted, a crisis of belief or grounding ensues. A comfort 
in the way things are is replaced by an anxiety of the unknown.  Such an epistemological crisis is 
depicted in Edward Albee’s play: The Goat: or Who is Sylvia? (2000). 
This chapter will primarily explore the meaning and impact of Albee’s play by bring this 
work into conversation with  Lévinas’s notion of Face. In sum, this analysis  will  explore how 
Albee’s characters experience disruption in their normal order and are forced to face a 
realignment of relations.  This play is about a goat, but the playwright’s treatment of the goat and 
the human realm invite broader questioning—how does the human exist in an order bigger than 
itself? In his own comments on the play, Albee points out:  
- 80 - 
 
You may. . . have received the misleading information that the play is about 
bestiality—more con than pro. Well, bestiality is discussed during the play (as is 
flower arranging) but it is a generative matter rather than the ‘subject.’ The play is 
about love, and loss, the limits of our tolerance and who, indeed, we really are. . . 
I ask of an audience. . . imagine themselves as being in the predicament the play 
examines and coming up with useful, if not necessarily comfortable responses”  
                                                                                                                          (SMM, 262) 
 
 In this quote Albee underscores elements and concerns that very much resonate with 
Lévinas’s ethical theory, that is, who we really are depends much on “love, loss and the limits of 
our tolerance” (SMM 262). The word “limit” here is crucial to understanding both the 
philosopher and the playwright. Human beings are limited in their ability to know; Bacon’s 
scientific methods proved helpful in organizing and interpreting phenomena, translated data into 
comprehensible knowledge. Likewise, human beings are limited in tolerance; there exists a norm 
of behavior constituted for the consensus of humanity. This idea of “limit” is what Lévinas calls 
“interiority.”  Following Bacon’s proposal to transform the secrets of nature into human 
knowledge, we categorize what we know into the interiority, our comfort zone. What then allows 
humanity to comprehend, create knowledge, and thus enlarge its interior territory? The answer is 
exteriority, the non-human, nature, or God, in Descartes’ terms. In short, the finitude of the Self 
depends on the infinite Other. The Other is infinite because the finite Self cannot comprehend the 
Other’s absolute alterity. The Self is finite as opposed to the Other’s infinity. It is thus through 
this dialogism between the Self’s finitude and the Other’s infinity that we come to know who we 
are.  
 Central to this discussion is the position of the Other and its status of elevation and 
alterity. Lévinas’s ultimate elevation of the Other comes from Descartes’ notion of the cogito in 
his third Meditation, in which he begins to ponder whether God is only a subjective idea or an 
objective presence. Doubtful of the Medieval ideology of an omnipotent God and seeking the 
possibility of human subjectivity, Descartes attempts to distinguish ideas generated by the human 
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and those imparted to human consciousness by God. Descartes describes the irreducible Other as 
“an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful substance, by which I 
myself, and all the other things that are were created and produced” (Qtd. in TTO, 57). The 
process of distinguishing human “authorship” from pre-human being brings Descartes to the idea 
of the irreducible Other, in that he relocates himself within the infinite Other (God)—it is this 
basis which Lévinas would later elaborate and appropriate for his prioritization of the Other over 
the Self.  While Descartes does not explain away the divine influences on an independent human 
subjectivity, he severs the human from the divine (while God affirms humanity’s ability and 
rationality). 
While Descartes enshrines human subjectivity in the cogito, Lévinas affirms and focuses 
on external reality, termed the Other infinity (God). This shift of focus from the cogito to the 
Other not only downplays human egoism, in order to accentuate how an ethical relationship with 
the Other is essential to the making of human subjectivity, but breaks the binary opposition 
rooted in epistemology. That is, infinity is not the negation of finitude, as it is irreducible and 
cannot be categorized/conceptualized/ comprehended through any epistemological/consciousness 
means. Because finitude/humanity is encompassed within the larger reality of infinity, it cannot 
conceptualize the Other/God’s infinity. So, just as God is not “non-human,” the Other can 
neither be categorized as “non-Self.” The relationship between God and humanity exactly 
parallels that of the Other and the Self.  
On pondering what is positive about this “exterior reality”/ Other, Lévinas further departs 
from Descartes and raises questions about being and knowledge. The search of traditional 
Western philosophy, for conformity between being and knowledge, ontology and epistemology, 
as well as reality and consciousness, as Benso notes, demonstrates  the process of Self-
construction and a violent Self-Other relationship, as Bacon’s rhetoric discloses. While searching 
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the world for knowledge is good, equating it with being is not unproblematic. This procedure 
implies an over-dependence on rationality, consciousness, and a hubris mindset that risks 
exclusion, denigration and rejection of experiences that cannot be measured through rational 
means. In addition, prioritizing the search for knowledge through dissection of “the womb of 
nature” and appropriating what’s inside the womb will only diminish the significance of the 
ethical relation between Self and the Other. This movement risks reducing the Other, making it 
to exist solely under the Self’s epistemological lens. 
This tension between being and knowledge informs the philosophical backdrop for The 
Goat. Having Martin encounter absolute Otherness in a socially unacceptable form, Albee 
throws a wrench into our conception of normality. The tragedy in Martin’s family challenges the 
concept that only normalcy will bring about happiness, a presumption that espouses an 
Aristotelian  teleology,41 claiming that happiness only derives from the exercise of rationality (in 
other words, people only feel happy when they depend on  common sense, and lead a normal 
life). Ascending to the crest (of career and social status), Martin embodies fully this fundamental 
outlook and epistemology. He however is awed by the power of infinity. The Face (i.e., absolute 
Otherness) is irresistible, and presses Martin to the border, bringing him to face the limits of his 
Self-ness.  
In the play, Sylvia’s face serves as a Lévinasian Face, effecting a destabilization of the 
Self. This element brings us to the confluence of Albee and Lévinas and the fundamental 
questions: how do humans see and exploit non-human Others? How are non-human objects (as 
opposed to subjects) de-faced, cut off, or deformed to become a “being” subsumed into a 
Selfness, a Self that uses common sense and normalcy to justify its own existence? In what 
                                                            
41 Aristotle believes the telo of humanity is to exercise its reason. Humanity will then achieve happiness once it 
fulfills this teleology. 
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moments do the “Faces” of beings emerge and destabilize selfness? Both Albee and Lévinas 
point out a new understanding of the Self and the Other, the limits of the rational Self per se, and 
the constraints of traditional epistemology (rationality).  Their views are thus enlightening when 
addressing the impending eco issues of today, such as that of meat-oriented diets and the 
shortage of crops that ensue. This visioning reveals the hero (humanity) as trapped, awaiting a 
new epistemological lens whereby the hero might obtain a new knowledge of love. In sum, the 
fundamental issue is one of relations and responsibility--where do we locate ethics in a world the 
human and the non-human both inhabit?  
If Albee’s work suggests a question regarding the way we treat the Other, I argue, 
Lévinas’s ethical theory can help fashion an answer. The Goat is a very provocative drama, 
pointing out how people gripped by rationality experience a disturbance in their reality when the 
Face appears. That the play ends with the killing of the Other highlights an insistence on 
rationality, and how this rationality can be employed as justification for Self’s violence toward 
the Other (in order to affirm its Selfness/humanity). In other words, only with the endorsement of 
violence can rationality or normalcy assert its power. The absurd humor of seeing Stevie 
displaying the blood of the goat at the play’s end exposes the problems of Self/rationality. Albee 
thus does a commendable job of examining the constituents of Self and Self-Other relationships 
in this work, an examination spurred by a representation of bestiality. Beyond his exploration of 
Self-Other relationships, Albee uses the matter of bestiality to more broadly explore the larger 
issues of human-animal/ environmental relationships today.  
In this context, the Lévinasian notion of ethics can be employed to provide illumination. 
The Lévinasian notions of finitude and infinity help to gear the play toward a dialogism between 
Self and Other— one that is less a specific moral orientation than a necessary ethical mechanism 
(needed as much as air is needed for survival), implemented for the continuation of both human 
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and non-human existence— an exploration of love and responsibility. This mechanism 
implemented for the ultimate elevation of the Other and subjugation of the Self is as tenacious as 
the scientific principle of inertia. That is, just as the inertia principle in physics dictates an 
object’s state of motion, Lévinas’s ethics similarly affirms the Self as finite and the Other as 
infinite. Shifting ethics from a moral/religious discourse into a critical discourse is one of 
Lévinas’s biggest contributions to modern ethics. While many term him a wishful idealist, his 
ethical insight proves revealing and provocative, leading to a fundamental question of the 
relation of responsibility between Self and Other, the question that permeates and enlivens 
Albee’s play The Goat: or, who is Sylvia?   
Following this introductory material, my discussion will proceed through two basic 
movements. The first section examines The Goat and highlights the range of issues it provokes. 
The second section employs Lévinas’s theory to shed light on elements of the play and to show 
how Lévinas and Albee are in dialogue—specifically, how both speak to today’s environmental 
issues. These efforts, in the end, will lead to a demonstration of Lévinas’s ethical theory, how it 
is not morally oriented (that is, not built on codes or moral legalism) but rather constitutive, a 
condition or relation between Self and Other, and how such an ethical understanding might 
preserve both the human and the non-human.  
The Goat 
Having received three Pulitzer Prizes for drama—for A Delicate Balance (1967), Seascape 
(1975), and Three Tall Women (1994), Edward Albee stands as a prominent figure of the 
American theatre. His long-lived status as a leading American playwright, however, does not 
derive from his endorsement of the-way-things-are. Rather, his works deeply reflect his view that 
the role of theatre or art is to protest the status quo (Albee SMM, 82). He believes individuals are 
in trouble if they wish to conform to, instead of contest the norms of society. What art needs to 
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do, he asserts, is to “stand against the fiction that everything in this slipping land of ours is 
peachy-keen” (Sommer “An Overview of Edward Albee's Career.”) He wants art to “change 
people, to try to bring them into a greater sense of themselves, make them more alive, more self-
aware” (Albee SMM, 82). Given these concerns, it is not surprising that human relationships 
play an important role in his works. From Who is Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (1962) to The Goat 
(2003), Albee has consistently explored issues within middle-class family settings. Such a 
mundane milieu helps foreground the status quo and its looming social boundaries, with the 
darker side exposed (i.e., via volatile and abusive relationships, bestiality, etc.) This milieu also 
makes location and setting highly important. Michael Billington, in his review of the play’s 
London production, writes: “If Page's production, as a whole, is less effective than the Broadway 
prototype, it is because it seems curiously deracinated. In New York you could almost smell the 
Park Avenue affluence of Martin and Stevie's world which made its destruction all the more 
poignant”. Such commentary focuses on the American aspect of the play but also highlights the 
economic context, the influence of finance and position. Such grounding moreover grants the 
work a timely aspect and sense of urgency. As critic Stephen Bottom suggests, Albee's plays are 
rooted in the here and now rather than in some “imagined, fictional elsewhere” (Bottoms 10).  
Indeed “chang[ing] the status quo” seems to be the overarching theme in Albee’s long career. 
While critics approach his works from various angles in The Cambridge Companion to Edward 
Albee, a consensus emerges that affirms this contestatory aspect.  Philip Kolin describes Albee in 
his early years as an “angry bird of youth” who attacked illusions of identity and the myth of his 
own country. John Clum looks at how Tiny Alice, A Delicate Balance, and Finding the Sun deal 
with impotence and marriage—a theme not uncommon among Albee’s works—and concludes 
that Albee’s characters are burdened  with "discontent and disappointment” (Bottoms 73) in their 
search for spiritual and emotional fulfillment (as well as sexual satisfaction). Both critics 
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highlight the emotional dissatisfaction precipitates a desire for social change. But Albee is not 
just a young writer driven by discontent. Examining Albee’s award–winning plays, Thomas 
Adler sees in the writer a call for growth and the embrace of the foreign. He argues that 
“although change is necessary for growth, it evokes the fear of the unknown…. [These plays] are 
‘act[s] of aggression against the status quo’ (Qtd. in Bottoms 151). 
Some audiences appreciate Albee’s insistence on challenging ethical boundaries, while 
others do not. Despite having audiences who “value being challenged and appreciate theater that, 
if it existed, would fit into the School of Anti-Complacency” (Sommer “An Overview of Edward 
Albee's Career”), Albee has not always enjoyed success. Albee’s failures “at the box office are as 
well known as his critical successes” (Sommer “An Overview of Edward Albee's Career”). “The 
string of bombs includes All Over, The Lady from Dubuque, The Man Who Had Three Arms, and 
adaptations of The Ballad of the Sad Cafe, Everything in the Garden and Lolita” (Kanfer ). 
Moreover, his ambition to challenge the status quo has sometimes been interpreted as simple 
provocation and a striving for fame. Literary critic Elysa Gardner, for instance, describes The 
Goat, or Who is Sylvia? as “perversely impressive,” with audiences possibly becoming perplexed 
and “sickened by the self-indulgent mess, in which the cynical, disdainful view of family life that 
has informed some of Albee's more eloquent works reaches its nauseating nadir” (Gardner).  
So it seems that what audiences and critics like and what they hate about Albee’s work 
indicate two sides of one coin. While some value his courage to challenge the status quo, others 
disdain such provocation. Other theatre artists who challenge policies or systems may not be as 
confrontation as Albee, who tends to touch a raw nerve with regard to “human relationship[s],” 
the rudiment of all politics, gender, economy and culture. Though he sets his plays in the milieu 
of mundane daily life, his presentation of human relationships can be disturbing. In an interview 
with Vicky Hallett, Albee points out that, while Who is Afraid of Virginia Woolf? is less 
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shocking, with few four-letter words removed, “the real shock is how people treat each other, 
and that hasn't changed” (Hallett). 
Given this basic orientation in Albee’s plays that challenges the status quo, The Goat is not 
thus too surprisingly; it is in keeping with the common attitude of Albee’s oeuvre. In Stretching 
My Mind, Albee explains the impetus behind the work:  
I was thinking about writing a play about intertwined matters—the limits of our 
tolerance of the behavior of others than ourselves, especially when such behavior 
ran counter to what we believed to be acceptable social and moral boundaries, and 
our unwillingness to imagine ourselves behaving in such an unacceptable 
fashion—in other words, our refusal to imagine ourselves subject to 
circumstances outside our own comfort zones.  (SMM, 259) 
  
This statement suggests that we should not look at what is superficial in human 
relationships, but look to investigate how humans define their codes and conditions of belonging.  
The dramatization of bestiality in short puts the spotlight on such fundamental concerns and 
questions. In other words, the intertwined matters Albee hints at involve a complicated 
convergence of epistemology, domestic politics, and human definition. Having Sylvia in the title 
and as the target of the drama’s discussion, The Goat not only suggests reconsideration of the 
human/ non-human relationship, but also the role theatre plays in such contemplation.  
While reconsideration of the human / non-human relationship has been discussed widely 
in ecological discourse, the critical combination of environment and theatre has developed rather 
slowly in theatre studies, as theatre artist Theresa J. May points out. This may be because theatre 
has been defined as a representation of human actions and the space where such actions are 
staged, as English professor Una Chaudhuri speculates. May elaborates on this point by stating 
that: “Literary studies has a long tradition of criticism that examines the signification of 
landscape and nature imagery and a body of canonical texts” (“Beyond Bambi” 97). However, 
theatre studies do not have such a tradition. May argues that the basic epistemology evident in 
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conventional theatre regards “nature Other” as an object, a domain domesticated through an 
anthropocentric lens. May, however, correctly challenges this view, reminding us that “All 
constructions of ‘nature’ are ideological” (May “Beyond Bambi” 97). 
In order to re-conceive this Other, May defines “Ecocriticism”: “[it] is a critical 
(discursive) perspective on cultural performance (from theatre, film, and literature to zoos, 
amusement parks, and social protests) afforded and informed by the science of ecology and the 
greening fire it has precipitated across disciplines” (May “Beyond Bambi” 97). Along this line of 
thought then, theatre— I should reconsider its conventional outlooks and its passivity and  
should re-position itself in this ecocritical revolution. In Staging Place: The Geography Of 
Modern Drama, Chaudhuri gives one example of how theatre can act as a cultural site of 
resistance to traditional epistemology. As embodied on the naturalistic stage, theatre privileges 
vision. The fact that realism and naturalism dominate theatre, rendering visibility as the primary 
organizer of performer-audience experience, illuminates the fact that theatre is an extension of an 
anthropocentric epistemology (the human viewpoint dominates). In her discussion of Jim 
Cartwright's Road (1986), a play that demystifies the erasure of Otherness practiced in 
naturalistic theatre of visibility, Chaudhuri writes: “The theatre’s investment in presence, 
visibility and display is revealed in Road to be an illusion. . . a fantasy of anthropological 
dimensions that seeks to vanquish otherness without the pain of being othered oneself” 
(Chaudhuri “(De)Facing the Animals” 53). Chaudhuri thus argues for new theatrical 
investigations and for an understanding of humans being in the world that does not over-value 
the status of the human.  
 In her review of Staging Place: The Geography Of Modern Drama, Jeanne Colleran 
points out the spatial dimension of the Self-Other epistemology, and her observation is helpful 
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when reconsidering Albee’s dramatic work, his fascination with  “intertwined matters” in the 
relationships of the human and non-human: 
Social spaces are largely spaces of containment: places where strictures are set 
upon the body particularly by means of that which houses the body; strictures that 
determine what may enter, what may remain, what cohabit, what abide. The 
pervasive fears at the end of one millennium and the beginning of another revolve 
around the fragility of these social spaces: how much difference, after all, can be 
accommodated?  (238) 
 
This quote gives emphasis to the elements of boundaries and containment.  And the fact 
that Sylvia the goat is only allowed to appear on stage as a carcass serves as a kind of reply to 
Colleran’s question above. While Albee’s play challenges conventional structures of human 
belonging—of what difference can be accommodated, the play does not completely abandon 
human social space (though the presence of the dead goat invites fear and disruption). The 
goat—as a kind of co-equal presence—is banned from the stage; she is banned from what theatre 
symbolizes. Theatre here embodies the epistemological site of human activities where she is only 
allowed to fulfill certain roles. Given the conventional outlook of theatre, it is almost impossible 
to represent non-human/nature. 
 It is therefore difficult to envision a kind of theatre that yokes human performance and 
non-human/nature together in a performing space.  In effect, if conventional theatre gives  a 
representation of reality through a human lens, how is it possible that non-human/nature might 
be performed for the sake of itself, instead of human interest? Or, is performance even possible 
when trying to recast the human/ non-human relationship? In Performing Nature, editors 
Gabriella Giannachi and Nigel Stewart suggest ecocritical study in theatre must necessarily be 
“hybrid and interdisciplinary,” even though it remains “fraught with epistemological uncertainty 
and controversy” (19).  
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Certainly theatre studies should explore new approaches and strategies in how the theatre 
form might accommodate new understandings of the human/non-human relationship.  Albee’s 
play does not stand as a formal or stylistic experiment.  His play retains a conventional theatrical 
approach in style and method. Nonetheless, The Goat highlights discourse and dramatic action 
that challenges conventional viewpoints; the play also promises new potentials for ethical 
reconsideration and a new model of epistemology. Such difficult subject matter can raise issues 
from a variety of angles, and not all critics have come to a common interpretation of the play.42 
Commenting on the London production at the Almeida Theatre, Michael Portillo asks in his 
review why adultery is de rigueur while bestiality is taboo. Michael Billington, identifies a 
different concern and writes that “Albee implies there is a malaise affecting American society; 
but he never exactly defines the source of the unhappiness motivating Martin and the fellow-
sufferers he meets at a therapy session” (Billington). Regardless of the different critical 
responses to the play, and the different problems they point to, critics rightly note the Albee’s 
play concerns human tolerance.  Albee’s play asks a number of provocative and demanding 
questions, ones that bear upon the limits of human thinking and the extent of human belonging. 
Since bestiality is not something unheard of,43 what is so intolerable about it? Is it intolerable 
because an elite like Martin should not be taking part in it?44 In that case, what does Martin’s 
social status symbolize? Is social status a parameter influencing human-animal relationships, in 
the construction of humanity itself?  
 Overall, nature/animals are never recognized as absolute Others. Una Chaudhuri observes 
that "[a]s pets, as performers, and as literary symbols, animals are forced to perform for us. . . . 
Refusing the animal its radical otherness by ceaselessly troping it and rendering it a metaphor for 
                                                            
42 See “Review of the Goat.”  
43 See Tanya Gold’s “A goat's eyes are so beautiful.” 
44 Michael Kuchwara describes the character Martin as “The fair-haired Pullman [actor who plays Martin], dressed 
in a crisp, buttoned-down blue shirt and striped, preppy tie, is all WASP good looks.” (“Review of the Goat”)  
- 91 - 
 
humanity, modernity erases the anima even as it makes it discursively ubiquitous" (“(De)Facing 
the Animals” 105). Albee’s play invites questioning about the status of the animal as Other. The 
play’s action investigates how the Self-Other relationship and the treatment of the Other shape 
human subjectivity. The issues addressed are indeed intertwined, and the subject, as Albee 
indicates, is not bestiality per se, but how human epistemology decides our perception of the 
Self/human versus the Other/non-human. With Albee affirming an  attitude that calls for a 
disengaged regard for human behavior, the play’s plot highlights discussion of normalcy and its 
implicit hierarchies, a discussion that invites analysis via  Lévinas’s notion of the  Self-Other 
relationship (in this case, human vs. nonhuman). That is, as Albee strives to provoke people into 
rethinking who and what they are, we note the play’s concern with ethics (as Lévinas emphasizes 
an ethical relationship with the Other).  Thus, Albee is dramatically exploring territory that is 
consonant with Lévinas, whose work and thoughts can provide an alternative vision for twenty-
first century relationships. 
In the play, what is intolerable is, of course, Martin’s “affair” with Sylvia the goat. His 
insufficient justifications for this behavior make it even more insufferable. Paradoxically, his 
persuasion could never be sufficient because human language/discourse is a product of human 
subjectivity. It is finally incapable of describing experiences outside of that subjectivity. While 
this “discourse of normalcy” collapses once it is seen outside the territory (of Self’s interiority), 
it serves as a testament to the way the Self/interiority/finitude treats and looks at the 
Other/exteriority/infinity. “A roasted lamb chop served on the dinner table” and “falling in love 
with Sylvia the goat” register two drastically different phenomena in light of different ethical 
moments of Self-Other relationship. The two behaviors generate different ontological 
relationships with animals and present philosophical issues about what is normal. 
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What is “Face”? 
In terms of Lévinas’s theory of “Face,” the situation of a “roasted lamb chop” would give 
evidence of an act of violence and would witness to the de-facing of the Other. Contrarily, the 
situation of “falling in love with a goat” would demonstrate the power of the Other’s Face. The 
issue of importance here is what happens to the Self and how the Self reacts when the Other’s 
Face appears. 
First of all, what is “Face”? In Totality and Infinity, Lévinas sets forth his distinct theory 
of “exteriority and the Face” in section III, after discussion of the violence of the Same and 
Totality in the previous two sections. In this section, Lévinas proposes that it is the notion of the 
“Face” that illuminates the idea of “infinity”—what is outside human knowledge.  Lévinas writes: 
“The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, 
encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched” (Lévinas TI, 194). The Face not only escapes any 
reach of the senses, which construct an ontological comprehension of the world, but is also 
beyond our epistemological understanding. It is “…not resplendent as a form clothing a content, 
as an image, but as the nudity of the principle, behind which there is nothing further” (Lévinas TI, 
262). Here the form can be seen as tantamount to a (human) teleology of a being. For instance, a 
goat is for lamb chops, as a cow is for beef, etc. However, a goat is a goat. It is itself the purpose 
of its own existence (instead of existing for human interest). In this way of thinking, the meeting 
of Self and the Other is not limited to dining tables , as myriad human activities activate a 
process of subsumption, demanding that the Other yield to the Same/thematization. As Noreen 
O’Connor, in his “The Personal Is Political: Discursive Practice of the Face-to-Face”, explains it, 
“to move the notion of encounter outside the representationalism of intuition and concept to the 
dimension of separation. The face-to-face relationship both maintains distance and interrupts all 
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totalities. Hence, the face is not a presence announcing an unsaid which, in principle, could be 
said” (62).  
Barbara Jane Davy believes Lévinas’s nudity of the Face refers to things that exist 
beyond all thematization, and hence are part of “infinity.” To “thematize” means to comprehend 
the Other under the Self’s epistemology and to reject any other possible existence of the Other 
itself. Because the Other’s absolute alterity cannot be understood within that epistemological 
frame at all, it is outside the Self’s finitude/interiority. She argues, however, that “all other 
entities exceed our ideas about them. It is not possible to exhaust the details of a thing in 
description. I can describe a tree as a red maple thirty feet tall, brilliant red in the fall…These 
details do not fully describe everything that the tree is” (51). Davy aims to argue that “[the] 
nakedness of the Other in terms of thematization should not restrict Lévinas's understanding of 
the face to the human” (51), an observation that highlights how the face appears when the Self’s 
“prison fortress,” in Nietzsche’s words, collapses.45 In other words, the Face is/appears as 
something beyond linguistic and epistemological ontology, and disappears when ontological 
interpretation is imposed. As Jeffrey L. Kosky indicates, language is essentially an interpellation 
or an invocation, and its approach “. . . is not conditioned by a horizon wherein it appears” (18).  
At one time or another, we’ve all shared this common experience: when one intends to 
“write down” something he/she feels—for instance, an inextractable emotion encapsulated in one 
or more events, images, or memories, etc.,—it is often the case that the linguistic representation 
is not able to represent completely, if not betray, the original experience, emotion, etc. In this 
case, the web of meaning takes away the original context of the feeling, and moves the 
experiential context to a linguistic one. This example illustrates how linguistic/epistemological 
attempts at expression can fail to encapsulate the meanings of all beings or experiences. It also 
                                                            
45 See “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense-1873.” 
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implies how meaning/existence of the Other can be twisted or fabricated to suit the Self’s own 
interest.  Given this situation, fundamental questions emerge; for instance, when the Face 
appears, should the Self confront it or de-face it?  
This confrontation with the Face of the Other then gets to the core of Lévinas’s ethical 
theory. For Lévinas, subjectivity is formed through an ethical relationship, i.e., social relations, 
with the Other. Without the Other, “I” would not come into existence. O’Connor writes: 
“Without the proximity of the other in the face everything would be absorbed in Being. . . 
totalities absorbing the very subject to which it is unconcealed” (63). In other words, the reason 
why “I” can stand out as a distinct entity is the recognition that there are “other” distinct entities. 
Without the Other, “I” am but part of Being and the concept of “I” does not exist. Hence, to 
maintain the distinctness of “I,” I have to make sure the network of other distinct entities form a 
distinctness of their own. Samuel Moyn believes Lévinas borrowed the concept of the Face from 
Rosenzweig,46  whose concept Lévinas shifts from divinity to humanity, and that he transposes 
the Other from Descartes’ idea of God to social relations. Hence, the Other refers not only to the 
idea of God, but also to other people.  Lévinas writes: “The eyes break through the mask—the 
language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye does not shine; it speaks” (Lévinas TI, 
66). The face, the epiphanic moment when infinity descends to finitude, is both fragile and holy. 
“In the face the Other expresses his eminence, the dimension of height and divinity from which 
he descends. In his gentleness dawns his strength and his right” (Lévinas TI, 262). 
If, as Lévinas argues, the “face” discloses the façade of one’s identity, then de-facing the 
Other risks a defacing of the Self. While Lévinas’s notion of Face does not imply an actual face 
but rather a metaphorical one, registering a moment when the Self loses its rational grasp of 
                                                            
46 Rosenzweig describes God’s loving gaze as “not the basic form of his countenance, fixed and immutable. It is not 
the rigid mask that the sculptor lifts from off the face of the dead. Rather it is the fleeting, indefatigable alteration of 
mien, the ever youthful radiance that plays on the eternal features. Love hesitates to make a likeness of the lover; the 
portrait would reduce the living countenance to rigor mortis” (Moyn 253). 
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reality, one can point to a literal and metaphorical appearance of the Face in Albee’s The Goat, 
where the Face of Sylvia is not allowed on stage but where her de-facing at the end of the play 
signals the danger of human subjectivity in its relation to the ecological order.  
 Set in the cozy suburb home of a modern middle-class family, the play is composed of 
three scenes. Martin (the father) is an outstanding architect who has just turned fifty and just won 
an award for urban design. He has a great family, a successful career and a good old friend. At 
first, Martin and his wife Stevie show a deep trust and confidence in each other. Both accept, if 
not passionately embrace, the fact that their son is a homosexual. The story unfolds with the 
couple talking about daily chores, with Stevie delicately bantering about possibilities of Martin’s 
affair, while awaiting Ross, Martin’s best friend, to conduct an interview with Martin. Martin’s 
first confession to Stevie about Sylvia, his goat-lover, is passed off as a joke. Later, when Stevie 
leaves Ross and Martin to their interview, however, Martin’s unusual forgetfulness and absent-
mindedness, together with a photo of Sylvia, all point to a more plausible account of an 
extramarital affair. Despite Martin’s plea to keep the thing private, Ross writes to Stevie with 
dogmatic self-justification. 
The second scene witnesses the face-off between husband and wife. Stevie and Ross alike 
represent defenders of tradition and normalcy. With mixed feelings of shock, confusion, anger, 
frustration and contempt, Stevie nonetheless keeps her fury and uneasy feelings in control. Even 
her breaking of bowls and pottery is carried out in a civilized manner. Martin’s reassurance of 
his love for Stevie is nevertheless juxtaposed with his untarnished affection toward Sylvia, which 
drives Stevie to further fury.  
In scene three, Stevie has removed herself from the house, leaving another family 
member (their son Billy) to confront and deal with the fact of Martin’s bestial relationship. 
Although Billy reveals his frustration toward his father, he also shows his love. In one 
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unexpected moment, they embrace, and Billy uncontrollably gives Martin a sexual kiss. This kiss 
is witnessed by Ross, who displays his contempt. Martin hates Ross’s sanctimoniousness, as the 
three effectively proceed to tear each other apart. The play ends with Stevie coming back after 
the quarrel, displaying the carcass of Sylvia, which she has murdered; Stevie thus makes good 
threat to Martin at the end of scene two: “I’ll bring you down with me!” (44). 
When looking at the many plays in Albee’s career, swearing appears quite frequently in 
his works. Aiming to change the status quo, Albee understands how repressive the status quo can 
be, and he thus values and dramatizes different transgressions and the flaunting of the taboo—
swearing thus can function as a transgression and as an emotional outlet. Swearing, however, 
may imply that individuals are constrained by the status quo and dare not venture into 
transgression (which may be considered abnormal); they thus swear out of frustration. Many of 
Albee’s plays thus reveal complicated characters, individuals both repressed and outraged, who 
must grapple with the negotiation of normalcy and abnormality.   
Among all the entangled emotions that the other characters express toward Martin, 
disdain is the one that stands out most. If, as Albee once mentioned, that Who is Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf? was a gentle way to say “fuck you” (Qtd. in Drimmer), then The Goat conveys 
such a sentiment in more emphatic terms. The play seems to warrant its torrent of profanity, 
given the explosive sexual context. Stevie voices vehement disdain of her husband.  In scene two, 
Stevie’s frequent tirades have multiple connotations. They not only serve as a recurrent reminder 
bestiality, but they indicate how she can only process the relationship through a frame of sexual 
discourse. Stevie shouts variously: “You told me! You came right out and fucking told me, and I 
laughed. . . I fucking laughed!” (28); “The fucking of animals!” (29); “Goat-fuckers 
Anonymous?” (32); “What is she fucking? Who?” (33); “GET YOUR GOAT-FUCKING 
HANDS OFF ME!!!” (37), and “animal fucker” (42). Such profanities have multiple meanings. 
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They not only point to Martin’s socially intolerable behavior, but also indicate Stevie’s 
emotional progression, from passive wrath to aggressive attack. Further, Martin’s restraint of 
using the term “fucking” expresses something about his attitude toward Sylvia and also discloses 
something about this wife, who seems addicted to profanity.  
STEVIE.  I’m your type and so is she; so is the goat. (Harder.) So long as it’s  
                                  female, eh? So long as it’s got a cunt it’s all right with you! 
MARTIN.  (Huge.) A SOUL!! Don’t you know the difference!? Not a cunt, a soul! 
STEVIE.  (After a little; tears again.) You can’t fuck a soul. 
MARTIN.  No; and it isn’t about fucking. 
STEVIE.  YES!!                                                                                     (42) 
While Martin never utters this word, he cannot blunt Ross and Stevie’s accusations and 
their contemptuous categorization of his behavior. Despite this disdain, Martin does attempt to 
adopt self-help measures: he joins a bestiality support group on the Internet, and he confides his 
secret in Ross in order to gain more time for “healing.” Ross and Stevie’s attitudes, however, 
remain consistent. Ross keeps calling Martin “sick” and exhibits sneering condescension.  
MARTIN. . . Don’t you and your son ever kiss? Don’t you and—what’s his  
                     name?—Todd love one another? 
ROSS.  (Hard; contemptuous.) Not that way!  
MARTIN.  (Angry and reckless.) That way!? What way!? . . .  
ROSS.  (A sneer.) You’re sicker than I thought.  (50-51) 
Ross nor Stevie share a common viewpoint of disdain and show abhorrence at Martin’s 
relationship. They react to him with derision and tacitly uphold a civilized disposition.   Even in 
extreme emotion, they represent a commitment to commonsense, to rationality and normalcy. 
Their high social rank further deepens their investment in the status quo. Their social position 
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makes Martin’s behavior even more intolerable. From Ross and Stevie’s point of view, it is clear 
that abiding norms are deep-rooted and demand allegiance. For them, showing disdain for 
abnormality is the best way for them to signal their own normality. Such a response, the 
mechanism of disdain, nurtures a tendency that works to de-face the Other.  
Representing the Lévinasian notion of Face, Sylvia and her look exist outside of this 
thematization of rationality. Throughout the play Sylvia’s face never appears on stage, but her 
(Lévinasian) Face is never absent. When Martin describes how he and Sylvia exchange the look, 
Sylvia’s Face automatically surfaces (in the audience’s mind). It lingers until the play ends 
because the play is about how Martin searches for possible ways to introduce Sylvia’s Face in 
scene one, how Stevie (and possibly Martin) attempt to understand who Sylvia is in scene two, 
and how Sylvia is de-faced by Stevie in scene three. While Stevie is preoccupied with the 
mechanical problems involved in human-animal intercourse, Martin is infatuated with Sylvia’s 
looks. 
MARTIN.  . . . it was then that I saw her. (Sees it) Just…just looking at me. 
… 
ROSS.  All right; let me help you. You’re seeing her. 
MARTIN.  (Sad laugh.) Yes; oh, yes; I’m seeing her. 
ROSS.  You’re having an affair with her.  
MARTIN.  (Confused.) A what? Having a what!?  (23) 
Apparently Martin and Ross “see” differently here. Ross equates Martin’s seeing some woman 
with having an extramarital affair. Martin, however, whose symptoms of amnesia are constantly 
reiterated throughout the play, is overpowered by the sight of absolute Otherness, that evoked by 
Sylvia’s appearance. Martin’s amnesia symbolizes his gradual withdrawal from common sense, 
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or traditional epistemologies, and this removal somehow empowers him, allowing him access to 
the Other.  
 To Ross and Stevie, Martin’s affair with Sylvia the goat is preposterous, an affair that 
evokes fear, disgust and contempt. Sylvia’s appearance and her eyes demonstrate their ultimate 
power over Martin and the uncanny way the goat captures his attention. Her mysterious power is 
also manifest through the many epistemological and ontological questions Stevie raises. Stevie 
asks whether goats cry (30). While Martin emphasizes Sylvia’s looks, Stevie wonders how 
Sylvia puts down her forelegs, turning her head to greet her husband (42). Martin, on the other 
hand, protests that he will not reveal any details of their intercourse. All attempts to ridicule, 
understand, pin down, or escape Sylvia’s Face only tears the couple apart.  
Chaudhuri analyzes Martin’s situation in The Goat and points out: “Martin’s case this 
pinnacle is, like so much else in the play, literal as well as figurative, with the literal being 
insistently associated with animality” (“(De)Facing the Animals” 11). This fusion of the literal 
and the figural—this animality that escapes our epistemology—may be viewed as a moment that 
invokes the Lévinasian Face. The affair haunts the stage with a ubiquitous curiosity, generating 
mixed feelings over the destabilized boundary of human normalcy, making the Face omnipresent 
and omnipotent, and hence serving as a sign of transcendence.  
I would here relate how discussion following a recent production of the play corroborates 
this assessment, how the goat—conveying the effect of the Face—produces anxiety concerning  
the flux of normalcy and social boundaries. In a discussion session after a performance at the 
Baton Rouge Little Theatre (April, 2008), a member of the audience mentioned how normalcy 
fluctuates over time. He noted that  Martin’s treatment might compare to how homosexuals were 
treated  forty years ago, and he humorously suggested that there might be an animated version  of 
Albee’s The Goat in Disney production another forty years from now. This post-production 
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discussion points to issues about how human’s emotions and affections are conditioned through 
mechanisms of social authority and common sense/normalcy; it also reveals how norms are 
codified and how they can change with time. 
 At the play’s conclusion, Stevie’s ritual murder of Sylvia affirms the power of normalcy, 
the social map Martin once inhabited but subsequently vacated. When Billy asks Martin about 
what the aftermath of the affair will be, Martin responds with blank confusion: “I don’t know, 
Billy; I don’t know that there are any rules for where we are” (47). While the affair has imploded 
common sense, the play indicates the drive to retain humanity and harness human behavior, to 
keep “interior reality” (human rationality) intact (that is, the characters still believe their “reality” 
overcomes all). The characters are disorientated when the Faces surfaces, forcing them to 
confront the daunting “exteriority” where there are no directions or rules for them to follow. As 
Chaudhuri points out, “… the blood on Stevie’s dress at the end of Albee’s play, stains the 
pristine surface of a desubstantialized humanism and its enabling genres” (“(De)Facing the 
Animals” 18). Common sense/rationality serves as the dominant principle deciding the direction 
of interior reality, a gravity that pulls in the core of reality. 
 Hence the murder acts as a reinstatement of normalcy, a means of checking the sense of 
disorientation. For Stevie, “A goat killed” should be a drastically different matter from “an affair 
exposed.” Mixing the two together produces an epistemological earthquake that engulfs Stevie. It 
is, however, more this epistemological betrayal rather than the affair itself that disorients Stevie. 
So a divorce, as Billy suggests, cannot be the solution. It must rather be a fierce means, like 
murder, to restore interior reality, or the “order of things”—wherein animals often function as 
symbols (an order where an animal’s carcass on a plate is a normal picture).  
 Thus, Sylvia is the scapegoat for normalcy, just as Martin is a scapegoat for the desire to 
change the status quo, these impulses characterize the essential tragedy here. Indeed, with the 
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deployment of the goat, the change of status quo, and the subtitle “notes toward a definition of 
tragedy,” The Goat seems to invoke the Dionysian origin of theatre. In ancient Greece, “the word 
‘tragedy’ derives from ‘songs sung by goat-men’, i.e., members of the cult of Dionysius” (“Goat 
song”). Professor Rita Felski points out that Greek tragedy was “often hailed as an exemplary 
source of insight into ethical and philosophical questions; in its very remoteness from the present, 
it could throw light on the dilemmas of modernity” (v). She also refers to Dennis J. Schmidt’s 
On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life when arguing that “the growing self-
doubt of philosophy, the questioning of reason, analytical method, and conceptual knowledge as 
primary values, has much to do with the turn to tragedy, as the form that most eloquently 
dramatizes the stubborn persistence of human blindness, vulnerability, and error” (v). Because 
tragedy remains the site of cultural transformation, negotiation, struggle and change, the play 
brings out the Lévinasian notion of Face to demonstrate a need for destabilization of the status 
quo. When the alterity of absolute Otherness descends, Martin can only subjugate himself to this 
epiphany. 
MARTIN.  . . . it was as if an alien came out of whatever it was, and it…took me   
           with it, and it was…an ecstasy and a purity, and a …love of   
            a …(Dogmatic.)  un-i-mag-in-able kind, and it relates to nothing whatever,  
to nothing that can be related to! Don’t you see!? Don’t you see  
the…don’t’ you see the “thing” that happened to me? What nobody  
understands? Why I can’t feel what I’m supposed to!? Because it relates to  
nothing? It can’t have happened!. . .                (39) 
Western theatre captures this moment of cultural throe through the tragic epiphany when a new 
ethics is about to be born. In this aspect, it celebrates Dionysian spirits that release the sexual 
drive from social bounds. Through such change, it actually anticipates a positive future of 
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fertility. The goat song (Greek word root for “tragedy”) celebrates a release from rationality. 
Through such throes issues a positive hope for a negotiable, if not better, future. The 
goat/Dionysian not only suggests a destructive side, it also fosters possibilities of fertility.47  
The relationship between Martin and Billy is curious in the play. If Martin (Sylvia) 
symbolizes the scapegoat of normalcy, Billy appears to be the marginalized lost sheep when it 
comes to (socially acceptable) “sexuality,” as humanity is de-orientated from normalcy. Martin’s 
attitude, from repressed contempt, to reconciliation, to a final active defense for his son, 
illuminates his breaking through the bounds of normalcy. This movement further signals a total 
surrender of finitude to infinity, through suggesting that love/tolerance (for the Other/unknown) 
should come before an epistemological ontology. As Lévinas notes, ethics is the first philosophy. 
When Stevie confronts Martin’s affair in scene two, we see Martin, stressed, ranting 
rudely to Billy about his sexuality. This expression suggests that Martin had feigned acceptance 
of his son’s homosexuality in order to maintain the façade of a lovely family. Meanwhile, 
Martin’s rudeness over Billy’s sexuality almost makes Stevie laugh, but Martin does not seem to 
be aware of this. Which is more laughable— homosexuality or bestiality? Martin is never aware 
of this contradiction as an issue until well into scene three, where he reconciles with Billy.   
In scene three, Billy inquires as to the whereabouts of Stevie. In a trance, Martin recalls what 
Stevie said at the end of scene two: “You have brought me down, and, Christ! I’ll bring you 
down with me!” (44). Billy seems to not quite understand what Stevie means by this statement, 
                                                            
47 Jennifer Wise, in her “Tragedy as “An Augury of a Happy Life,” argues that fifth-century Greek tragedy 
functioned as an augury of happiness. In Aristotle’s time, however, these tetralogies were stripped of their 
celebratory and other civic elements, fifth-century tragedies came to look like “one-act tear-jerkers, merely sad 
stories of the deaths of kings.” This type of play transformed a propitious political art into a weepy histrionic one, 
hence produced Aristotle’s otherwise perplexing “sad-ending” theory of tragedy. Albee’s title of The Goat: or, Who 
is Sylvia? (Notes Toward a Definition of Tragedy) then responds to this controversy of whether a tragedy should 
point to a better or more miserable future. 
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but his complaint about Martin’s behavior is actually the same accusation leveled by Martin, 
who “brings him down from normalcy”. 
BILLY.  . . . the talk I was going to do at school became history. . . What will I    
         say now!? Goodness me!. . . I came home yesterday and everything had   
         been great—absolutely normal, therefore great. Great parents, great house,  
         great trees, great cars—you know: the old “great.” . . . But then. . . a letter  
         from great good friend Ross written to great good Mom about how great  
         good Dad has been out in the barnyard fucking animals!         (49)                                          
Stirred by Martin’s changing attitudes toward homosexuality, Martin’s own affair, and his 
natural love toward his parent, Billy experiences confusion and his perception of love/sexuality 
is distorted. Embraced by Martin, Billy places a sexual kiss on his father’s mouth. At that 
moment, Ross comes in and witnesses the scene of forbidden incestuous love. Ross’s contempt 
enhances Martin’s angry outburst: 
BILLY.  (To Ross) It wasn’t what you think! 
MARTIN.  (At Billy.) Yes! Yes, it was! Don’t apologize. (To Ross.) Too  
       bad you couldn’t have brought your fucking TV crew over! 
       … 
MARTIN.  …This boy is hurt! I’ve hurt him and he still loves me! You  
      fucker!  He loves his father, and if it…clicks over and becomes— 
         what?—sexual for…just a moment…so what!? So fucking what!?  
         He’s hurt and he’s lonely and mind your own fucking business!   (50) 
Despite being deeply mired in loneliness, confusion, and despair, Martin boldly resists 
the imposition of normalcy (which Ross embodies here). Because he has experienced  Billy’s 
lonely position, fatherly love surges in Martin. He departs from Ross’s viewpoint and embraces 
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the lost sheep—represented by his son and himself. He diverts this sexuality away from the 
domain of Normalcy to the simpler issue of love and suffering. His realization heralds a 
Lévinasian moment, suggesting that ethics/love should come before a dominant social 
epistemology (that manifest in Normalcy). This insight explains Martin’s later furious remark 
about Ross’s behavior: 
MARTIN.  (At Ross; growing rage.) I’ll tell you what’s sick! Writing that fucking  
     letter to Stevie—why doesn’t matter!!—that’s what’s sick! I tell you about it; I  
     share it with you . . . because I think I’ve lost it, maybe; I tell you; I share it    
     with you because you’re …what!? …you’re my best friend in the whole world?   
     Because I needed to tell somebody, somebody with his head on straight  
     enough to hear it? I tell you, and you fucking turn around and…  
ROSS.  I had to!! 
MARTIN.  No! You didn’t! You didn’t have to! 
ROSS.  (Dogmatic.) I couldn’t let you continue! 
MARTIN.  (Near tears.) I could have worked it out. I could have stopped, and no  
    one would have known. Except you motherfucker. Mister on strike and you’re   
    out. I could have. ..  (52) 
Here, Martin exposes the ethical moment that confronted Ross: he could have chosen to confirm 
common sense (the inflexible right-or-wrong stance), or he could have chosen to protect his best 
friend by granting some leeway. Ross, apparently, has chosen the former. Ross takes on the 
value (violence?) inherited from the ontological epistemology instead of any ethical 
consideration. Martin makes a good argument, that because Ross fails love (friendship) and 
condemns the Other (Martin’s bestiality), he disrupts and ruins Martin’s family. This accusation 
points to Ross’s guilt and the fact that he cannot escape blame in the name of Normalcy. In a 
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Lévinasian sense, Martin’s reproach foregrounds Ross’s situation at an ethical crossroads. From 
this ethical viewpoint, Ross’s response toward a fragile Other (Martin’s confidence) and its 
consequences helps drive the story and informs its violent conclusion.  
Lévinas and Animals (The Ethical Position) 
In a sense, this ethical moment that Ross faces is what humanity faces today. The Other (i.e., 
Martin’s affair) is fragile, and its fate is held in Ross’s hand. Exposing the secret brings about 
accusation and shame, and this labeling is a great harm to his best friend. However, for him, 
aligning with the “inside law” appears morally correct; therefore Ross insists that he must tell 
Stevie in order to stop Martin’s affair. On the other hand, for Ross to reside in this comfort zone 
at the expense of Martin’s family is not ethically sound.  
Ross’s behaviors indicate an epistemology that retains its comfort zone at the expense of the 
Other. In other words, the Self/interior reality constructs itself through an elimination of the 
Other. Lévinas however affirms that the Self’s construction is in fact based on the Other. Here I 
will first show how the play echoes Lévinas’s thinking, and how it is relevant to today’s 
human/non-human relationship. I will then discuss the meaning of Lévinas’s assertive “ethical 
yes,” something rarely addressed in philosophical studies. 
From an ethical perspective, Ross is the antithesis of Martin. As mentioned, Ross only feels 
comfortable residing in the “comfort zone.” The most normal person, he represents a strict 
codification of mainstream thinking. Ross believes all the men around him have affairs outside 
their families, which makes Martin’s fidelity to his wife look unusual. It is implied that Ross is 
something of a TV program producer, with references to the interview and his TV crew, etc. He 
is good at capturing and representing what is “real” and “true.” This designation makes Ross’s 
outlook rely more on “vision,” aligning him with traditional epistemology. In contrast, Martin is 
a bold adventurer who is willing to explore the unknown. As the play begins, Martin is just 
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winning the Pritzker Prize, which will commission him to design “World City, the two hundred 
billion dollar dream city of the future. . . and set to rise in the wheatfields of our Middle West” 
(13). It is, as Medoff points out, a city “out of nothing, in the heartland of the US” (164). While 
Martin is able and willing to deal with any unknown, with that which goes beyond the present 
(moment), Ross cannot demonstrate such flexibility and cannot embrace a (new) relationship out 
of nothing.  
This feature of Martin’s character points to Lévinas’s suggestion that a relationship with the 
Other is a relationship with the future. In this case, Martin is the one who lets his imagination fly, 
and is willing to face the Other/future. This future is not an anticipation of the what-will-be kind 
of future defined by tradition, but a Levainsian future—a future that is totally unknown, has no 
relevancy to the present48, and is “out of nothing.” Through their conversation, Martin appears to 
be different from “other men,” the type represented by Ross. He has never had an extramarital 
affair (before this bestiality). When he is in love, he is absolutely faithful and devoted. He tells 
Ross how he cannot “perform” on one of their past playboy excursions. 
MARTIN.  I was already in love with Stevie and I didn’t know how much. 
ROSS.  Amazing Theory: The heart rules the dick. I always thought that the  
       dick was driven by ...                      (19)                                                                                
Their difference also reflects on their ethical stances, their responses to the Face of the 
Other. While Martin subjugates himself to the Other at the expense of his reputation and his 
family, Ross refutes the Other at the expense of his life-long friendship with Martin. Martin’s 
subjugation to the Other risks his reputation, social status, career and his relationship with his 
family and friends. In short, his subjugation to the Other is hazardous to his identity. The fact 
that his encounter with Sylvia takes place after his prestigious award is ironic. Martin’s 
                                                            
48 See chapter on Hwang for detailed discussion of Lévinasian concept of “time.” 
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imagining of the World City out of nowhere illuminates a Cartesian effort to be independent 
from God. That is, humanity strives to create something that has no reference to what already 
exists—not airplanes that imitate birds, for instance—something that bears absolutely no history, 
no traces of the Other/God. Therefore this prize proves Martin’s ability to be truly “independent” 
from the Other. However, shortly after this independence, Martin loses himself. 
The symptom of losing his social self is his constant forgetfulness, which signals a 
slippage of past memories and identity that makeup who he is at the moment. That is, when 
Martin “reaches” the city out of nowhere and becomes “the author of himself,” he sheds his old 
identity. However, does this refer to an emancipated Self or a disorientation? In depicting 
Martin’s succumbing to the Other, the absolute alterity, Albee seems to hint that when the Self 
reaches the state where there are no Others, it can only meet with dissolution and destruction. 
This explains why Martin feels “diminished” (48) when he reaches the pinnacle of his career—
when he is at the point where he can swell his ego. Also, at the onset of the interview, Ross 
compliments him: “you’re at the pinnacle of your success.” Martin then “considers that” and 
responds: “You mean it’s all downhill from here?” (14). In sum then, Albee suggests that a city 
out of nowhere proves not an achievement but an expression of human hubris, a pride that 
eliminates our dependence on the Other, thus begetting the disaster of human subjectivity. 
Like the insulting parrot in Walcott’s “First True Creole,” humanity imitates everything. 
Humanity is never original.49 If it ever desires to be or believes it is, Albee indicates, it only 
                                                            
49 Chaudhuri describes Walcott’s “First True Creole”: “If Albee puts the goat back in scapegoat, exposing the 
sacrificial logic of humanism, Walcott’s ‘First True Creole’ puts the goat, one might say, back in goat curry, and 
celebrates the animal as provisioner, resource, and raw material—not sacrificed to fantasies of human 
exceptionalism and transcendence but engaged with in a struggle for survival, yielding understanding, respect, and 
gratitude. Jackson’s unsentimental celebration of Crusoe’s mastery of his world through mastery of the animal body 
is contrasted with Trewe’s reaction to an animal killing by Jackson himself. Throughout the play, Jackson has 
complained about the hotel’s resident parrot, who, he says, taunts him with racist epithets. Harry merrily denies the 
allegation, saying that the parrot is not insulting Jackson but only repeating the name of former owner of the hotel, a 
German named Heinigger! When Jackson finally wrings the parrot’s neck and throws its body into the ocean, 
Harry’s anger leads him to make the following exceedingly unusual insult: You people create nothing. You imitate 
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incurs its own destruction, because it not only allows a drastic severing from the Other (thereby 
disorienting itself), but sends itself into a blind arrogance (which justifies and glorifies in its 
violence). If violence gradually takes over, to become a new measurement of humanity, a 
primary principle of the order of things, then the human realm is likely to go terribly awry. In 
other words, if humans do not admit and respect the Other (non-human) as a core aspect of its 
own constitution, its “selfness” will dissolve in the subjugation of the Other into its own 
epistemology. If finitude wishes to claim infinity, it is only for self-deception.  
Such an epistemology is also reflected in an ecological context, leading us back to the 
issue of ethics between humans and non-humans. The human Other is not limited to animals but 
the whole of the natural world; food chains serve as a constant reminder of the stratification of 
species and their interrelations between one another. As mentioned earlier, Robbins, in Diet For 
a New America, alerts us to the fact that the human species is now in jeopardy because of our 
lifestyles—a meat-oriented diet consumes a majority of the corn and oats we grow; the unethical 
raising and butchering of animals produces unhealthy meat; and chemical fertilizers, herbicides 
and pesticides not only hurt our health but also the Earth’s sustainability. Added to this is the 
controversy over whether the emission of carbon dioxide causes global warming and will lead to 
a drastic change of the global climate. All these issues suggest a profound, ethical relation 
between the human and non-human worlds.  
In Diet For a New America, Robbins describes why the Self in its current lifestyle feels 
threatened from the Other. Much like Stevie’s fear of abnormality, such fear invades our sense of 
reality and rationality. Robbins writes: “Because the raising of livestock requires a much greater 
use of resources, it puts us in a situation where there is not enough to go around. In this kind of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
everything. It’s all been done before, you see, Jackson. The parrot. Think that’s something? It’s from The Seagull. 
It’s from Miss Julie. [He might have added, its from The Wild Duck, its from Trifles—birds drop like flies in modern 
drama]. You can’t ever be original, boy.” (“(De)Facing the Animals” 17-18). 
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dilemma there lurks a fear in us all that we will be the one who won’t get enough” (my emphasis; 
354). This fear leads to violence among the human species, transforming the original infinite 
resources into something finite, and making competition a must.50 This transformation is 
furthered through globalized capitalism, which objectifies non-human bodies by commodifying 
nature. When water is bottled and priced, its infinity becomes finite, and access to it fosters 
competition, plunder, and the fear of not having enough. Theresa J. May points out that “The 
Goat explodes species taboos by offending our sense of absolute difference, illuminates the role 
of human desire in the commodification of nature…” (“Beyond Bambi” 98). What May terms as 
“absolute difference” is what Lévinas holds as the “face.” The commodification of nature itself 
also demonstrates the violence the Self imposes on nature/the Other. In sum, finitude is what 
causes competition and fear. Making something infinite into something finite is a historical 
process demonstrating human arrogance and hubris. 
The process of making infinite (resources) into finite (resources) corresponds to the  
subjugation of  the infinite Other before  the finite Self. When the finite Self cannot digest the 
vastness of the infinite Other, the Self is most likely to experience anxiety—asserting different 
forms of resource allocation and imposing needless panic (of not having enough). This explains 
why Lévinas does not consider the Self’s infinite responsibility toward the Other a moral 
exhortation but a scientific principle parallel to that of inertia. Subjugation and infinite 
responsibility toward the Other/infinity constrain the finitude within infinity, through which the 
Self nurtures and defines itself. Thus, after enjoying and satiating myself by “feeding on” the 
Other (note Lévinas’s notion of bodily enjoyment) , I should feel gratitude instead of greed.  
                                                            
50 The concept that fear (not enough) and avid results to infinite resource become finite is from an African prince’s 
philosophy. See “非洲王子的哲理” (“The Philosophy of the African Prince”) from Ajin’s blog and “Altruism” 
from the blog of長尾山娘 (“Long-tailed mountain lady.”) 
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We can use the concept of the Face to explain why gratitude and greed make two 
different Self-constructions.  Face is the nakedness of the Other, as depicted when Martin 
describes Sylvia as guileless. In a sense, the Other’s fragility stems from its nakedness and 
guilelessness. Why? Because the Other is totally ignorant of the principle of the Self (rationality); 
it reasons in a drastically different way. In other words, the Other will never react in any way that 
I would were I the Other: animals will not revenge humans; they will not trap humans for selling; 
nature will not punish me if I kill more animals than I need, etc. Non-human beings do not 
change their nature in response to my cruel treatment of them.51  
Because the Other is absolutely outside of my epistemology, it forces me to confront 
myself, my own conscience. When I face the Face of the Other, I do not talk to him (because I 
am unable to) but instead to myself, because the way I choose to treat him reflects how my own 
consciousness/subjectivity is constructed. In turn, my choice of how I treat the Other further 
shapes who I am. I can choose to bow to the Other, as Lévinas proposes, no matter what the 
Other is, or I may wonder about the ways I can know him in my own way.52 In either case, I 
confront myself. In this crucial moment, I am forced to shape who I am when I decide on the 
nature of my relationship with the Other.  
For example, I can kill a deer to fend for myself, or I can kill a thousand deer to make a 
fortune. I don’t need to take into any consideration the consequence (of the Other) because deer 
will not change behaviors or try to bring revenge upon me (nor will they reprehend me). The 
Other’s inactivity (from the Self’s viewpoint) makes my killing purposeless except to fend for 
                                                            
51 For example, Robbins describes that hunters used to take advantage of minks, who come out as a group to warm 
up those dying in the snow, by lying on the snow ground and round up their rescuers.  
52 Robbins describes how a junior high school student was rewarded with his science project “consisted of cutting 
the head off a living frog with a pair of scissors, to find out whether frogs swim better with or without their brains” 
(22). Robbins points out that this youngster learned disrespect animals through the experiment, though the science 
fair judges disagrees with him. After many examples mentioned, he further claims that “All animals—including 
those we have been taught to fear—can respond to love and give it” (33). While the book A Diet for a New America 
is entitled thus, it realizes what Lévinas said ethics should come from epistemology.  
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myself. That is, when the Other puts itself at my disposal—it does not react in any way which I 
need to take into consideration in order to mend my treatment to the Other. What I confront is 
not the Other but myself/my own conscience.  
To kill a deer to eat has a clear purpose (to sustain myself physically), whereas this 
purpose does not apply to killing a thousand deer. Therefore, meaning must be imposed in order 
to carry out the mass killing— a meaning created for justification. The one we are most familiar 
with is that of commodification, the circle of selling them, earning more money, buying more 
deer and killing more to sell. This is why Lévinas claims “killing one deer to eat” is enjoyable 
while “killing one thousand deers” (with its self-imposed purpose) only registers the Self’s 
cruelty and arrogance. This meaning-making process constitutes a Selfness/epistemology that 
breeds commodification, competition and fear, rendering the infinite into finite resources.  
It must be noted that Lévinas’s ethical theory of face-to-face encounter is based on 
human relations, according to the main tenets of his works Totality and Infinity (1969), and 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1998). Lévinas suggests that because animals do not 
have a face and language like humans, non human Others are excluded from entering into the 
ethical relations exclusive to humans. In such works, animals are mentioned only as a tool for 
Lévinas to explain transcendence: how humans should transcend their animality to become real 
humans. His only short essay about animals is “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights” collected 
in Difficult Freedom. This essay details his encounter with Bobby, the dog who welcomes the 
rabbles (Jewish captives) to Camp 1492 where they were held as prisoners by the German Nazis 
“stripped…of…human skin”, where they were “subhuman, a gang of apes” (DF, 153). Bobby 
however encounters them with face-to-face hospitality. Though they “were beings entrapped in 
their [Germans] species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without language” (DF, 153), 
Bobby’s unconditional love restored their humanity. That is, in Bobby’s presence, they were 
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human again. However, Lévinas seems to have difficulty in granting a reciprocal, unconditional 
welcome for Bobby (animals) because he soon reduces the dog to a metaphorical symbol.  
The fact that animals are excluded from enjoying the same unconditional welcome as 
humans may qualify Lévinas as a helpful figure in the environmental ethics discourse. Here, 
however, I second Barbara Jane Davy’s argument that one should interpret Lévinas’s writing 
about the Face metaphorically. Davy proposes that, while, for Lévinas, the Other must be a 
human being, the Other should be given an expansive meaning, that is, one should uphold a 
“phenomenological understanding of the Other beyond categories such as human, animal, plant, 
rock, wind, or body of water” (41). In light of this interpretation, Lévinas’s theory gains greater 
purview and can thus prove very insightful and productive vis-à-vis the theory and practice of 
environmental ethics. 
 To conclude, Albee’s play raises an issue to which Lévinas may provide an affirmative 
(ethical) answer. Without the Other, the Self will not be the Self. To ensure continuation of the 
human species, it is important to develop a respectful relationship toward the Other; this is also 
the best way for humans to access understanding of their essential Selves. The story of the 
spoons with handles so long that their handlers couldn’t use them to reach their mouths 
illuminates something essential in the Self-Other relationship. Everyone will starve if they try to 
feed themselves individually with the over-long spoon; but everyone gets fed if they learn to feed 
one another. The former individual-bound situation creates suffering, whereas the latter brings 
relief and comfort. Lévinas’s affirmation that ethics is the first philosophy applies to today’s 
world, as too often we see that violence breeds violence and that greed brings waste and 
degradation.   
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Chapter Four: 
Cultural Differences and Epistemology 
 
David Henry Hwang is best known for M. Butterfly, a play that ran for two years on 
Broadway and won the 1988 Tony, Drama Desk, John Gassner, and Outer Critics Circle Awards, 
and was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize. His Golden Child won a 1997 Obie Award for 
playwriting and subsequently moved to Broadway, where it received three 1998 Tony 
nominations. His latest play, Yellow Face, premiered in 2007 at Los Angeles's Mark Taper 
Forum and New York's Public Theater.  Hwang’s other plays include FOB (1981 OBIE Award), 
The Dance & the Railroad (1982 Drama Desk Nomination and Pulitzer finalist; CINE Golden 
Eagle Award), Family Devotions (1982 Drama Desk nomination), The House of Sleeping 
Beauties (1983), The Sound of a Voice (1983), Bondage (1992), Face Value (1993), and Trying 
to Find Chinatown (1996). He has also been awarded numerous grants, including fellowships 
from the National Endowment for the Arts, the Guggenheim and Rockefeller Foundations, the 
New York State Council on the Arts, and the Pew Charitable Trusts. In addition,  Hwang sits on 
the boards of the Dramatists Guild, Young Playwrights, Inc., and the Museum of Chinese in the 
Americas. From 1994-2001, he served by appointment of President Clinton on the President's 
Committee on the Arts and the Humanities. Such credits confirm the success that Hwang has 
enjoyed as a dramatist and points to the fascination that his plays have held for audiences across 
the country. Clearly he has established himself in the first rank of playwrights working today in 
the American theatre. 
In some measure Hwang’s rise and reputation can be attributed to changes in American 
culture witnessed in the 1960s, that is, the civil rights movement and the subsequent recognition 
and valuation of diversity, and the wider acceptance of multiculturalism.  The end of the 20th 
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century in U.S. history saw a marked rise in attention to minority groups, in all kinds of media 
imagery and academic discourse, with a greater visibility and importance achieved by women, 
gays and lesbians, the disabled, and people of color. This surge informed a new consciousness 
and sensitivity, leading to a society that in various ways attempted to follow concerns of 
political-correctness. This phenomenon also included an increased attention to the Asian-
American experience. With several Asian-related plays, such as The Dance & the Railroad, 
Trying to Find Chinatown, M. Butterfly, and so on, Hwang took the status as a key dramatist in 
theatre of ethnicity, as his worked helped to illuminate and contribute to an Asian-American 
history and to construct an Asian-American identity. Such an assessment of Hwang’s role and 
significance is highlighted by Ban Wang (Professor of Chinese and of comparative literature), 
who in his “Reimagining Political Community: Diaspora, Nation-State, and the Struggle for 
Recognition”, points out that “the evocation of the past” in Hwang’s plays “remains a viable 
means by which Chinese Americans may imagine their history through performance and 
storytelling” (251).  Linking Hwang’s emergence as an American playwright to the rise of 
multiculturalism in American culture emphasizes Hwang’s work as a vehicle of ethnic 
consciousness and identity—his success a consequence of his Asian-American lineage and 
ethnic-inflected drama. 53  
However, identifying Hwang as an Asian-American playwright who has risen to national 
prominence might be a qualification that Hwang does not like or think appropriate.54 On the one 
hand, winning a Tony Award for Best Play for 1988’s M. Butterfly brought Hwang accolades 
and attention, making him a figurehead and spokesperson in Asian-American circles in the 
                                                            
53 While some may define the term “race” differently from “ethnicity”, here I use them interchangeably. 
54 In an interview with Jack Viertel, Hwang said: “I remember being 23 and FOB opening at the Public and all of a 
sudden in certain circles I was considered a role model--the first profile of me ever published in the New York 
Times had the headline "I Write Plays to Claim a Place for Asian Americans"--which I don't think I even really said, 
but it just sort of came along with the job” (Viertel). 
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United States. On the other hand, however, such attention and focus have categorized Hwang’s 
works, marked them as limited to or exclusively concerned with racial issues. Rising as a 
playwright in the 1980s, when multiculturalism prospered, Hwang discovered that his ethnic 
background was easily foregrounded. Hwang, however, offers a view of race and ethnicity that 
challenges facile characterizations. While critics and audiences have frequently assigned him as 
the leading Asian-American playwright working today, he has endeavored to complicate racial 
awareness and thinking. Hwang is devoted to contravening the essentialization of the racial 
imaginary, and in many of his works about race—M. Butterfly, The Bondage, Face Value, The 
Yellow Face—the issue of “authenticity” has been a recurrent motif,55 and his plays have 
forwarded dramatizations of difference that emphasize contingency and relational-thinking 
(rather than purist identities and insular histories). 
Not being content with his racial identification, with his status as an Asian-American 
dramatist, Hwang has worked to expand such designation.  He has taken on work that highlights 
his writing skills (beyond his position as an Asian-Americanplaywright). Since his success with 
Golden Child in 1996, he has co-written the Disney-produced musical “Aida,” Disney’s 
“Tarzan,” and numerous other screenplays. Jana J. Monji points out that such works have a 
twofold function: they allow Hwang the opportunity to relax, to work on something other than 
race-related plays, without “the additional level of responsibility of representing Asians and 
Asian Americans.” Such works also serve as a marker of Hwang’s success, “proof that he wasn't 
boxed into an ethnic niche” (Monji). Despite such opportunity in different media, and despite his 
efforts in creating work that did not directly reflect his personal experience or background, 
Hwang did return to Asian-American subject matter; the urge to write an original play on his 
                                                            
55 Hwang has been criticized by Frank Chin as being inauthentic as a young playwright. But he does not believe 
there’s an idea of authenticity. See “David Henry Hwang Interview.” 
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past led in 2005 to the composition of the faux-memoir Yellow Face (Monji), a work which won 
him a third Obie Award in playwriting.   
The dilemma Hwang has faced is s not uncommon for minority writers.  First, their work 
may be evaluated by and promoted for its ethnic aspect; in this instance, questions of tokenism 
may arise. Such writers also face the problem of categorization—as they advance their work on 
racial or ethnic themes and issues, the reception and understanding of their work might invoke 
broad characterizations and essentialist understandings. One may argue that a politics that 
foregrounds multiculturalism may be commended, for seeking the recognition of pluralism and 
confronting racial prejudices that have remained active for hundreds of years; one may also 
detect problems with such a viewpoint, especially as it may risk an essentialized comprehension 
of different races and cultures. Where racial equality has not been realized, where pluralism has 
been slow to take hold, it is not likely that equality can be achieved simply by increasing the 
exposures of diverse cultures. In such cases, representation risks merchandising the essence of a 
certain group, playing down multiplicities within racial/cultural identities. Since the practices of 
“representation” are not unproblematic, it should not be deemed that simply presenting images of 
difference in and of themselves boost multiculturalism—a term that connotatively anticipates 
respect for diversity.  Ethel Pitts Walker, a female professor of theatre arts, in her essay “The 
Dilemma of Multiculturalism in the Theatre,” challenges the practices and applications of 
“multiculturalism,” which she describes as “presently a hollow cliché, a nomenclature clothing 
liberals who believe in some vague concept of equality”(10). 
In addition, multiculturalism may also be vulnerable to political forces. Joan W. Scott, an 
American historian who writes on French culture, observes: “If ‘political correctness’ is the label 
attached to critical attitudes and behavior, ‘multiculturalism’ is the program it is said to be 
attempting to enact” (13). If this view reveals multiculturalism enrooted in and issuing from 
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“political correctness,” instead of genuine ethical concern, then focus centers on political 
positioning and power structures.  And it is often the case that multicultural thinking presumes a 
center/margin dynamic, one that tacitly subordinates minorities. Walker writes: “Theorists 
generally define multiculturalism from a Western European basis, implying the assimilation of 
other groups into the base culture” (7). This aspect of multiculturalism then determines the view 
that “difference” is defined by and accepted through the enforcement of political forces; this 
outlook does not significantly acknowledge an ethical component—the ethical is relinquished, 
given over solely to the political arena.  
 As a driving force of identity politics for decades in America, multiculturalism appeals to 
the coexistence of difference racial/cultural groups. It reinforces an individual identification with 
collective attributes, i.e., race, culture, ideology, appearance, etc. Thus defined, identity politics 
is vulnerable to the accusation that it delimits individuals, reducing them to their appearance and 
characteristics; that is, it is a system of affirmative action tied to ethnic backgrounds and racial 
attributes.56 Embracing a pluralist framework, one that questions the  unified concept of identity, 
Scott challenges the common application of multiculturalism and argues, “identity is taken as the 
referential sign of a fixed set of customs, practices, and meanings, an enduring heritage, a readily 
identifiable sociological category, a set of shared traits and/or experiences” (14). Increased 
attention to multiculturalism and identity politics has drawn debate and different responses from 
U.S. political parties. Some political conservatives view any recognition of demographic 
diversity as a “dangerous orthodoxy”; some of their liberal opponents claim that exposure to 
diversity will enhance fairness and tolerance (Scott). While those on the left regard their 
opponents’ view as repressive, their own outlooks are not altogether unproblematic and 
                                                            
56“For example, Barack Obama did not run for president on a platform of ethnic recognition in a system of affirm
ative action but as a cosmopolitan, unraced intellectual” (“Multiculturalism and Beyond”). 
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frequently demonstrate a kind of “wishful thinking,” oversimplifying the issues of race and 
difference.  
Competing opinions from the right and left notwithstanding, one major concern of identity 
politics involves its tendency to generalize and naturalize a racial/cultural collective; identity 
politics suggests a presumed “authenticity” that draws a given group together as a monolithic 
whole. Hwang points out this dilemma of identity politics in a 2008 interview: “. . . in the 
generalization of a collected groups, and analysis only through the lens of power, it fails to attest 
to individual unique, etc.” (Qtd. in Viertel). Scott  confirms the point Hwang sets forth and 
further argues that the  naturalization of identity, by making it a matter of biology or history, 
assumes that people are “discriminated against because they are already different when, in fact, I 
would argue, it is the other way around: difference and the salience of different identities are 
produced by discrimination, a process that establishes the superiority or the typicality or the 
universality of some in terms of the inferiority or atypicality or particularity of others” (14-15).  
The problematic aspects of identity politics have drawn scholarly attention and critique. In 
Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading, Rey Chow argues that “contemporary 
multiculturalism risks fascism in its positive imagining of ethnic others” (Qtd. in Parikh 318), as 
it craves to generalize and idealize oppressed minority groups. Chow suggests that “idealism has 
been the primary mode through which cultural studies has attempted to establish a form of 
resistance theory, it is also this idealism by which the ‘other’ can say or do anything in the 
current climate without being considered wrong”. 57  Chow goes so far as to suggest, in the 
                                                            
      57 In the introduction to her collection of essays, Ethics after Idealism: Theory-Culture-Ethnicity-Reading, Rey 
Chow describes a particularly angry and telling response she encountered to her argument in this book that 
contemporary multiculturalism risks fascism in its positive imagining of ethnic others: “’Only she could write 
something like this,’ some readers charged, meaning, I suppose, that only a ‘woman of color’ and therefore a double 
minority, could possibly mount a criticism of multiculturalism as such without getting into trouble, without being 
labeled ‘racist’” (xxii). 
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contentious chapter titled “The Fascist Longings in Our Midst,” which analyzes the fundamental 
mechanisms of fascism, that “the positivistic desire that motivates the brutalities of organized, 
historical fascism is also at work in the liberal, multicultural celebration of Third World peoples” 
(Qtd. in Parikh 319). Such criticism highlights how liberal viewpoints, regardless of how well-
intentioned they may be, can activate dynamics that obscure aspects of difference and serve their 
own agendas. 
At the core of any fascistic enterprise is the element of domination, an exertion of violence 
that is often abetted by appeals to rationality. Chow’s critique of identity politics and its 
multicultural advocacy casts aspersion on those in positions of privilege, those who form a 
consensus and wield a politically-correct discourses, which themselves may exert a violence in a 
self-justifying manner. In short, this outlook, which subordinates the individual and particular to 
the provenance of the group, may practice a kind of totalitarianism.  
The dynamic of totalization stands of one of the crucial features of Western culture 
according to the thinking of Emmanuel Lévinas. The impulse toward totalization, for Lévinas, is 
evident in both Western philosophy and politics, aspects of a fundamental Western rationality.  
In much of Western politics there is a fear of difference and conflict; as Lévinas points out: “the 
Hobbesian claim that the peaceful order of society is constituted in opposition to the threat of the 
war of all against all” (emphasis mine; TI, 161). For Lévinas, “domination of the category of 
totality in Western philosophy is linked to the domination of totalizing forms of politics—
ultimately, Nationalism and Stalinism—and the complete reduction of the ethical to the 
political”(TI, 161). The unusual proposal of Lévinas’s philosophy involves the prioritization of 
the ethical over the political (at least before the political).  For Lévinas, the fundamental 
relationship is an ethical one, between the Self and the Other. This relationship demands a 
responsibility for the Other, without knowledge of the Other. Hence, Lévinas prioritizes ethics 
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over any ontological rational reduction, that ultimately leads to politics (the realm of government, 
jurisprudence and partisan power). 
Lévinas’s insights can prove illuminating and helpful when exploring issues of identity 
politics (and by extension in analyzing the plays of Henry David Hwang). Indeed, Lévinas’s 
notion of ethics—the relation between Self and Other— provides a helpful perspective when 
considering the advantages and drawbacks of identity politics and the sort of impasse it has come 
to inhabit. Defying the prioritization of rationality in Western philosophy, Lévinas proposes an 
ethics that is not dominated by a human-centered standpoint. Ethics does not involve issues of 
rights, legal claims, or group-belonging—it rather indicates a relation of obligation. 
Indeed, Lévinas is “useful” if one holds that identity politics has revealed evidence of 
exhausting itself. In an interview, literary critic and theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak notes 
that she has been “deeply troubled by identity politics” (Yan 430) because people get to know 
other parts of the world through a cartographic position instead of a face-to-face encounter. 
Other scholars have also expressed some concern with identity politics. Political theorist Lawrie 
Balfour elaborates on the danger of essentialization in his “Reparations after Identity Politics,” 
indicating that identity politics risks enshrining a view of minority as victims “whose moral 
authority is not subject to discussion or critique” (788). Insofar as politics hinges on guilt over 
those repressed in the past, identity politics invites the charge of divisiveness and engages in “the 
kind of shoring up of borders, internal and external, that produces new exclusions” (Balfour 788). 
This impasse identity politics faces today registers an urgent of a new set of ethics. 
Given this compromised position of identity politics, Lévinas’s theories of ethics offer 
alternative understandings and insights for the negotiation of difference. Emphasizing the 
importance of ethics and Self-Other relations, Lévinas asserts that identity alone does not 
account for human subjectivity. Identity politics, taking Lévinas’s cue, would appear to 
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overvalue the economy of interiority of subjectivity, thereby diminishing the significance of 
relations between interiority and exteriority.  For Lévinas, the ethical is prior to any identity 
position; it appears as a relation and not as an attribute or identifying quality. 
As Hwang strives to illustrate the dilemma of identity politics (mostly through his depiction 
of racial issues), one finds that Lévinas can be brought into a productive conversation with 
Hwang and his work. A number of Lévinas’s concepts prove helpful in analyzing Hwang’s 
dramas, including Lévinas’s understanding of time and the Other, his take on ontology and 
epistemology, and, of course, his  prioritization of ethics as the First Philosophy.  In sum, 
Lévinas advocates what has been termed “The Wisdom of Love,” and this concept proves very 
useful and illuminating when analyzing Hwang’s writing, especially his ideas on race, ethnic 
difference, and multicultural encounter.  
In his recent work, The Yellow Face (2007), a faux-memoir, Hwang addresses and 
challenges the tendency to denote “race” as differentiation maker, one that sustains a monolithic 
community in a globalized world. While he has himself served as a spokesperson for Asian 
Americans since M. Butterfly, he had not openly explored or fully questioned identity politics 
until this work. Though the success of M. Butterfly in the 1980s effectively served to shore up 
the call to political correctness and was used to advocate for multiculturalism and identity 
politics, Hwang did give some evidence of hesitation. In his 1984 work, The Sound of a Voice, 
Hwang exposed a problematic epistemological Self-Other encounter in the play, a problem 
embodied in romantic love. This early work did not confront identity politics in a straightforward 
way; however, the issues and relations that Hwang explored in this piece indicate a sort of 
foreshadowing, as the questions this work poses serve well to contextualize the questions he later 
raises about identity politics in The Yellow Face. 
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The first part of this chapter proceeds through two basic movements. The first explores 
Hwang’s understanding of Western epistemological models, as implied in The Sound of a Voice. 
The second uses Lévinas’s analysis of time to account for the differences between West and East, 
that is, a Western Self and an Eastern (i.e., non-Western) Other— the two indicating conflicting 
epistemological model. Gendering these oppositional epistemological models, Hwang has a man 
represent the Western, dominant and progressive historical view, given to a linear viewpoint of 
time; he uses a woman to represent an alternative view—the Eastern, subjective, given to a non-
linear viewpoint of time. As the play unfolds its tragic love story, it demonstrates how different 
epistemologies should seek interaction, to effect a co-existence, as opposed to a binary hostility. 
Advancing what Lévinas calls “the wisdom of love,” the play critiques the man’s pursuit of 
“light,” which indicates a “love of wisdom,” an outlook equated with traditional philosophy. 
Moreover, the manner in which the man experiences the Other (the woman) as something he 
must subsume and make surrender, highlights the violence inherent in traditional Western 
epistemology.  In short, in this play Hwang explores alternatives to Western rationalism and the 
impulse to totalize. 
While Sound of a Voice is not Hwang’s typical “race play,” it is a key play in tracing the 
trajectory of Hwang’s dramatic vision and thinking on matters of racial identity.  Given the 
work’s suspicion of the traditional Western epistemological model, upon which much of the 
understanding of race pivots, the play stands as a precursor to his later work, which more directly 
confronts issues of identity politics. The following analysis of Sound of a Voice thus functions as 
a point of entry for the chapter’s later discussion of the more mature and more acclaimed play, 
Yellow Face, which foregrounds racial identity as a guiding theme. In both works, one notes a 
suspicion of traditional epistemology, and, despite however well-intentioned that identity politics 
might be—in pursuing social equality—the fact that such a politics remains committed to a kind 
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of traditional epistemology signals a potential hazard (one that the work of Lévinas exposes and 
challenges).  Following discussion of The Sound of a Voice, the second half of this chapter will 
direct its attention to Hwang’s play Yellow Face and will further investigate questions of identity 
and ethical relations.  
The Wisdom of Love: The Interplay of Mythos and Logos in The Sound of a Voice 
Emphasizing continental philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas’s insistence on respect for 
difference and obligation to abject Others, scholar Silvia Benso reverses the conventional attitude 
of philosophy—“the love of wisdom”—and instead asserts “the wisdom of love.” The traditional 
notion emphasizes the love of knowledge/truth and encourages the consumption of the Other 
through an uncompromising rationality. As a consequence, this outlook generates a strict 
dichotomy between “self” and “non-self” (i.e., the Other). Benso reconfigures the fundamental 
aspects of the Self-Other relationship in terms of logos and mythos—the logical and non-logical 
accounts of reality respectively. Benso argues for “…a mutually regulated interplay of mythos 
and logos as a way to regain a sense of wisdom that remains respectful of the elements of 
otherness…[this interplay] results into a mytho-logy in which the logos [is] directing the 
mythos…” (117). In other words, the Other’s otherness should not be cordoned off from the 
Symbolic order, i.e., language, but should be respected, warranted and sustained in the Self’s 
realm through politics/and institutions. In view of Hwang’s play The Sound of a Voice, this 
reconciliation of the Self-Other relationship is embodied in the romance between a Japanese 
Samurai (Man, sword) and Hanako (Woman, flowers), the woman he loves. In his dramatization 
of their relationship, Hwang provokes consideration of broader matters of intimacy, outreach, 
and being-in-the-world with Others. 
 The Sound of a Voice retells a love entanglement set in ancient Japan. It is almost a 
universal love story, with both characters yearning to hear another voice in order to assuage their 
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loneliness. They, however, find themselves catapulted into collision, as their intimacy reveals 
different worlds in operation. This collision is not only reminiscent of many romantic 
relationships, it also suggests two different epistemological models embedded in gender 
relationships. Hurrying along with his sword on an indeterminate journey, the Samurai embodies 
a dominating, apocalyptic sense of linear (temporal) progress and urgency. He can only fall 
asleep amidst the sounds of a city, and he needs consistent practice in sword play so as to 
maintain his sense of control. For him, all things inscribe their existence on the longitudes and 
latitudes of time. Through this rational lens the world logically coheres among a motley 
collection of events and things. He upholds a rational epistemological model and a logical 
account of reality. His stance and outlook effectively demonstrate Plato’s attitude toward myths 
at the dawn of Western civilization and philosophy.  His vision also registers the woman as an 
unfamiliar entity in need of pinning down, of fixing within an orderly frame.  His Samurai 
journey may in fact be understood as his attempt to subsume the woman within his 
epistemological field, to bring her into his knowledge. 
For the man in this play, the world operates in terms of either victory or defeat. Hwang 
invests the first half of the play with romantic exuberance. This aspect is important because the 
man is high-spirited only when events play out in a dominating, apocalyptic and linear way—
reflecting a bellicose nature in matters of daily life. In scene three, the man helps the woman 
chop wood: “I enjoy it, you know. Chopping wood. It’s clean. No questions. You take your ax, 
you stand up the log, you aim—pow!—you either hit it or you don’t. Success or failure”(159). In 
scene five, he again helps her by scrubbing away the stubborn floor stain with “a little rhythm” 
(163). His joyful shout upon the removal of the stain conveys something significant about his 
perception of their romantic relationship. 
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MAN.  I didn’t think I could do it. . . but there—it’s gone—I did it! 
WOMAN.  Yes. You did. 
MAN.  And you—you were great. 
WOMAN.  No—I just watched.  
MAN.  We were a team! You and me!     
(Man grabs Woman. Pause)     (Hwang 163) 
Over something as trivial as scrubbing the floor, the man gives over his affection for the 
woman. More specifically, this is a moment where their differences are reconciled,as they join to 
fight off a common “enemy.” Only when she is secured as “part of him”—meaning, she is 
playing the appropriate role in his social expectations—can he develop romantic feelings toward 
her.  
As a warrior, the man girds his sword at all times. When first led into the woman’s house, 
he keeps his hands on the hilt in a watchful manner, before the woman invites him to join her at 
tea. He has come to the woman’s dwelling with a purpose—sent by the “outside world” (the 
village), where it is rumored that the woman is a witch. This purpose not only represents the 
masculine/logical and conquering spirit, but also signifies his craving for control and his 
apprehension over being devoured by the mythical Other. He never appears on stage without a 
prop with him. The axe and scrubber serve as supplements to the sword, functioning as means to 
control and fight off the enemy. Ironically while both the axe and scrubber are designed to have 
their own “enemies,” the sword’s only enemy, as the play’s action will show, is a fly. In scene 
seven, the Samurai is gleeful over his victorious achievement of chopping a fly in two—so much 
so that he insists on giving her some “pointers” (166) on swordsmanship. At the height of his 
pride, he, however, soon experiences defeat, and the subsequent rout will tarnish his career as a 
warrior. With the dramatic tensions now heightened, the story takes on a chilling and tragic tone.  
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Among the primary issues of this play is that of time, and how different measurements of 
time hinder the romance between Hanako and the Samurai. In this instance, Lévinas’s alternative 
notion of time can help to illuminate the play’s text and its theatrical performance, as the 
epistemological model of Lévinas suggests a view of time that marks the burgeoning of a 
contemplation of the Other (which will later inform his theory of alterity).  
Traditional Western epistemology has subsumed time via a human-centered perspective and 
rationale. However, for Lévinas, this ontological comprehension of time is problematic. It entails 
a forced logic indicative of a linear movement of time throughout history. The fact that “now” 
both passes and comes along in the same moment is itself contradictory. This paradox proves 
that such an understanding of time is framed within a subjective perception of reality, with time 
existing solely for its own end.   
In a linear movement of time, “the present encroaches upon the future” (Lévinas EE, 95). 
Lévinas defines Now as the virile ego and denotes Future as an unknown Other. In a linear 
perception of time, however, as Future automatically flows into Now, it loses its alterity; an 
understanding exists solely for the Self’s end. In that tradition, Now consumes Future, and 
perpetually triumphs over Future, as Self triumphs over the Other. The subject, in this 
epistemological model, remains enclosed in “an instant,” imagining itself progressing into the 
future. However, for Lévinas, the Self is merely entrapped in cyclical instants.  
In that instant, it “constitutes its own object” and produces “its own interior for signs of its 
conformity with being” (Lévinas MHO, 12). “I” circulates across instants, linking a series of 
coming Nows, which are termed as Future (Lévinas EE, 95). In other words, the rationality 
forming a subject’s epistemology registers only a dialogue between Self and its soul. For Lévinas, 
this ontological understanding of time informs the Self’s “long tradition of pride, heroism, 
domination and cruelty” (TTO, 103). Lévinas later connects time “to the alterity of the other 
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person, and progressively radicaliz[es] the sense of the Other’s alterity” (Lévinas TOAE, 6). He 
claims in Existence and Existents: “the dialectic of time is the very dialectic of the relationship 
with the other, that is, a dialogue which in turn has to be studied in terms of other than those of 
the dialectic of the solitary subject” (96).58 
The relationship between Now and Future, Self and the Other, Lévinas proposes, should be 
perceived within an ethical relationship instead of an ontological one. That is, Future is not an 
instant that will automatically become Now, but is instead an absolute Other that can only be 
reached through a transcendence of subjectivity. Future only comes about when the Self breaks 
its solitude and engages with an alterity coming only from the Other.59 Hence the Self should 
bow to the Other because only through subjugating itself to the Other can Self construct its own 
subjectivity. Alterity of the Other cannot be understood in ontological terms, but in ethical 
terms.60 
In The Sound of a Voice Hwang presents two understandings of time: the man’s ontological 
terms of time (the cyclical instants) and the woman’s ethical terms of time (Time only exists 
when the Other comes).  Hwang sets The Sound of a Voice in an indeterminate time frame, with 
the transition between scenes coming as a rotation of night and day. While bemused by the 
                                                            
58As Lévinas states in his short essay, “Martin Heidegger and Ontology”: “the subject itself will constitute its own 
object” (12). He presents a cautious warning about subjective being enclosed within “its own interior for signs of its 
conformity with being…[because from] there, it is but a step to idealism” (12). This dialogue between “self and its 
soul” is dangerous in the sense that it situates itself within the chain of signification and imagines its own 
transcendental signifier (i.e., God) to justify or even glorify its own violence toward the Other. Moreover, in “Is 
Ontology Fundamental?”(Lévinas BPW, 9), Lévinas claims that because a being only exists when it comes into my 
comprehension (when it is enlightened), “I” do not invoke it, but instead name it and possess it. That “possession is  
the mode whereby a being, while existing, is partially denied”, indicating such a being is under my power. This  
being is also no means or tool of mine, but an end in and of itself  because it offers itself to me. Lévinas argues that  
even if the being is dominated by me, I do not possess it. 
59The Other can be demonstrated through death. Death is not the end of subjectivity, but signifies an unknown realm 
outside epistemology that constructs subjectivity. In other words, unknowability and absolute alterity characterize 
Death and/as Future. Lévinas claims: “Death is never now” (Lévinas TI, 72) because the instant of now is 
subjectivity’s realm. When Death comes, the subjects loses its reign and is no longer itself.  
60Lévinas holds that the subject should not only subjugate itself to the holy Other, but further held as a hostage. We 
never know what death is, or what future will bring, hence we can only be passively subsumed into it, becoming part 
of it. It is something that reverses the subject from active to passive. While “the now is the fact that I am master, 
master of the possible, of grasping the possible”, death is “the end of virility” (Lévinas TI, 73).  
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woman’s temporal cognition, the man defines time as an antagonistic relationship. 
Characterizing life as a state in constant mobility, he notes: “Traveling is a matter of timing. 
Catching the light” (158). Like a predator, the man hounds the daylight like his sword hunts an 
enemy, riving the world according to the dualism of Self and Other. The woman, however, views 
time differently and with an alternative reality. Their divergent models of epistemology can be 
well demonstrated through their conversation about flowers in scene two: 
MAN.  You must have received these [flowers] very recently. I would guess— 
   within five days.  
                 WOMAN.  I don’t know. But I wouldn’t trust your estimate. It’s all in the amount 
of care you show to them. I create a world which is outside the realm of what you 
know. 
                 MAN.  What do you do? 
                WOMAN.  I can’t explain. Words are too inefficient. It takes hundreds of  words to 
describe a single act of caring. With hundreds of acts, words become irrelevant. . .    
(159) 
The woman’s disbelief in the man’s estimation suggests that the flowers have lasted longer than 
five days, since she puts so much effort into caring them. For the man, it is only natural that 
flowers blossom at a certain point of time, just as they shrivel up and die at another. So he 
estimates that the fresh flowers must have appeared within the past five days. For him, it is 
nothing but a matter of time, instead of a matter of care. However, the flower he pilfers in scene 
one shrivels up later in scene four (because he does not know how to take care of it), implying 
that care is “outside of the realm he knows.” Flowers are not something he can control, at least 
not with his sword (which connotes the ontological understand of linear time). This revelation 
later sparks within him an inner fear, especially when this anxiety is aggravated by the rumors—
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the mythical accounts of the woman as witch and how he will be trapped in the never-dying 
flowers—told to him by the villagers.  
In my February 2009 production (Hatcher Hall Theatre, Louisiana State University) of the 
piece, I called for a vase of flowers to be placed in the center of the stage during the half-hour 
pre-show; it was my intent for the flowers/prop to serve as a guiding symbol, conveying the core 
emotion of the play and bringing the audience into Hanako’s entropic reality. The prop helped 
reveal the man as an intruder, implicitly identifying the performance setting as the woman’s 
territory. As an extension of the woman, the flowers then took on in a symbolic way her passion 
and loneliness.  
In Hwang’s play, the woman (Hanako) appears to be illogical and mythical in terms of time 
and its passage. She tells the Samurai: “I lose track [of time]. . . I don’t consider time when there 
is no voice in the air. It’s pointless. Time begins with the entrance of a visitor, and ends with his 
exit” (156). In her outlook, time itself is cyclical, [MAN: The light? WOMAN: It will return. 
(159)]. Unlike the man, she does not “catch the light” so that her flowers might bloom. Time is 
never experienced in competitive terms, and she does not cry out for “advancement.” The 
Present does not consume the Future in her reality. Time only seems evident when a 
stranger/visitor comes in for her to care for. Her account of reality is reminiscent of Lévinas’s 
characterization of time—time only exists when the Other enters her world and she becomes 
subject to it. It is “the amount of care” that she puts into the Other (flowers/ visitors), instead of 
her exquisite control of the sword. By subjugating herself to the Other—in this case the romantic 
relationship—she is able to transcend the “instant” characterized by recurrence of “the same.”61 
                                                            
      61 It refers to the recurrent instants, but can expand to Lévinas’s usage of this term. Peperzak points out that in 
Totality and Infinity, Lévinas uses The Same to characterize “the whole of Western philosophy, whereas ‘the infinite’ 
indicates the transcendence suppressed by that same tradition.” The Same “concretizes itself in the behavior of a 
monopolistic ego and the totality of Greek and European philosophy” (120). What is significant, however, is that 
Lévinas does not “fall into the trap of a contrary opposition” because “without any sameness…only the dispersion of 
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In other words, it is not time per se but her relationship with the Other that determines the nature 
of time and constructs her subjectivity. In short, she demonstrates on an existence outside of 
linear time and suggests a different way of understanding Self and Other. 
In my production, the vase of flowers was the only one prop on the minimalist stage. I 
marked the space as the woman’s domain. The location of the vase shifted as the scenes 
progressed. At times it was set on a shelf, serving only as a house decoration. At other times (as 
in scene two where the above conversation takes place) it occupied center stage, symbolizing the 
relationship the woman decides to nurture. By a metonymic process, one that advanced with the 
rising dramatic tension, the vase of flowers became an indicator of the play’s gender relationship 
as well as an image of the daunting and mystical Other. 
Fraught with suspicion of Hanako’s mythical existence (and the rumored imprisonment of 
visitors), the Samurai hesitates to respond to Hanako’s passion. Their encounter exemplifies the 
kind of Self-Other relationship Lévinas condemns—one that emphasizes logic and progress 
while reducing the Other to a mythical existence. This dynamic is best demonstrated when the 
man is defeated by the woman. Amazed by the woman’s technique, the bitter man begins to 
recount the rumors circulated about the woman throughout the village. He also affirms these 
stories by confessing that he senses that the woman’s face has changed since he first saw her. On 
the other hand, fostering the relationship with meticulous care, the woman nonetheless is afraid 
of what her superior technique (of swordplay) might bring about. 
WOMAN.  All visitors do [leave]. I know. I’ve met many. . . There are 
boundaries outside of   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
an extreme atomism would remain, which would be the end of all philosophy and thought in general” (130-131).  
What’s crucial is the ethical relationship between the same and the irreducible Other. In  
terms of time, The Same denotes how a being is entrapped in the recurrent instant. See Peperzak’s The Quest of  
Meaning.  
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which visitors do not want to see me step. Only who knows what those 
boundaries are?   Not I. They change with every visitor. You have to be 
careful not to cross them, but you never know where they are. And one day. . . 
you step outside the lines. The visitor knows. You don’t. You didn’t know that 
you’d done anything different. You thought it was just another part of you. 
The visitor sneaks away. The next day, you learn that you had stepped outside 
his heart. . .   (168) 
What provokes an even deeper fear in the Samurai is his awareness that he might become like 
the flowers. Because he cannot understand the woman through “words” (i.e., language), he views 
her through the epistemological lens that is available to him, that is, the way of looking at the 
world provided by his training as a warrior. More specifically, he imagines the woman as another 
mysterious warrior with a (different kind of) sword. This fear grows greater until he loses his 
confidence when defeated. From that point on, he imagines a human inside the petals of flowers 
[MAN. …It hums. It hums with the peacefulness of one who is completely imprisoned. (169)]. 
In this way of understanding, he regards the woman’s care no longer as a signifier of the 
tenderness between the lovers but as the scythe of a reaper.  
MAN.  I came here with a purpose. The world was clear. You changed the shape  
        of your face, the shape of my heart—rearranged everything—created a world  
        where I could do nothing.    (174) 
The basic story of The Sound of a Voice is a simple one; the travelling warrior comes into the 
space of the woman and encounters a challenge, one involving love and conquest.  In short, how 
can he be in a loving relation with Hanako and still retain his status and world-view as a samurai? 
Entering her world also demands commitment to a new order of time—how can the warrior react 
and respond? 
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The struggle and interaction of the play is effectively conveyed through the play’s key 
properties. While the sword represents the rigid order of linear time and its concomitant ideology 
(i.e., Symbolic Order— the language), the lexicon of the “floral language” proves to somewhat 
more complicated. Chiefly associated with the woman, the flowers, are definitely not limited to a 
singular symbolic meaning. As the play unfolds, the characters quickly take on the masks of 
mysterious beings, functioning to subvert linear time and sheer causality. The romantic 
dimension colors the relationship between the Samurai and the woman. As the man struggles 
with the romantic love and his mission as a warrior, the flowers act in a multivalent way--they 
are passive, enervated, and prone to victimization from the man’s epistemological lens; on the 
other hand they serve as a formidable penitentiary that imprisons the once-virile warrior.  
At end the play concludes tragically, and the love between the characters does not come to 
fruition. The warrior appears finally disheartened and dispirited, as though effectively castrated 
and divested of power. He steps into the space of the woman and sees her dangling feet beneath a 
curtain. She is revealed hanging. This conclusion indicates that the interaction between the two 
modes of existence of frames of understanding have found no synthesis. On one level, it can be 
thought that the woman has been killed by the warrior’s world order, by his epistemological 
context. The closing image of the play highlights an empty vase, the flowers vacated, indicating 
both the absence of the woman’s body and “woman’s time” in history.  
 The Sound of a Voice achieves strong dramatic effect through a simple love story; however, 
the confrontation between the warrior and the woman draws powerful and psychological and 
relational conflicts into play.  In terms of Self-Other relationships, this ending reveals that the 
woman/Other suffers from categorization, from being forced under the labels that the man/Self 
tries to impose on her. As he seeks to gain power of her, the man shows himself susceptible to 
the susperstitious “stories,” trumped up by the outside villagers, tales that tell of the woman as 
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witch imprisoning her visitors. His reaction to these stories and his consequent attempts to wield 
power poignantly demonstrate a dynamic of domination in this instance of how the Self treats the 
Other.   
In the man’s world, romantic affection can only occur when the Other takes on a submissive 
stance, when the lover caters to him, i.e., the Self. Romantic love is thus conditional. Moreover, 
the lover can be made into a scapegoat, punished on account of Self’s fear of being enervated 
and rendered effeminate. Romantic feelings only happen when the Self feels good about itself or, 
in this case, feels secure within its own territory. Romantic love represents the Self-Other 
relationship in a powerful and fundamental way, in that it most effectively registers humanity’s 
paradox of being—a condition perpetually caught between a perpetual craving for the Other and 
its own fear of self-diminishment, of the blurring the of boundaries between subjectivity and the 
Other.   
The fundamental epistemological model of Self-Other can be identified at the core of 
romance. What is more, the human Self replicates this same model in its treatments of racial 
Others, animal-others, etc.  If the practice of any kind of tenderness, or any love or altruism 
depends upon the “sure” Self, one confident of boundaries and self-empowerment, what does 
this mean for human interactions—for  justice, charity, sympathy, morality, and so on? In short, 
does love only come after the assertion of the Self has been secured? That this understanding 
might be held as true and right keenly worried Lévinas, who claimed that ethics should be the 
First Philosophy, that obligation and responsibility should precede the Self in its particular 
situation, in its particular identity.  
One can see how aspects of Lévinas’s outlook come into play in Hwang’s work. The way in 
which The Sound of a Voice conveys different understandings of time echoes Lévinas’s 
reflections on a non-linear, non-sequential time, and how different models of time privilege 
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different understandings of the Self and Other. Certainly the emphasis Hwang gives to the Self-
Other relation in the love story of the play evidences his fascination with alternative ways of 
understanding the Self and Other, his fascination with  exploring the wisdom of love. Indeed, the 
origins of the story between the warrior and the woman indicate religious aspects. Considering 
that the Japanese Ikebana (the way of flowers) originates from a religious tribute to Buddha, the 
tangled relationship between sword and flowers reflects the story of Shakyamuni Buddha’s 
enlightenment—an epiphany when he successfully transforms swords into flowers.62 Hwang’s 
fascination with this story indicates his openness to other modes of conception, to challenging 
and expanding the Western preoccupation with rationality and knowledge.  
This image of transforming swords into flowers points to Lévinas’ss insights and the pursuit 
of the wisdom of love. As the image holds oppositions in a kind of unification, it also 
correspondes to Benso’s suggested modality of Self and Other, as inspired by both Plato and 
Lévinas.63 Being aware of rationality’s rigidity, with its tendency to sublate opposite terms, 
Benso encourages faithfulness to the ambiguity of reality (123).  In The Wisdom of Love, Or: 
Negotiating Mythos and Logos with Plato and Lévinas, she carefully averts the traditional 
                                                            
      62 As Mara (the evil god of change and death) bars him from his quest, Shakyamuni Buddha transforms the 
shooting arrows and swords into flowers. This moment demonstrates Shakyamuni Buddha’s enlightenment, and also 
implies a new envisioning of a harmonious Self-Other symbiosis. In her book, When Things Fall Apart, Pema 
Chodron interprets this as a matter concerning the perception of reality. “What may appear to be an arrow or a sword 
we can actually experience as a flower” (65). Thus, while the gnawing confusion of reality hurls spears and swords 
toward us, staunch belief in exercising reason is where humanity’s happiness is enshrined. So it is not surprising that 
philosophy becomes “the love of wisdom.” Here, subsumption of everything into the spectrum of human knowledge 
can consign us to security and happiness. However, for Chodron, it is the shunning of reality that causes eternal 
suffering.  
      63 The war logos (the mortals) waged on mythos (the immortals) can be dated back to Plato. Originally, both 
mythos and logos play their compromising, if not distinctly equivalent, roles as the ways to approach the world. 
However, Plato challenges the oral culture which privileges images over rationalized written form, and subjugates 
the narrative of mythologies toward an educational end. The unverifiable discourse of mythos then becomes a 
narrative one that must be guided by verifiable discourse—an argumentative discourse led by logos. In How 
Philosophers Saved Myths: Allegorical Interpretation and Classical Mythology, Luc Brisson compares “mythos/ 
logos” to “unverifiable discourse/ verifiable discourse” and suggests that the latter term, namely “logos” and 
“verifiable discourse” of each, contrarily falls in the realm of philosophy. In this process, mythical discourse is not 
effaced. Instead, it transits from a dominating role to a subordinating role. Philosophy, then, becomes the love of 
wisdom, negating the original validity of mythological/imaginative narrative accounts. 
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opposition between mythos and logos and instead proposes a negotiated version of interplay 
between them. Predomination on either side is dangerous. She further remarks: “…mere myths 
are self-centered.” (123); “Philosophy reveals not the essence of reality, but the canvas, the fabric, 
the relations of which reality is made… (122). Both mythos and logos interweave and work to 
create what we know as reality, and both should operate as counterpoint against the potential 
dictatorship of one or the Other.  
The Sound of a Voice thus stands as an early play in Hwang’s career which reveals the 
playwright’s concern with forms of knowing, with categories of relation, with different ways of 
understanding the interplay of Self and Other. The play’s suspicion of an over-emphasis on 
rationality, on the warrior’s mode of knowing and the impositions it brings to the Other, 
foreshadows and helps illuminate his later work, and his later concern with the dynamics of 
labeling and viewing human relations in terms of rationalist modes and rigid identifications. 
 The Yellow Face 
Highlighting the motif of “authenticity,” Hwang’s race plays, notably M. Butterfly, The 
Bondage, and Trying to Find Chinatown, can be seen as an investigation in racial identification 
and a challenge to common modes of naming and categorization—the plays challenge traditional 
understanding and the emphasis on “the love of wisdom.” Presupposing the essence of a certain 
group and naturalizing what binds that group, be it blood, attribute, customary behavior, culture, 
etc., invites challenge by Hwang.  He regards such a viewpoint with skepticism and looks with 
suspicion upon “authenticity,” which indicates “the love of wisdom” (anthropology) and the 
worship of knowledge. But both Hwang and Lévinas question this rationalist mode of marking 
and sorting the world.  In short both are concerned with what falls under the umbrella of 
“knowledge/philosophy” and what falls beyond.   
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In Sound of a Voice Hwang reveals that essentializing the Other is a means to turn the 
Other into an “object of knowing.” This assertion of knowledge, which then becomes “authentic 
truth,” serves to inform and organize the reality we experience every day. Under such an 
epistemological lens, woman’s existence is deemed problematic and intolerable (which leads to 
the anxiety and destabilization for the warrior). Lévinas’s theories demonstrate that it is through 
this violent subjugation of the Other, through this essentialization, that the inner reality of the 
Self is completed and secured. In other words, essentialization is a project carried out by Western 
epistemology; such an outlook implies a totalitarian politics that tends to know Others only 
through an epistemological prism, one that fails/refuses to recognize the Other’s alterity and 
uniqueness. 
Such ways of thinking play a crucial role in how one understands multiculturalism and 
identity politics. Many of Hwang’s race plays can in effect be seen as a challenge to and a 
critique of this way of thinking. In having his characters constrained and afflicted by such an 
epistemological model, one  characterized by the subsumption of the Other into the Western 
realm of knowledge,64 Hwang questions not only the “authenticity” of the empowered Self but 
also the supposed essence of the disempowered racial Other. By declaring “[as] our nation 
becomes increasingly diverse, traditional definitions of race become blurred, and, in the ideal 
world, we will choose our own identities” (Qtd. in Lee rev. of Tokens? 666), Hwang not only 
urges a harmonious symbiosis of people bracketed in multivalent racial categories, but ultimately 
envisages a world where such categories lose their linguistic and cultural potency. Lévinas’s 
notion of philosophy as “the wisdom of love” then helps to contextualize Hwang’s effort in 
destabilizing a fixed imagination of racial relations and the treatment it condones. 
                                                            
64 See Edward Said’s Orientialism. 
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This ideal and approach embodied in his questioning “what is Asian American,” illuminates 
Hwang’s cultural status and position. In the United States, Asian Americans seem to inhabit an 
ambiguous space in America’s racial knowing. In “The State and Subject of Asian American 
Criticism: Psychoanalysis, Transnational Discourse, and Democratic Ideals,” David Leiwei Li 
attributes the exclusion of Asian American citizenship to the constitution of the nationality:  
“…an American universal of abstract citizenship is historically embodied in the 
particulars of a European morphology, whether it is in the form of the national 
image, its proper genealogy, or institutional and cultural legitimacy. The dominant 
particular is presented as an inclusive universal but translated historically and 
materially as a practice of excluding other particulars. In this historical imaginary of 
the American democratic vista, the Asian American is that which exists without a 
proper name and an appropriate contour” (282). 
 
This passage indicates the Self-Other relationship Hwang suggests in The Sound of Voice, 
wherein the Other is instilled within the Self’s knowledge. The imagination of the American 
nationality is hinged on a totalitarian outlook, fixing the Other and excluding the Other to 
complete its own subjectivity. In short, the West uses the East to assure its own cohesion. 
Case in point is M. Butterfly, an avatar of Orientalist fantasy played out in political, racial 
and gender contexts. The process of subjecting/falling in love with Song, a cross-dressing 
Chinese opera singer, enables the French diplomat to envisage and maintain his unified, coherent 
view of reality. That is, the racial/sexual/political Other is subjugated in his knowledge, a frame 
which he maintains under his control. The play ends, as is well known, with Gallimard finding 
out his that his logic has gone topsy-turvy--Song is a male spy who comes to him with a political 
purpose. M. Butterfly thus well demonstrates Hwang’s concern with Western knowing and with 
the ambiguous and constraining categories given to the Asian-Other. 
Hwang’s career exhibits the writer’s continued concern with this topic, though he 
complicates his thinking on identity. His 1992 play Bondage “explores human identity but moves 
away from the playwright's earlier concerns about immigrant cultural integrity and toward 
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questions about the validity of ethnic identities in general” (“Bondage”) This play is set in a 
parlor where an unidentified dominatrix named Terrie role- plays with her client, Mark; in 
various scenarios he encounters different ethnic Others. The interactions between the client and 
the costumed Others highlights the display of prejudiced racial attributes. Each new scenario 
allows the audience to witness the arbitrariness of stereotypical racial impressions: “blondes as 
bimbos, Asians as geeks, and African Americans as sexual beasts exist only in the realm of 
pretend” (“Bondage”). The play dramatizes the detrimental effects of such thinking, and the 
impediment that such racial attitudes set before person to person intimacy.  Here Mark and the 
dominatrix can only come into a kind of communication once the costumes have been stripped 
away, each identity divested (indicating the artificiality of costume and stereotype).  
The issue of “authenticity” is further addressed in Hwang’s 1996 play, Trying to Find 
Chinatown, where the images of racial identity collapse and reform in mixed fashion. Ronnie, an 
Asian American, is offended by Benjamin, a Caucasian adoptee of an Asian-American family, 
when the latter presupposes that Ronnie automatically knows where Chinatown is because of his 
appearance. The authenticity issue is re-contextualized and complicated through biological and 
adoptive connections, which highlight the fluid and changeable use of the term “race.” What 
Hwang intends is a rethinking of race and an acknowledgement of its many complications. 
Writing in her review of Tokens?: The NYC Asian American Experience on Stage, Josephine Lee 
corroborates Hwang’s outlook: “even seemingly obsolete notions of race are barely ‘blurred,’ 
never mind ‘dead.’ Instead such racisms are continually resurrected in ever more complicated 
ways” (666).65 
                                                            
65 Also, in About Face: Performing Race in Fashion and Theater, Dorinne Kondo mentions that “Hwang tells of a 
white woman in the audience who proclaimed her shock that Asian Americans were raising issues of racism (1994). 
She clearly viewed Asian Americans as model minorities, assuming that racism for us is no longer an issue. Her 
anger/guilt/doubt/surprise may have been shared by many members of the audience” (236). 
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Though considered something of a failure, Hwang’s 1993 play Face Value (which he would 
rework into his 2007 play Yellow Face) highlights another dynamic of racial thinking. 
Advancing the view that race is a mask, that it is to some extent performative, Face Value stands 
as a satire of the Miss Saigon controversy of 1991.66As Hwang’s second Broadway work, Face 
Value also covers material that is similar to that of his previous race plays. Like Bondage and 
Trying to Find Chinatown, Face Value also problematizes the notion of authenticity, here 
through a farcical situation of mistaken racial identities: two Asian-American actors dressed in 
whiteface plan to interrupt a show featuring a Caucasian actor dressed in yellowface. The 
farcical situation ends with an array of couples paired with partners of another race. 
Unfortunately, Face Value closed before it would have officially opened in 1993, as a 
consequence of “audience reaction, poor box-office performance, and the artistic and production 
team’s assessments” (Kondo 235). Despite the play’s lack of success, anthropology and 
American studies professor Dorinne K. Kondo points out that “[a] complex politics of reception 
was at work during the production of the play” and that the “chilly reception” the play received 
indicated that “ Hwang had touched a nerve about race”67 (235-36).  
Kondo’s observation about Hwang’s touching a nerve with Face Value points to the fact 
that racial concerns of Asian American groups have not died down but have become more 
complicated and problematic. Most of Hwang’s racial works until this point—M. Butterfly, 
                                                            
66 The controversy began with the casting of Jonathan Pryce, a white actor, to play the role of the Eurasian engineer 
in the Broadway production of Miss Saigon. In response to a clamorous protest from Asian American groups, 
Cameron Mackintosh, the producer, allegedly claimed he had “look[ed] under every rock” in search of an Asian 
American actor but failed to find one. United Actors’ Equity recognized Asian Americans’ protest and, as a result, 
did not issue a card for Pryce to work in the US. This decision, then led Mackintosh to cancel the show. However, 
succumbing to the loss of millions of dollars and jobs for theatre people due to the cancellation, Actors’ Equity 
reversed their decision. Miss Saigon opened in February 1991 featuring Pryce as the Engineer (Kondo 229).  
67 Kondo, in About Face: Performing Race in Fashion and Theater, includes negative reviews: “Kevin Kelly of the 
Boston Globe wrote, ‘Face Value illuminates very little. It proves as shrill as its real-life stimulus [her emphasis]. 
Worse, for all the intensity of its message, it’s labored and unfunny.” She also mentions that “audience nervousness 
around race may indicate that a farce about race, especially by a person of color, may be too unsettling at this 
historical juncture. Hwang opined that audiences, both in Boston and on Broadway, were unsure whether or not it 
was alright to laugh” (236).  
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Bondage, Trying to Find Chinatown and Face Value—pointed to a resistance to this traditional 
epistemology model, one that seeks to naturalize the Other. This concern is in sympathy with 
Lévinas, in that both affirm the danger of totalitarian politics, i.e., labeling and stereotyping in 
the case of races.  
Hwang envisions a state where there is an openness with identity, where identity is not a 
constraint and may have more fluid meaning (and may involve some degree of choice).  This 
could mean that Hwang suggests that identity per se should not exist. Or Hwang may indicate 
that some of the almost a priori appeal to attributes, i.e., race, gender, sexuality, etc. should not 
predetermine a person’s outlook or worth.  For instance, one can choose to be in a group where 
that shares the same value system, like Americans share the democratic outlook. Regardless of 
how Hwang specifically views the limits or possibilities of identity, he seems to argue, in 
keeping with Lévinas, that an ethics comes before identity.  
After 17 years, Hwang reworked the material of Face Value and produced the brilliant play 
Yellow Face, a piece that exhibited a strategic shift in the playwright’s thinking on race and 
ethnicity. Yellow Face is divided into two acts. A form of “mocumentary,” facts and fantasies are 
interwoven throughout the entire play. This strategy aims to mock the alleged objective stance of 
the media, as seen in the framing of the face-off between DHH68 (stage character of Hwang) and 
the reporter in the second act.  
Act I employs “the scattershot quoting of headlines, bylines, and datelines to identify its 
events and characters” (Gross). The first event is a recap of the Miss Saigon controversy, which 
began with the casting of Jonathan Pryce, a white actor, to play the role of the Eurasian engineer 
in the Broadway production of Miss Saigon. In response to a clamorous protest from Asian 
                                                            
68 DHH is the embodiment of Hwang himself in Yellow Face. But because this is a faux memoir, DHH does not 
equate to Hwang. 
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American groups, Cameron Mackintosh, the producer, allegedly claimed he had “look[ed] under 
every rock” in search of an Asian- American actor but failed to find one. United Actors’ Equity 
recognized Asian Americans’ protest and, as a result, did not issue a card for Pryce to work in 
the US. This decision, then led Mackintosh to cancel the show. However, anticipating the loss of 
millions of dollars and jobs for theatre people due to the cancellation, Actors’ Equity reversed 
their decision. Miss Saigon opened in February 1991 featuring Pryce as the Engineer (Kondo 
229). 
This complicated and contentious production context informs the background of the play, 
in which Hwang writes himself in as a character. The situation grows more complicated (and 
here one notes the issues of racial purity and fluid identity) when Hwang depicts himself as DHH 
in the casting process in Face Value. While one of the two actors who comes to the audition, 
Rodney Hatamiya, is obviously an Asian American, Hwang does not choose him. Hwang instead 
prefers another actor, Marcus G. Dahlman, whose appearance is a hundred percent Caucasian but 
whose racial background remains unclear.  Because Actor’s Equity rules that a producer cannot 
ask about an actor’s ethnicity, Marcus is able to hedge his bets on the matter.  
DHH’s decision to cast Marcus creates a crisis. This decision has many implications, for 
the leading man in Face Value is supposed to be an Asian masked in  white face, as a parody of 
the traditional “yellow face.” However, when the casting director asks, “does he look Asian to 
you?” DHH is faced with a dilemma and must confront the question of “authenticity”:  
STUART.  But guys, does he--? Does he look Asian to you? 
DHH.  What do you mean, “look Asian”? 
STUART.  Well, he doesn’t seem to possess—any Asian features…at all. 
DHH.  And what exactly are “Asian features”? 
STUART.  He’s got dark hair, but— 
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DHH.  Short, high cheekbones, slanty eyes?  
STUART.  David— 
DHH.  I gotta say, I find your question sort of offensive. Asian faces   
    come in a variety of shapes and sizes—just like any other human beings. Which  
    we are, you know. 
      STUART.  Miles, is he Asian? 
NEWMAN.  . . . He’s not full-blooded— 
DHH.  He’s Eurasian. You want to start discriminating against them now? 
STUART.  David, if our leading man, who’s supposed to be an Asian  
dressing up in white face—if when he takes off his makeup, he still looks 
white—would that bother you? 
DHH.  “Looks white”—to whom? Other white people?   (21-22) 
So after Marcus gets this role, DHH learns from Rodney that Marcus is a purely white. This 
creates a highly ironic situation in that DHH, “Leader of Miss Saigon protest casts white guy as 
Asian—by mistake!” (26) Marcus, on the other hand, enjoys his new Asian identity and uses 
language that has been employed by those discriminated against because of their ethnic 
appearance. He declares: “Never let anyone tell you that what you look like is who you are. 
Those are the limitations we have to fight. Even people who look like me. Especially people who 
look like me” (37).  Such expressions reproduce the language often used by DHH himself. 
Meanwhile, at the end of this act DHH hears from his father, HYH, that in a zealous moment he 
has made a large donation to Bill Clinton’s campaign-- because Clinton loved HYH’s idea of 
“Chinese Republican Bankers for Clinton” (34). 
The story of Yellow Face takes on a serious tone in Act II , when Hwang brings material 
into the play concerning anti-Asian hysteria in the late nineties and the true life events 
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surrounding accusations against his father for money-laundering and collaboration with China69, 
and his involvement in the Wen Ho Lee espionage70. These real-life events provide the 
background for Hwang’s face-off with a news reporter, an encounter following which each 
writer would give his own subjective interpretation. These experiences would lead to “an exposé 
of Hwang’s father for the two-faced journalist, and a final chapter for Hwang in the saga that will 
become Yellow Face” (Gross). 
Through the farcical situation of miscasting Marcus in act I and the unjust accusation of Lee 
and HYH in act II, Hwang raises important questions concerning multiculturalism. In his review 
of Yellow Face, Samuel Park rightly points out that unlike Hwang’s other race plays, which were 
written “in the early days of the multicultural debate and championed ‘Asian American’ as a 
coalitional identity, Yellow Face pinpoints the difficulty of rehearsing such monolithic 
communities in a globalized world, ultimately questioning the viability of race as a successful 
marker of difference” (280). So Yellow Face not only reasserts Hwang’s earlier question 
concerning  the issue of racial/ethnic authenticity, it also challenges some aspects of  
multiculturalism, which may only offer a token to salute diversity, and which may demand racial 
allegiances and qualifiers of belonging (in face of multiple and competing identity positions). In 
other words, as much as multiculturalism demands respect for the Other, acting against the 
appropriation of a Western viewpoint, its own methods may involve dynamics of subordination 
                                                            
69 Henry Y. Hwang was under senate investigation regarding his transactions with the Chinese government via 
Chinese-American banks, among which were the first Asian American bank and Far East National Bank, of which 
Henry Hwang was the founder. In Yellow Face, Hwang uses the original article in the New York Times: “NWOAOC: 
New York Times, May 11, 1999. China sent cash to U.S. bank, with suspicions slow to rise. Written by—(Sound 
cue:“Name Withheld on Advice of Counsel.”) Late in the spring of 1996, federal bank examiners discovered that the 
central bank of China was moving tens of millions of dollars into the United States, depositing it in a maze of 
accounts…at a small California bank…Far East National…. (Pause) [Far East National's CEO, Henry Y.] Hwang, 
69, is a well-known figure among Chinese Americans in Los Angeles…. [Hwang's] office is decorated with 
photographs of himself with various American presidents, including Bill Clinton, and with a poster from M. 
Butterfly, the Broadway hit written by his son, David Henry Hwang, who was formerly a director of the bank” (50). 
Hwang then notes that “an underlined ellipses (…) denotes a deletion within a quotation” (8). 
70 Lee the scientist was unjustly accused of spying for the Chinese government. (See Park’s rev. of Yellow Face.) 
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and violence (invoking in its own right a Self/Other power relation) wherein the individual’s 
value is instilled within the coherent racial labels that “[act] upon them from the outside in” 
(282). 
Devising Yellow Face as a “mocumentary” proves an effective strategy for Hwang, as he 
seeks to set forth a political envisioning of “race” as well as a criticism of the multicultural 
movement. In “Masks or Farces Re-Visited: A Study of Four Theatrical Works Concerning 
Cultural Identity,” theatre scholars William H. Sun and Faye C. Fei claim that Hwang’s decision 
to structure and fashion Face Value as a farce may have been the reason for its failure; because 
farce generally creates the expectation of clear execution and a straightforward targeting of its 
satire. Audiences consequently experienced confusion in face of the play’s complicated issues 
and muddled action. If Hwang in fact committed this blunder with Face Value, he would not do 
so again. In an interview he admitted that, while he had been wanting to fix Face Value for 
seventeen years, he could not think of a proper way to do so: 
Then I started thinking about the stage documentary form-making it a mock stage 
documentary that would poke fun at some of the absurdities of the multicultural 
movement. It seemed easiest to poke fun at myself, since that way I would be 
offending only me. Then I figured the play would begin and end with two fairly 
public events--the Miss Saigon thing [Hwang and other artists protested the 
casting of Jonathan Pryce in an Asian role] and the charges leveled against my 
father in the late '90s. This would be a way of exploring all the different facets of 
yellow face.          (Qtd. in Viertel) 
 
 This section of my chapter analyzes Hwang’s criticism of multiculturalism in terms of the 
Self-Other relationship. Emphasizing the acceptation of the Other (minor culture), 
multiculturalism still operates within an ethical frame wherein “authenticity” dominates, and 
hence strengthens the essentialism of both the Self and the Other. Therefore, I argue that Hwang 
considers multiculturalism still working within a traditional epistemology.  
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The rise of multiculturalism situated Hwang in the place of a hero/spokesperson within the 
minority group (Asian American). While personally he disapproves of such an (racial) 
authenticity, under the trend of multiculturalism he unavoidably became the role model: people 
believed he was writing plays to claim a place for Asian Americans. 
What is the difference between Hwang’s ideas about (racial) identity and those that 
multiculturalism proposes? Hwang does not think race/appearance can be the differentiating 
marker, because such a marker, Hwang suggests, is based on stereotypes and risks reducing the 
individual’s value before the stereotypical label. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, 
affirms/accepts appearance (racial attribute) as a differentiating marker but proposes that this 
marker should not lead to discriminatory treatment. This quest for protecting the different 
informs Actors’ Equity’s rule that casting directors cannot inquire about an actors’ racial 
background (a policy deemed as a multiculturalist legacy). 
This clarification of the difference between Hwang and multiculturalism is crucial in 
understanding Marcus’ casting in Hwang’s play. First of all, the fact that Actors Equity 
overthrew its own original decision to submit to the market (mainstream value) proves 
multiculturalism has its own limit. After all, forbidding the inquisition of an actor’s racial 
background is a means of treating the symptom instead of getting to the root of the racial 
inequality problem. So multiculturalism still reveals the authentic/monolithic mindset, despites 
its attempted advocacy for accepting multiplicities and diversity. In other words, if there is no 
issue of racial (actors) inequality, then there’s no need for Actors’ Equity to set up such rules.  
That is, the rule would not be necessary if prejudice and unjust practices were not continuing 
(like a “do not litter” sign would not be necessary if people were not littering).  
Further, by enhancing its essentialism, the multiculturalist movement gives Hwang a sort of 
“heroic status.” Despite that his plays reveal his disapproval of “authenticity,” he is hailed as “a 
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model” (for Asian American). His writing has been perceived as writing for the monolithic 
minority group. In other words, within the ethical frame of multiculturalism Hwang occupies a 
cultural position that provides and sustains power (one that Marcus finds fascinating).   
After DHH passes off Marcus as an Asian, by saying Marcus’ father is a Jew from Siberia (a 
city in Asia), Marcus takes on a minority identity under the stage name of Marcus Gee. Marcus 
is soon hailed as the hero of the minority group. He enjoys this new identity so much that he 
refuses to take off the “yellow mask.” So when Marcus’ true ethnicity is revealed, one notes a 
highly ironic and complicated situation— DHH casts a white actor pretending to be Asian in a 
satire (Face Value) to protest the Miss Saigon controversy—where a Caucasian masked as an 
Asian has been targeted and criticized.  In other words, while DHH writes Face Value to debunk 
a false representation of Asians, Marcus refuses to take off the mask (race pretension). He is 
unwilling to leave the empowered cultural position, thanks to the essentialization enhanced by 
multiculturalist movement. 
Therefore through Marcus’ actions, Hwang suggests that multicultural movement is less 
ethical than political in nature. That is, the movement’s ethical end—of bringing respect and 
honor to difference—is compromised with political manipulation. Not only is it difficult to use 
racial attributes as a differentiating marker, it is also problematic to use such a marker to carry 
out an ethical task. While multiculturalism manifests a call for equal treatment for different racial 
groups, its understanding of identity based on appearance or group traits can lead to political 
oppressions (within the group).   
However, what Hwang does clearly indict is the still implicit racism of American society.  
This is evident in Act II, where HYH is accused of money laundering as a Chinese spy 
(representing other anti-Asian hysteria events in the late nineties).  Sitting on the board of his 
father’s Far East National Bank for a few years, DHH also finds himself a target of the 
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investigation. Hwang reveals the xenophobic mindset beneath the seemingly neutral and 
objective media coverage through the face-off between the journalist NWOAOC (Name 
Withheld on Advice of Counsel) and DHH.  
NWOAOC:  . . . Mr. Hwang, your father is a Chinese banker. 
DHH:  Chinese American. 
NWOAOC:  Exactly. 
DHH:  There's a difference. 
  NWOAOC:  And it's that difference that interests me. If I were investigating  
Israeli espionage, I would look to the Jewish community--it's  
just logical. Does your father see himself as more American, or  
more Chinese? 
DHH:  That question makes no sense. 
NWOAOC:  On the contrary, I think it's quite relevant. 
DHH:  How about you? Do you see yourself as more American or more  
white? 
NWOAOC:  That's not the same thing. 
DHH:  No? 
NWOAOC:  Not in the least. 
DHH:  Why not? 
 NWOAOC:  Because there's no conflict between being white and being  
American. 
DHH:  Did you really just say that? There's a conflict--between being   
Chinese and being American?                     
. . .                                                                        (my emphasis; 55-56) 
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This exchange reveals the presumption that there is no conflict between being white and being 
American. This is the root of the problem, that Hwang is wary of (authenticity), and does not 
think methods like the multiculturalist movement can fix. This face-off, taking place after 
HYH’s passionate donation (for Clinton campaign) and the implicit accusation of him being a 
Chinese spy, reveals Hwang’s concern of a prejudice ingrained within the traditional 
epistemology. Such epistemology centers on a Eurocentric Nationalism, one that presumes a 
monolithic culture and value as indicated in Ban Wang’s article. Within such context, 
multiculturalism, a movement that proposes recognition that the country is composed of 
multiplicities, only pays lip-service to minorities. Despite multiculturalist movement, there is still 
the presumption of a dominant culture that always keeps a watchful eye on Other race/cultures, 
and implicitly marshals minor cultures into a process of assimilation, as Joan W. Scott discusses.  
 Hwang’s plays thus show a suspicion of domination on at least two levels. First, as 
shown above, here is clearly wary of an American nationalism that sees the Asian Other with 
prejudice.  However, he is also concerned with a multicultural politics that constrains individuals 
and bases group coherence on identity markers. Both, for Hwang, would seem to operate on a 
model of antagonism, one where the motive is to maintain a coherence of the Self. Therefore 
multiculturalism (as with American nationalism) still operates on the level of traditional 
epistemology, in a Lévinasian sense, where the Self is threatened by the unknown Other. While 
the movement implies a respect for the Other, its emphasis on using appearance (or other identity 
traits) as a differentiating marker again reveals a totalitarian impulse. The Self-Other relationship 
in the multiculturalist movement does not differ from that inherited from traditional 
epistemology. In short, the racial/ethnic group functions as a Self seeking to overcome or 
subsume difference within its ranks. In addition, the fact that the multicultural movement has 
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enacted political undertakings (seeking power for the group) may put in a lesser light its ethical 
component (that is, responsibility for the Other outside of identity).  
In the play, HYH is the scapegoat in the witch hunt of the (foreign) “face”—a mask (racial 
stereotype) that works outside in of mainstream subjectivity. HYH, however, believes his 
American identity can be achieved, that he can be a real American by his identification with this 
country. Hwang recounts that his late father died because his dream had been lost: “Sick as I got 
of hearing his shtick, it had been Dad’s whole life: his faith that in America, you can imagine 
who you want to be—and, through sheer will and determination, become that person. (Pause.) If 
only it were true” (62). One may finally question if it is an identification that is not decided on 
appearance but on will and determination that informs the identity politics that Hwang acclaims.  
In her production of Hwang’s Yellow Face, 71 Leigh Silverman set up a gigantic mirror 
upstage reflecting the actors and audience. Samuel Park commends this powerful use of the 
mirror at the end of the play, when it is used as a “striking window into a village in China, 
suggesting the folly of solipsistic concerns over personal identity and the importance of 
empathizing with those potentially thought of as foreign to us” (Park). This window opening on 
China recalls Marcus’s email at the outset of the play where he describes his journey to a remote 
corner of China. This device also highlights the face of the Other at the very end—the window 
symbolizing a crack in the Self’s epistemological fortress.  
This highly affecting ending, and the overall impact of Hwang’s play, seeks to bring ethics 
down to a face-to-face level, a movement that confirms the view of Spivak. As Amit S. Rai 
points out: “For Spivak responsibility lies in alterity, in the call of the Other. And yet it would 
seem that this other is also a living, struggling person, or sometimes a certain type of person” 
                                                            
71 Directed by Leigh Silverman. Mark Taper Forum, Los Angeles. 22 May 2007.  
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(Rai). Because a totalitarian epistemology imposed on the Other is all too easy way to approach 
the Other, it avoids the work of encounter and the weight of responsibility. It is easy not to look 
around the world but to remain insulated in the Self. For instance, consumers enjoy material 
goods but they have no idea how some workers may suffer in the manufacturing of these goods. 
They have no way to empathize with workers’ toil in the sweatshops because they do not 
encounter specific workers as human beings, but only reduce them to a function related to 
product and productivity. In a racial context, people likewise do not empathize with other races 
because they label them with stereotypical imaginings.  
This bit of face-to-face encounter in a global world, where the acceleration of 
manufacturing and consumption override everything, is difficult to achieve. A lack of 
communication and encounter strengthens the “interior economy,” in Lévinas’s words, and 
preempts responsibility (which can contribute to exploitation and global degradation).  
Though they emphasize different aspects, The Sound of a Voice and Yellow Face both 
point to how the Self-Other relationship of the Western tradition and its problem in dealing with 
difference. Demonstrating an order that that celebrates the Same and Totality, The Sound of a 
Voice exposes traditional Western epistemology through romantic love. Yellow Face elaborates 
on how this epistemology brings about racial conflicts. Lévinas’s work invites new ways of 
thinking about difference and relation, and is helpful in discussing racial issues. The term 
“wisdom of love” attributes a respectful coexistence of different peoples, a state where Self 
meets and greets the Other. The term “love of wisdom,” on the other hand, suggests a 
subject/object relationship where the Self deems the Other (races) as an object (of knowledge). 
The two outlooks decide different orders of ontology and ethics, and can write different stories in 
race histories. 
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Chapter Five: 
The Female and Desubjectification 
 
The correlation between women and the term “Other” has a long history in twentieth-
century academia. Appropriated by scholars in discourses concerning post-colonial and feminist 
studies, “Other” often refers to fragile and suppressed subaltern groups. Scholarship has 
investigated this subordinate status and the many ways that women have been positioned in 
secondary roles and oppressed conditions. Traditionally women have been viewed as passive and 
malleable, contained and limited by law and social structures. The latter half of the twentieth-
century witnessed a significant change in women’s social and economic status; this effort 
continues to promote and protect women’s workplace and domestic rights, though many 
obstacles still remain, as women all too often still inhabit the position of the Other. 
While women have appeared onstage since the beginning of American theatre, a theatre for 
and about women, made by women has been relatively recent, coming into existence in the 
1960s. One question that has challenged and sometimes troubled feminist stage practice and 
women’s performance is the very question of how to present women. Should theatre attempt to 
represent existing women, the status quo, or should it launch a revolutionary agenda, seeking to 
actively change “women” for a better future? Should such theatre use conventional forms or 
work to expand performance styles? How should the stage present a woman as agent in a 
patriarchal world?  
This chapter will explore such issues by discussing feminist playwright Paula Vogel’s 
works. The chapter will first survey the historical and cultural background of the feminist 
movement and feminist theatre, and it will then discuss how Vogel’s ideas and theatrical 
techniques stand out from those of other feminist playwrights. The remainder of the chapter will 
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analyze two of Vogel’s works, Hot ‘n’ Throbbing and And Baby Makes 7, to elucidate her 
theatrical methodologies and goals, that is, how her particular feminist theatre serves to disrupt 
patriarchal discourses and to envision alternative feminine subjectivities. My discussion will also 
bring Vogel’s work into conversation with the thinking of Emmanuel Lévinas, whose work 
offers new insights in the Self-Other relation and the possibilities of a non-traditional subjectivity. 
The twentieth-century feminist movement can roughly be divided into three waves. The 
first wave began in the early 1900s (leading to women gaining the right to vote in 1920); 
following this achievement, the Women's Rights Movement kept on with organized activities 
and various efforts in reform (Eisenberg and Ruthsdotter). For instance, Alice Paul, the leader of 
the National Woman's Party, drafted an Equal Rights Amendment for the United States 
Constitution. This proposed legislation appealed for both genders to have equal rights. Also, at 
this time appeared Margaret Sanger, a public health nurse, who proposed public policies for birth 
control. She forwarded the idea that women should strive to gain the right to control their own 
bodies, as traditionally women’s bodies had been viewed as vehicles for reproduction. Generally, 
the first- wave feminist movement focused more on reform than revolt, and it also aimed at 
minimizing gender differences.72 
The second-wave feminist movement took place within the civil rights movements of the 
1960s. This movement encouraged actions taken on the government’s part to address issues of 
discrimination against women. After President Kennedy convened a Commission on the Status 
of Women in 1963, federal and state laws followed that targeted discrimination and extended 
regulation into both the domestic and work spheres. In the same year Betty Friedan’s publication 
                                                            
72 There is another stance arguing that “first-wave feminism” began “in the late 18th century with the publication of 
Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), and ended with the ratification of the Twentieth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which protected a woman's right to vote.” See Tom Head’s “Third-
Wave Feminism.” 
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of The Feminine Mystique signaled a new era when women could look beyond their roles as 
housekeepers. The second wave movement was more revolutionary than reformist in nature. 
Second wave feminists were often called radical feminists, who devoted to feelings and 
experiences exclusive to women. Kathie Sarachild, a radical feminist who had been a member of 
the New York Radical Women, explained that this search into the nature of women was 
analogous to 17th century’s quest for science (to oppose scholasticism)73. Hence, second-wave 
feminism is often characterized by its appeal to essentialism. This wave emphasized the positive 
attributes of the female and asserted the female in a position of primacy over the male. It focused 
on shared qualities and the nature of women as a whole, often drawing on the body as the locus 
of female power. 
In contrast to the second-wave feminist movement, the third-wave movement disagrees with 
essentialism. There is an awareness that both the first and second-wave movements seemed 
limited in outlook, only focusing on the  struggles of white, heterosexual, and middle-class 
women, hence ignoring the rights of women of color, , lesbians, bisexual women, and 
transgendered women, low-income women and women in the developing countries. Viewed as 
an evolution of the previous waves, this third-wave movement may also be understood in 
generational terms.  As Tom Head explains: “it refers to how the feminist struggle manifests 
itself in the world today. Just as second-wave feminism represented the diverse and sometimes 
competing interests of feminists who struggled together under the banner of women's liberation, 
third-wave feminism represents a generation that has begun with the achievements of the second 
wave.” Most importantly, however, the third-wave feminists focused more on “woman” as a 
                                                            
73 Sarachild puts it this way: “The decision to emphasize our own feelings and experiences as women and to test all 
generalizations and reading we did by our own experience was actually the scientific method of research. We were 
in effect repeating the 17th century challenge of science to scholasticism: ‘study nature, not books,’ and put all 
theories to the test of living practice and action.” See Nachescu, Voichita. “Radical Feminism and the Nation: 
History and Space in the Political Imagination of Second-Wave Feminism.”   
- 154 - 
 
social construction—rather than a given essence—and sought to critique the institutions and 
discourses that situated the female in a position of subordination. 
While the feminist movement has a rather long history, feminist theatre appears as a more 
recent phenomenon. Theatre professor Sue Ellen Case points out in her 1985 work Feminism and 
Theatre  that “the feminist movement was only twenty years old and feminist theatre practice 
younger still” (4). In the United States, female playwrights remained outside the dramatic canon 
until the 1970s. In 1978, director Julia Miles voiced concern with the continued gender disparity 
among theatre practitioners.74 Fortunately the issue of gender disparity was improved. In 1992, 
Miles wrote: “There is now a nucleus of powerful women playwrights’ voices and they write 
both women’s issue plays and public-issue plays. They write in order to explore human values 
and the desires for transcendence of self . . . their audience will share an idea, a feeling, a dream 
they have struggled to make into a play” (ix).  
Miles’ concern about the lack of women in the American theatre reflects the aspiration of 
first-wave feminists, who focus on the “inclusion of works by, for, and about women” 
(Eisenberg and Ruthsdotter). Such a view brings attention to challenges and problems with such 
practice.  Many of the scholars who write on American drama focus on the great works of 
American male playwrights and often claim that women’s plays “lack universality.”  Such critics 
clearly cannot validate a female-gendered subjectivity (Martin Roudane 113). Miles’ statement, 
on the other hand, also implies an essentialism that dominates the outlook of second-wave 
feminists, who concentrate on writing women’s stories that speak from women’s situations. 
Theatre critic Martin Roudane indicates that the languages women playwrights use to animate 
their works create a woman-centered universe. Their works “validate a set of behaviors and 
                                                            
74 Miles points out that “only 7 percent of all plays produced Off-Broadway and regionally were written by women; 
6% percent were directed by women” (Martin Roudane 113).  
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responses that celebrate the female as subject rather than object; the female as a central agent in 
her own life” (113). 
Since feminist theatre is linked closely with the various feminist movements, one might 
expect such theatre to encounter the kind of resistance and backlash experienced generally by the 
women’s movement. Claiming to be a feminist theatre cannot in and of itself guarantee any 
success in the theatre market, especially as its efforts are often highly experimental.  Just as the 
feminist movement sought to initiate social change, feminist theatre seeks change and challenge 
to the status quo. One may in fact view feminist theatre practice as “itself a form of cultural 
representation influenced by changes in the landscapes of feminism, women’s studies, 
economics, politics, and cultural studies” (Eisenberg and Ruthsdotter). However, change is often 
met with strong resistance.  As Linda Alcoff explains it, feminism involves “matching theory to 
practice” (Eisenberg and Ruthsdotter), and feminist theatre may be seen as a kind of radical 
practice. However, box office reports frequently indicate modest support for such innovative and 
challenging shows. Too often women-oriented theatre has softened its critique in the hopes of 
gaining greater audiences.  “[Those] that find success tend to take fewer risks and are generally 
less threatening to middle class audiences; commercial theatre’s response to feminism has been 
the same as the other media-token gestures often hiding deep hostility” (Eisenberg and 
Ruthsdotter).75 
Given the resistance encountered by many feminists, and the challenges that women’s 
theatre has faced, there are many female playwrights who have rejected being labeled as feminist 
                                                            
75 Successful plays O’Malley’s Once a Catholic, Wasserstein’s Uncommon Women, Dunn’s Steaming, Henley’s 
Crimes of the Heart, Norman’s Getting Out and ‘Night Mother all focus on female characters and explore 
concepts/themes of feminist drama:  relationships, sisterhood, sexuality, female autonomy—weakness tend to be 
comedies of manners, revelations of the surface level not challenges to the deeper social 
structure.  Exceptions:  Ntozake Shange’s ‘for colored girls, Gems’ Piaf, Churchill’s Cloud Nine).  The scripts tend 
to be more challenging than the productions. (Eisenberg and Ruthsdotter) 
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playwrights. Take Marsha Norman and Wendy Wasserstein as examples. Both active in the 
1980s, both tended to depict female characters existing in a male-dominated American society. 
Instead of exploring and dramatizing a new female image/subjectivity, as the feminist social 
movement sought to advance, they tended to approach this “second sex” with a humanist, rather 
than a gender-approach. Norman herself expresses discomfort with being labeled a feminist 
playwright, and Wasserstein asserted that she wrote plays for both male and female audiences 
(Martin Roudane 132-33). Both may fall into the category  of first-wave feminists who, as  
theatre scholar Jill Dolan explains in her criticism of Wasserstein, “sell[s] out to established 
systems like the meritocracy of mainstream American theatre without trying to challenge or 
change them” (434). Alisa Solomon also points out that the female playwrights who received 
Pulitzer Prizes in the 1980s, notably the two aforementioned and Beth Henley, represent 
“intelligent, educated women” who “ assure us that they are funny for the same traditional 
reasons women have always been funny: they hate their bodies, can’t find a man, and don’t 
believe in themselves” (Qtd. in Savran A Queer 202).   
It is against this example of appeasement and compromise that Paula Vogel stands out (she 
shares most in common with the third wave). Asserting that theatre should help women to 
explore and reconfigure their subjectivity, Vogel refuses a representation of women that follows 
the status quo. In many of her works, as theatre scholar David Savran points out, including 
Desdemona, Meg, Hot ‘n’ Throbbing and And Baby Makes 7, Vogel deliberately appropriates 
patriarchal texts. Through such  “damning appraisal” (Savran’s words) of men’s texts, Vogel 
gives evidence of how one might envision a re-imagination of female subjectivities, through a 
fundamental reexamination of the Self-Other relationship. If humanist approaches only depict 
females inhabiting their current position of subjugation, reinforcing the female as the victimized 
image of the “Other,” the feminine as a projection of the Self/patriarch, then Vogel’s works 
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signal a new possibility; they explore alternative encounters and images and offer a novel 
understanding of the Self-Other relationship.  
Born in 1951, Paula Vogel is a playwright and professor at Brown University. Vogel came 
to prominence with her Obie award-winning play The Baltimore Waltz (1992), an AIDS-related 
dark-comedy. Her Pulitzer Prize-winning play How I Learned To Drive (1997), however, is her 
best-known work, one that depicts incestuous sexual abuse. Along with The Oldest Profession 
(1981), which deals with prostitution, And Baby Makes Seven (1984), which gives a whimsical 
alternative to the traditional familial relationship, and Hot 'N Throbbing (1994), a face-off 
between patriarchal discourse and female narratives that interweave elements of  domestic abuse 
and pornography, these works reveal Vogel’s daring and willing venture into taboo and 
controversial issues.  
Vogel’s plays stand as distinctive works in the American theatre, both for their subject 
matter and style. Many critics, such as Jill Dolan, admire Vogel’s choice of topics, especially 
how the works address difficult and sensitive issues. Vogel cites no clear methodology or 
polemical intent; she asserts that she “’writes the play backwards,’ moving from emotional 
circumstances and character to craft narrative structure” (“The New Fellows of 2010” 4). She 
also explains: “My writing isn't actually guided by issues … I only write about things that 
directly impact my life” (“The New Fellows of 2010” 4). Vogel’s work and approach are 
admonished by some critics, who believe that her mingling of comedy and satire often 
“diminishes the seriousness of [her] drama's emotional impact” (“Vogel, Paula – Introduction”). 
Other critics prize such novelty and ingenuity. David Savran, for example, views Vogel’s 
approach with a positive lens:  
The effect of this defamiliarization is to allow spectators and readers to see these 
characters and their situations in a new light, to reevaluate the meaning of  
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women’s work outside the home, or to celebrate the elements of fantasy that 
necessarily structure all relationships.           (Savran in Vogel xi)  
 
What Savran identifies is a crucial aspect of Vogel’s playwriting. I argue that Vogel’s unusual 
dramatic techniques and practices of defamiliarization serve a thematic end, that is, the 
defamiliarization can equate to a desubjectification. Vogels’ plays explore the phenomenon of 
desubjectification, whereby the traditional female category and subjectivity are exploded.  In a 
manner that is unique to Vogel, her plays seek to overhaul existing femininities, by dismantling 
them and presenting the possibility of new subjectivities.   
Because Vogel is an avowed feminist, her plays are about women and women’s attempts to 
find their place in the world. Her belief in the instability of gender as a signifier and drama as 
“the most dialogical of all literary forms” (Savran A Queer187) allows her to explore alternative 
narrative practices and voices, her works invoking a wide range of gender discourses. The 
women in her plays, instead of appearing as individual agents with completed subjectivities, defy 
any sense of insularity and wholeness and present a different potentiality, a fluid, alternative 
femininity, one that undergoes testing and experimentation in Vogel’s theatrical lab. Such 
explorations aim to contest patriarchal imposition. While many of Vogel’s contemporary 
(feminist) playwrights76 also expose the repressed condition of women, Vogel stands out not 
only for her unique (narrative and theatrical) style, but also, and more importantly, for the way 
she breaks the representation of “misogynist clichés and stereotypes”77 of women for liberatory 
purposes. This overthrown of female images, of status quo representations, initiates a search for 
new images, for an alternative relationship between the feminine and patriarchal social structures 
(new Self-Other relationship)--hence, the envisioning and new imaginings of female subjectivity. 
It is this investigation of subjectivity that marks Vogel’s playwriting. In an interview with David 
                                                            
76 This excludes Wasserstein, according to Dolan.  
77 “Not all the plays by Henley, Norman, and Wasserstein from this period focus on the affluent and cultured, but 
most recycle these misogynist cliches and stereotypes in a surprisingly uncritical way” (Savran A Queer 202). 
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Savran (June 4, 1997), Vogel describes this “feminist approach” as a reimagining and overhaul 
of female subjectivity.  She relates: “How can I [(i.e., Vogel herself)] seduce both the men in the 
audience to identify directly, to empathize directly with the female subject, and to retrain women 
in the audience to identify directly with the female subject? It’s a problem of retraining” (Qtd. in 
Savran The Playwright’s Voice 273). Former colleague and acquaintance, David Savran has 
given close attention to Vogel’s work, and his assessment of Vogel’s handling of subjectivity is 
most insightful:  
For [Vogel’s] works like so many recent feminist writing, does not deny the 
different material and ideological effects produced by the opposition between 
masculine and feminine. It does, however, question the finality of this division, 
not by offering a radically different vision of society but by insinuating an 
alternative model of subjectivity. . . Paula usually requires only one self-
contradictory subject who encloses within her or him both this debilitating 
division and a remedy for that division. . . Paula more often than not gesture 
toward a future that is utterly different, a fantastic, utopian future in which lovers 
can be forever reunited and self-division healed.   (A Queer 203) 
 
 While I am reluctant to identify the self-division as a “symptom” of some victimized 
syndrome, I do share with Savran the belief that Vogel takes a different stance, that she proposes 
an alternative to the victim-blaming tendency for which the second-wave feminists are so often 
noted.  In fact, this Self-division aspect is key to her work.  It is through this phenomenon that 
one witnesses the desubjectification of a character.  As the character experiences multiple 
narrative selves, a healing process can occur (it is thus not a symptom of pathology but rather an 
indicator of health). This process may be seen in terms of a past Self (How I Learned to Drive), 
an enacted alter ego (And Baby Makes 7), or an embodied fictional figure created by the 
character (Hot ‘n’ Throbbing). Importantly, it is here that we may bring Lévinas into conversation 
with Vogel’s theatre, as her methodology of de-subjctification exhibits dynamics that are similar 
to the movements Lévinas sets forth is his notion of “existence with existents.”  
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What is existence without existent? 
The autonomous subjectivity operates upon the assumption that it is a rational 
subjectivity. It defines itself according to its ability to categorize and organize, to come to 
comprehension of the universe. It makes the universe intelligible by supplying itself, as Lévinas 
explains, a reason “for every being and a reason for every reason, making itself the unfailing 
source of reasons” (EE, 8). Subjectivity appears as “the self-activating power to operate gear, to 
organize for itself a practical field. The leap from a means to an end. . . from a palpable 
configuration to the telos it refers to or relates to or signifies, is the metaphysical thrust that 
opens a field, that reveals a world” (EE, 8). 
This kind of existence with subjectivity is tantamount to conscious subjectivity. What 
Lévinas reflects upon, however, are existences other than a conscious/rational one; in other 
words, existences without subjectivity/rationality. Sleep, for instance, is not a suspension of 
existence, but another mode of being/existence. Non-conscious existence should not be defined 
as an opposition vis-à-vis a conscious existence. 
Lévinas believes that before the consciousness/Self is born, there is only existence, the 
Being, in which many existents (without subjectivity) are not categorized as “object” but just 
“beings,” because “object” is itself an idea derived from the opposition of “subject.” Being 
remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging to no one. . .” (EE, 58). For 
Lévinas, it is through the interaction with, or “eating up” of the others, that an existent gradually 
forms its interior economy, and thereby produces its own consciousness.  
Therefore the state before an existent can have a rational grasp on reality, interpret its 
world using a self-centered perspective, is what Lévinas terms as “existence without existent.” 
This is the state when the existent is not yet aware of its distinction between Others (not have its 
own objects), when the existent’s “interiority” is not yet formed—a reality of its interior 
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economy that pivots on its rationality, that centers on itself as a “unfailing sources of reasons” 
(EE, 8). In other words, what Lévinas articulates is a state where an existent/being has not yet be 
born or emerged from the existence/Being. This is a state where there is no consciousness of Self 
or of Others. It is a state before any closed identity.  
Through desubjectification Vogel points toward the return to such a state.  This process 
may shed the patriarchal skin from female subjectivity in the hope that a new one will born from 
the “existence.” In other words, only through “destroying” the existing subject can there be 
possibilities for an overhauling of female subjectivity. By “destroying” I mean a subject loses 
his/her control over reality, or specifically, that he/she is not aware of his/her out of control. It is 
theatre that can present such moments. 
I think this concept can be helpful in understanding Vogel’s method of desubjectification. 
Through multiple narrative voices Vogel gives chances for her characters to explore alternative 
modes of being/existence. The self-division is not simply seen as an opposition to a single 
consciousness; rather, the division represents the potentialities of alternative existences. On stage 
these characters undergo moments of “existence without existents,” temporarily breaking out of 
the constraints of social imposition. In this theatre we see there are chances for revolution, for the 
overhauling and refashioning of subjectivity. As the translator of Existence and existents, 
Alphonso Lingis points out that this kind of a repositioning is not “equivalent to the inertia of 
things; it is a positive confiding of oneself to the world, and a relationship with the terrestrial, 
reservoir of support, prior to every relationship with things” (EE, 9).   
In short, Vogel’s desubjectification seeks to erase the distinctness of subjectivity, to 
reduce an existent/subject into a pre-object mode, so that its present subjective contours are 
blurred. In this way the stage anatomizes a subjectivity, exposing the social and cultural drives 
that work on it, and reveals new imaginings. This movement rearranges the networking of those 
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drives, yielding the possibility of new networks, and thus new subjectivities. So in Vogel’s 
works, alternative voices often erupt from the conventional and seemingly complete but 
traumatic self. The self divides into different parts, and subjectivity appears in flux. Actions are 
taken on stage, but, more often than not, the audience is not sure who is doing them. It is a 
moment where “the author” of the self is indeterminate, as if the character no longer function as 
an enclosed subject, but rather a container or a contested arena where various social and cultural 
forces knot and disperse. By doing so, such playwriting has the opportunity of “canceling and 
deforming the structures that have held women framed, stilled, embedded. . .” (Savran A Queer 
192).  
 I will first discuss Vogel’s play Hot ‘n’ Throbbing, where characters are shown to labor 
under masculinist discourses and appear to be sites for the voicing of dominant ideologies. The 
characters in this play may come to the verge of desubjectification (even transformation), that is, 
Charlene may experience the divided and fluid Self; however, the play finally shows the triumph 
of masculine imposition.  Aside from depicting the central female character as an identity 
inscribed by patriarchal structures, the play seems to challenge second-wave thinking, that is, 
that women can inhabit a place of their own and assert an essentialist female voice.  Through 
representing the failure of the self-alleged feminist (Charlene), the play indicates Vogel’s 
rejection of second-wave feminism and its quest for an “all-women theatre.” Vogel questions this 
outlook, which wishes to attain the goal of empowerment through a simple inversion of the 
subject-object position (i.e., for women to actively claim what has been traditionally claimed by 
men). Through the representation of this failure, the play challenges the dominant/subordinate 
binary itself and thus seeks a new way to disrupt patriarchal discourse. 
 Following this discussion of Hot ‘n’ Throbbing, I will examine how Vogel’s play And 
Baby Makes 7 goes beyond the reach of the prior work. While Hot ‘n’ Throbbing  serves to 
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challenge second-wave notions and reveals how gender is set and delimited by a masculinist 
power structure (that is, how gender is constructed), And Baby Makes 7 dramatizes the 
possibility of moving beyond the dynamics of patriarchy; the play investigates the phenomenon 
of desubjectification, which might promise a new form of  feminine subjectivity. Through the 
notion of “growing up,” Vogel depicts a subject’s transformation from what Lévinas’s terms the 
“virile ego,” a position of independence, to one of interdependence in an “effeminate” ethical 
relationship (see second section). In having the characters yield their dominance before the Other, 
they realize that responsibility to the Other is one crucial aspect in the make-up of the Self’s 
subjectivity. Moreover, the characters experience the state of an existent without existence—a 
condition outside of fixed identity commitments. 
Hot ‘n’ Throbbing 
Produced by the American Repertory Theatre, Hot ‘n’ Throbbing first opened on April 16, 
1994 at the Hasty Pudding Theater in Cambridge, Massachusetts (Vogel 227). Dealing with 
domestic violence and the female attempt to search for an independent sexuality and subjectivity, 
the play was credited with being timely and significant.   
Critics agreed that the play identified an element of concern for society, the spreading 
infiltration of violence and pornography. Domestic violence may not be an issue in all 
households, but its increasing frequency is alarming. Elyse Sommer’s review points out that 
The exploration of violence and sexual excesses in the home and all around us fits 
right into our daily diet of print and television news stories. It's dismayingly 
timely coming as it does after a week with headlines ablaze with a dysfunctional 
Minnesota's teenager's multiple shooting spree and suicide.  (“Hot ‘n’ Throbbing”) 
 
 While critics concurred that the play is about domestic violence, they debated the cause 
of that violence and the role of sexuality. They also questioned the tone and intent of Vogel’s 
work. Jason Zionman began his review: “I'm not sure if Paula Vogel's ‘Hot 'n' Throbbing’ is a 
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comedy about domestic abuse or a tragedy about the effects of pornography”. Rutter focused on 
the question of desire and titillation: “Vogel treads familiar ground— the difference between 
what turns men and women on. . .” The play tries to do many things and presents the ambiguous 
nature of sexuality; it dramatizes a (female’s) yearning for an independent sexuality/subjectivity 
and for a society free of (sexual) violence.  This vision and its accomplishment presented a tough 
and risky task.  
 However, Rutter’s assertion that “Charlene’s acceptance, the play argues, stems from her 
own indulgences into the fantasy world of porn”, is much too one-sided a reading of the play, 
and it misses the purpose of Vogel’s intent. Charlene does not in any facile way accept and 
approve of the status quo and a male-dominated understanding of sexuality. . .  Zinoman and 
Brown, on the other hand, recognize the ambiguous, grey area of how female sex behaviors can 
be interpreted. Zinoman maintains a more neutral position, acknowledging that “Charlene makes 
a point of saying that while the female characters in her adult entertainment (she doesn't like the 
word ‘pornography’) may be sex objects, they are always in control. Which is more than can be 
said for Charlene…” Further for Sommer, the contested arena between “male porn” and “the 
independence of female sexuality” dealt with in the play signals “. . . how cultural conditioning 
predisposes women to accept imbalanced and violent relationships and the deleterious effect of 
being witness to sexual and physical abuse on normal family bonding and emotional 
development” (“Hot ‘n’ Throbbing”). 
In conclusion, the play depicts a tug of war between patriarchal sex discourses and the 
possible narration of an active female erotica. 78  While the play ends with a failure of the 
                                                            
78 Vogel claims that she wrote this piece to several soundtracks, and one of them was Janet Jackson’s Control 
(particularly “Nasty”) (Vogel 234). As the lyric indicates in “Nasty”: “I'm not a prude (no)/ I just want some respect 
(that's right)/ So close the door if you want me to respond (ooh ooh yeah)/ 'Cause privacy is my middle name/ My 
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woman’s pursuit of independent sexuality (she is killed), I think Vogel wishes to illuminate how 
a simple inversion of subject-object position (i.e., the women-centered theatre featured by 
second-wave feminists) is problematic in attaining the goal. In other words, by having a 
culturally passive subject (i.e., woman) actively voice and declare her desire does not guarantee a 
revolutionary overthrow of that dominant (patriarchal) culture. This methodology does not undo 
the women/female erotic narrative as the Other, to gain a more balanced relationship with 
patriarchal discourse as the Self. Moreover, Vogel in the play gives emphasis to the constructed 
nature of the female, how Charlene, even in considering herself independent, still voices and is 
controlled by masculinist discourses. While Charlene herself cannot overthrow the dominant 
discourses (as she employs them), one may argue that Vogel as playwright—in illuminating and 
mimicking/satirizing such discourses—may create a kind of disturbance, one that destabilizes 
masculine authority. However, what Vogel dramatizes is not a reversal of power positions. 
Rather, the position of a new subjectivity comes from a process of desubjectification, a 
phenomenon illuminated by Lévinas’s notion of “existence without existents.” 
Featuring domestic (sexual) violence, Hot ‘n’ Throbbing depicts a fairly conventional story, 
the violent struggle between a wife and her ex-husband, though the form of narration is quite 
unconventional, employing “several bodied and disembodied narrators” (Savran A Queer 189). 
The plot is simple. Charlene is a single mother who supports her hardscrabble life by writing 
erotic scripts for an allegedly feminist film company—Gyno Productions. She considers herself a 
feminist; her works, different from traditional porn that centers on male fantasies, are specifically 
for women. The play unfolds with Charlene’s daughter, scantily clad Leslie Ann (The Girl) 
announcing that she is going to spend the night with her best friend , Lisa, an assertion that leads 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
last name is Control/ No my first name ain't baby/ It's Janet/ Miss Jackson if you're nasty,” there is always a risk of 
women trapped in incurring disrespect if they are active in sexual behaviors. See “Janet Jackson’s lyrics ‘Control.’” 
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to a quarrel with Charlene and bickering with her brother, Calvin (The Boy), whom she terms a 
perverted geek.  
As Leslie Ann makes her way out, Charlene expresses concern about Calvin, who, in sharp 
contrast, never hangs out. Following Calvin’s exit from the house, Charlene’s ex-husband Clyde, 
a gangbuster brute, breaks down the patio door and barges into the dwelling, despite the newly-
issued restraining order against him. Charlene then pulls out her “protection” and shoots him (in 
the ass). Interestingly, the story at this juncture shifts drastically to a tone reminiscent of 
romantic-thriller films. From this point on, the couple has a seemingly real heart-to-heart 
conversation, and we soon learn that Clyde is a poor loser who cannot afford a prostitute. In a 
gush of sympathy, enjoying the pleasure of being in control, Charlene decides to have sex with 
him. When she moves to retrieve another “protection” (i.e., contraception), the unstable husband 
exposes his hair-trigger temper and strangles her to death. The play ends with Leslie Ann (The 
Girl), ignoring her mother’s corpse; she ages on stage and steps in as substitute for her mother, 
assuming the role of the female-erotica scriptwriter.  
Vogel’s play presents a number of issues and concerns.  In this work we note Charlene’s 
efforts to affirm her female agency and advance a female erotica. We note women seeking their 
own livelihoods. Just like Charlene, who gains a restraining order from her abusive ex-husband 
and must write to fend for her family, “Voice-Over” also appears as an independent sex worker 
who “claims herself” to be in control. Both represent female desire as something totally 
independent from patriarchal imposition—this purity of desire is in keeping with the values of 
cultural feminists. Charlene’s outlook may finally give a too optimistic view of female assertion.  
Charlene’s effort suggests a position of power for the woman. Charlene’s murder and the 
failure of her quest casts a skeptical light on her feminist agenda. Vogel seems here to question 
any notion of an insular female identity—one outside of social shaping and constraints.  The play, 
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moreover, questions how a disruption of patriarchy is possible, how the female can exist beyond 
predetermined codes and expected behaviors. 
Vogel’s play fascinates in its investigation of gender roles and power relations.  Its 
heightened theatricality and playful stylistics contribute heavily to the work’s appeal. The setting 
of the play is indicated as Charlene’s living room, a platform between two booths where The 
Voice and Voice Over (the foxy dominatrix) respectively reside. Alternating “stage lights” and 
the “blue light” indicate the shifting between reality and the fantasy of the erotic dance hall. 
Vogel indicates The Voice as “a presence, more than a person. At times he acts as a 
bouncer/owner in the erotic dance hall. . . The Voice breathes a lot through the mike. The 
Voice’s dialect varies from German, French, Victorian British and Brooklynese. It often sounds 
just like The Man . . . ” (232). The Voice clearly embodies a male discourse regarding sexuality, 
suggesting that violence leads to women’s orgasms. 
MAN.  Do what? 
WOMAN.  Oh, you know. You know very well. 
MAN. (Getting angry): Christ! 
(Man and Woman look at each other. Blue Light.) 
V.O.  FLASHBACK—THREE YEARS AGO. 
(The Man strikes The Woman hard on the face; in slow motion, it almost  
 looks like a caress. The Woman falls on the sofa. The Man drags on  
cigarette and then moves it toward Woman’s face.) 
THE VOICE. “Case 103 continued. Subject increasingly resorted to                        
         violence against wife as an erotic stimulus for erec—” 
What one notes in Vogel’s heightened theatricality is an emphasis on multiple voices and 
positions of narration.  The Voice and the Voice Over act as competing voices in Charlene’s 
- 168 - 
 
head, playing out (embodying) the erotica script The Woman (Charlene) is writing.  The voices 
also offer relevant comments about the actions occurring within the household. In Charlene’s 
script, Voice Over is a sex worker. She is “at times bored with her job; at times emphatically 
overacting, trying to land a role in a legitimate film” (232).  
One notes a kind of contest between The Voice and Voice-over , who speak as  ideological 
embodiments of The Man and The Woman in dominant cultural values (and signal clues 
regarding  gender stereotypes). When Charlene is threatened by Clyde’s violence, Voice Over, 
believing that she is acting out “scripts,” is also kidnapped by unknown men who treat her 
violently. Sporadically The Voice and Voice-over reflect on the behaviors of The Boy and The 
Girl, hinting that such stereotypical gender-coded behaviors will carry on into future generations. 
For instance, Voice Over in one sequence plays as the girl in a red light district where the 
voyeuristic boy (Calvin) pays a visit. Both The Voice and Voice Over have their words amplified 
through microphones. The Voice’s values are embodied by The Man (Clyde), just as Voice Over 
incarnates the view of The Woman (Charlene). The opposing male and female outlooks, reified 
in The Voice and Voice Over, play out the interaction between Clyde and Charlene through the 
frame of mainstream discourse.  
In a sense, Vogel illuminates the power of discourse in her use of The Voice and Voice 
Over, who not only passively play out Charlene’s erotic scripts, but also actively take over 
Charlene’s subjective stances. That is, instead of acting as an author, Charlene frequently enacts 
what The Voice/Voice Over commands.  
THE VOICE. “So close, she can almost taste—“ 
V.O. 
Smell. His. — 
THE VOICE:  “Sweat.” 
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(A blue light fills the stage again. There is a rustling at the sliding glass window. 
We see The Boy against the glass, watching. He stretches his arms against the 
frame.) 
MAN.  It will never be as good as it is with you. 
THE VOICE. “CUT TO: INTERIOR. THE WOMAN closes her eyes.” 
(The Woman closes her eyes.) 
THE VOICE. “CLOSE-UP on her lips as she kisses THE MAN, hard, on the 
mouth.” 
(The Woman sits by The Man and gently kisses him. They look at each other. Then 
they kiss again—a long, hard kiss, breathing each other in.) 
V.O. 
            “VOICE-OVER: What are you doing, Charlene?” 
THE VOICE.  “THE MAN and THE WOMAN look at each other for a long 
time.” 
V.O. 
“VOICE-OVER CONTINUED: This is not a movie, Charlene.”  
                                                                             (Vogel 265) 
In her use of film language, Charlene submits to The Voice like an actress abiding the 
demands of a director. In addition to Charlene and Clyde, Calvin The Boy also enacts The 
Voice’s narration. What Vogel depicts is the susceptible aspect of the self, how external 
discourse infiltrates the individual’s interior. 
Through the verbal usage, body expression, interaction among characters and stage 
directions, etc., Vogel does everything to remind us that The Voice represents a patriarchal 
discourse while Voice-Over, the female erotica narration, is a repressed and submitted Other. 
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The Voice’s various European dialects suggest the power and importance of authoritative 
sexologist figures, such as Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov (Lolita), nineteenth-century 
sexologist William Acton (The Functions and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs in 
Childhood, Youth, Adult Age and Advanced Life Considered in Their Physiological, Social and 
Moral Relations) and Austro-German sexologist and psychiatrist Krafft-Ebing (Psychopathia 
Sexualis). Within such sexological discourse are blatant inaccuracies, for example, that male 
violence leads to female orgasm, and that women do not naturally have sexual drives—“love of 
home, children and domestic duties, are the only passions they feel” (249), etc. Such patriarchal  
ideologies  permeate The Voice’s utterances, suffocating any attempt for active female sexuality 
in Charlene’s fictional erotic texts--as Clyde’s (as a burglar) condescending remark goes: “I’m 
here to audition. To Give You. New Material. The E-Rot-icly UnEmployed…Write this up, 
Baby” (251). 
 Though featuring the “Voice-over” and herself as the active, controlling force in sex 
activities, Charlene’s script, a hodgepodge of assimilated sexual expressions and patterns 
borrowed from the (patriarchal) status quo, however finally is shown to be beyond her own 
control. Both Charlene the author and “Voice-over,” the impersonator of her characters, are 
subdued by male violence. The script finally follows the track of patriarchal discourse. Through 
this failure of “Charlene’s scripts”—where Charlene is both an (striving-to-be) author and a 
constructed subject/characters—Vogel suggests that a simple inversion of the subject-object 
relation cannot work to make a new female-erotica (female subjectivity). What the play shows is 
the female’s desire to be independent from the constructed subjectivity (defined by patriarchy) 
and how the female’s effort may often only reinscribe the patriarchy; this is a problem frequently 
encountered by second-wave feminists, who seek the ascendance of women. Hot ‘n’ Throbbing 
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finally demonstrates the imposition of male dominance, the recycling of misogynist and 
pornographic discourses, and the assigned, subordinate position of the woman. 
What one observes in Hot ‘n’ Throbbing is that Charlene’s search for her/women’s own plot 
finally reveals that female sexuality is inscribed within male perspectives. Charlene’s desire to 
write registers women’s desires to make the invisible (female sexuality) visible and to redefine 
their (sexual) identity on the patriarchal page. If in patriarchal discourse women are turned on 
(sexually) by violence, then it is Charlene’s task to expose an alternative female sexuality that 
presumes an independent subjectivity. This attempt to override male/patriarchal imposition 
stands as Vogel’s chief concern—the possibility of a clandestine feminine power that might 
overwrite “male discourse”—represented by The Voice, who intrudes upon the Voice Over’s 
narration with passages from phallocentric figures like D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, and 
Nabokov's Humbert Humbert.  
The imposition and authority wielded by The Voice correspond to the ascendance enjoyed 
by the Western self. These patriarchal discourses79 imply a totalitarian power that subjugates the 
Other (bringing it into the Same); they represent a tradition rooted in a  linear, apocalyptic sense 
of time, a gendered/male time that devours the future/ Other and expands its (interior) territory 
(see full discussion in my chapter on David Henry Hwang), in a Lévinasian sense. Within this 
understanding of time, the Other is subdued by the epistemological mode that provides the Self 
with comprehension. For instance, female erotica is so foreign to Clyde that he cannot tell the 
difference between female erotica and porn. Dominant discourse by its nature tends to snuff out 
any counter voices; MAN: …Talking involves disagreement. (258). The confrontation between 
(patriarchal) discourse and (female) narrative then involves a power struggle of sexual/erotic  
                                                            
79 Lévinas has a totally opposite definition of the term “discourse.” Here, the term is used more in a Foucaultian 
sense. 
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languages, though the struggle is situated within the political, cultural, economical, and sexual 
impositions that a male-dominated society has placed on women. Distancing her work from 
traditional adult videos that are driven by male fantasies, Charlene intends a “women erotica” as 
an affirmation of female independence. This understanding of “erotica” implies a subject 
(male)/object (female) inversion. 
WOMEN. Gyno Productions is a feminist film company dedicated to  
            producing women’s erotica.  
MAN. Erotica is just a Swedish word for porn, Charlene. Just face what  
                you’re doing. Take pride in it.                            (261) 
The difficulties involved in Charlene’s painstaking effort to generate “women’s tales” are 
twofold. First, Charlene exhausts the vocabularies for inventing narratives of female sexuality. If, 
as the French philosopher Michael Foucault points out, sexuality is a constantly changing 
concept activated by power relations, i.e., law, medicine, and pathology, then a deficiency of 
vocabularies may come as a corollary.80 Female sexuality as a concomitant of feminine 
subjectivity owes much to feminist discourses, which are mostly evident in academic contexts.  
In other words, feminist discourse may be legitimate, but only in the field of academia. In the 
languages of popular cultural or daily life, feminist /female erotica utterances are unfamiliar (not 
housed in a male-dominated society). Therefore without a (popular/daily) discourse to proffer 
validated vocabularies and usages, it is not surprising that Charlene runs short of ways to express 
her efforts in female erotica. Such an attempt to import female porn into a culture where porn 
                                                            
80 In his The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Michael Foucault points out that sexual discourse is a constantly 
changing concepts. For example, homosexuality appears to be one of the sexual practices when it was “transposed 
from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been 
a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (43). So too were all other minor sexual perverts with 
some “strange baptismal names” given by sexologists in nineteenth century, such as Krafft-Ebing’s zoophiles and 
zooerasts. Foucaults indicates that “[these] fine neames for heresies referred to a nature that was overlooked by the 
law, but not so neglectful of itself that it did not g on producing more species, even where there was no order to fit 
them into” (43). 
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means “male-perspective porn” also risks enhancing the existing connotation of that word (porn 
from a male perspective). 
Secondly, throughout the play, Charlene has to repudiate, albeit without much success, that 
she is NOT writing pornography but something other. In a Lévinasian sense, it is always difficult, 
if not impossible, to fight against the thematized totality of discourse. Lévinas points out that: 
“…to know objectively is to know the historical, the fact, the already happened, the already 
passed by. The historical is not defined by the past; both the historical and the past are defined as 
themes of which one can speak. They are thematized precisely because they no longer speak” (TI, 
65).    
Those who defy patriarchal discourse, Charlene and her female erotica in this case, expose 
their inauthenticity and ambiguous state at the same time they speak. If the Other can make loud 
enough noises and win some approval, as seen with feminist movements, they only win over a 
limited habitat (i.e., within academic discourse). Given this sanctioned habitat, their acts then 
win some degree of recognition. In this case the Self-Other relationship is more balanced. On the 
other hand, if the Other does not make enough noise to gain any approval, it remains “othered” 
and what it says is absorbed into the Self’s (patriarchal) discourse, which is then only 
strengthened. 
The thoroughly entrenched (and imperialist) nature of masculinist discourse appears 
throughout Vogel’s play. For instance, while Charlene is experiencing “writer’s block,” The 
Voice and Voice Over compete, offering different synonyms for “throbbing.” Voice-Over 
suggests “pulsating” and “heaving,” as The Voice offers “beating” and “battering” (243-44). The 
competition between dominant male discourse and female narrative foreshadows the later 
confrontation between Charlene and her ex-husband Clyde, as well as the interpolation of Voice 
Over’s script. When Clyde complains of his unlucky efforts in hiring a prostitute (because he 
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only had $18.37), compassion (for old times’ sake maybe) pulsates through Charlene and leads 
her to assert her sexual independence; she gives him sex as a gift. The thought that Charlene is 
always “prepared,” always ready, however, infuriates Clyde, who finally beats and batters her.  
In this light, female erotica may seek to function as a manifesto declaring female 
subjectivity, though it can also act as a reinforcement of patriarchal discourse. Therefore, as 
Charlene makes her way into this conundrum, it is hard to discern whether this double-ness can 
bring a promising future, trumpeting women’s sexual independence, or, to the contrary, will only 
reinforce an obscene voyeuristic exploitation of the female body. In discussing Foucault’s 
concept of subjectivity and its correlation to sexual acts, professor Ryan Claycomb concurs that 
“the individual becomes a subject when those deeds are confessed,” however, “[although] the 
speech act endows the speaker with a notion of subjectivity, the subjectivity is created within a 
pre-existing matrix of power, and is already circumscribed by the moral codes” (109).  
Following this line of thinking, male discourse functions as the matrix from which the 
female sexual narrative is drawn. While the speech act (the narrative) endows the speaker with 
subjectivity, female existence has already been circumscribed by patriarchal codes. Thus, 
Charlene’s notion of erotica is already circumscribed by the concept of porn in male discourse. 
She emphatically denies this aspect of her writing:  “I could kill your father for telling you kids a 
thing like that. I do not write pornography. There’s a mile of difference between that and . . . 
adult entertainment” (238). With a voyeuristic son, and a daughter eager to sell her own body, 
Charlene experiences isolation and seems frustrated, trapped by the impositions a male discourse 
that her own efforts only reinforce. 
The ending of the play confirms the problematic effort to promote a female erotica in face 
of male discourse. When Charlene agrees to have sex with him, Clyde undergoes mixed 
emotions. He is at first surprised and can hardly believe his luck. When Charlene goes to retrieve 
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her contraception, declaring that “A girl scout is always…prepared” (286), Clyde recalls the 
restraining order.81 He grows steadily angry, feeling that he is not in control. He then shoots 
Charlene, who, startled with seeing blood on her hands, hears Clyde shout: “I think women really 
get turned on to men in pain…” (289).  
As this event plays out, there is a parallel demonstration of male-to-female violence 
occurring with The Voice and Voice Over. When Voice Over, a sex worker, thinks she is “acting 
out” Charlene’s movie script, The Voice interrupts her narration and demands a change in the 
script. 
V. O. 
          That’s not what we rehearsed. . .  
THE VOICE.  Since when are movies made by screenwriters? Directors  
          make the movies. Not some broad sitting on her ass. Improvise,  
          can’t you? Your dialogue has gotta be as good as the dumb ass  
          writer. . .  
V.O. 
          But I thought— 
THE VOICE.  Do we pay you to think? You’re a professional, aren’t you?  
           Do you want the role or don’t you—we’re wasting overtime— 
. . .  
V.O. 
(Bad acting) 
            “Please don’t hurt me…” 
                                                            
81 At this moment The Voice then announces a case in which Mr. C, a husband charged with a restraining order and 
thus unable to “arouse himself by normal stimuli” (286), was overcome “with a desire for …’lust murder.’ Only 
after he had satisfied himself with violence on ex-wife’s body was subject apprehended.” (286). 
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THE VOICE. I’m not gonna hurt you, baby…I’m just gonna teach you a  
             little lesson. . . 
. . .  
V.O. 
               Shit! Wait a minute, guys—that really hurt. . . are you guys with  
                                            Gyno Productions? 
THE VOICE.  This is not your screenplay.                    (287) 
The Voice then takes over The Man (Cylde) and The Woman’s (Charlene) position, saying: 
“I’m beating you to teach you a lesson. . . Bitch. What makes you think, with your big fat butt 
and your cow thighs, that you’re worth eighteen bucks…” (292). Unbuckling his belt, Clyde 
cries out, blaming Charlene as the one who has forced him to do this-- because “You should 
never—never gotten that restraining order—kicked me [Clyde] out of my own home!. . . A man’s 
home is his Castle. . . What we do in here is… our fucking sacred business…Not the goddamn 
judge’s!” (293). He then punches her in the stomach before he strangles her to death. 
The ending, with Charlene subdued by Clyde’s violence, obviously gives no hopeful 
expression of an independent female sexuality. Both “the author” (Charlene) and “the character” 
(Voice Over), existing as the projection of women, as a general social category, are 
simultaneously subdued by male discourse and male control. Such an ending seems to imply a 
failure of a female narrative to override/overwrite male discourse. If, as feminist Judith Butler 
suggests, female subjectivity lies in gender performance per se,82women are  here denied a 
chance for rehearsing their own script.  
With this ending, does Vogel imply that there is no way out for women to find their own 
(sexual) narrative? Does Hot ‘n’ Throbbing finally only give a bleak and defeated outlook, 
                                                            
82 See Butler’s Gender Trouble for reference.   
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giving over to misogyny and male assertion? I would argue that Vogel’s play can be 
recommended on a number of fronts and that the playwright is not defeatist in attitude. The play 
does not give consent to the masculinist order depicted in the play but executes strategic 
resistance against masculinist norms. One positive for Vogel may be the assertion of a more 
accurate understanding of the female position and female identity.  In this respect, the play can 
be seen as a clearing of the deck, tacitly asserting that second-wave feminism is antiquated and 
inadequate as a model for gender progress.  
First of all, Charlene does not “invent” female narratives. Rather, she gleans her sources 
from the dominant discourse on porn.  She listens to The Voice, who embodies the historical 
discourse on sexology, and the information bombarding the public via contemporary media, in 
hope that she can ferret out the secret truth of female sexuality. Her work  
. . . documents the circulation of public discourses about gender and sexuality, as 
speeches and ideas overheard or adapted by the woman are incorporated into her 
text, and will presumably go on to animate other individuals who will view her 
film once it is finished. Here, a creative, nonviolent recursivity is offered as an 
alternative to the more deeply ingrained verbal habits and behaviors of the culture 
at large.      (Richardson 690).  
 
At the onset of the play and throughout the course of the action (until The Voice 
appropriates the script), both Charlene the writer and Voice Over emphasize that “she is in 
control” (235, 286). This reiteration, however, does not guarantee that an independent subject 
can automatically articulate itself (much like a repressed Other is not able to articulate itself by 
claiming itself to be in control). Likewise, female narrative/subjectivity does not validate itself 
just by self-assertion. A simple inversion of subject-object relation does not work, that is, the 
woman cannot seek to take the male position of dominance. An act (writing female erotica 
narrative) must be considered in its social and cultural contexts. In order for feminist movements 
or female erotica narrative to succeed, many cultural and political factors would need to change 
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(more a matter of structural change than individual rebellion). Clyde, for instance, is curious and 
inquires about Charlene’s alleged confidence about this female sexual independence: 
MAN. . . . So where do all these words come from? 
WOMAN.  I don’t know. When I really get going, it’s like a trance—it’s  
            not me writing at all. It’s as if I just listen to voices and I’m taking  
            dictation. . . .  
MAN. Doesn’t that spook you? I mean, whose voices are these? Who’s in  
           control? 
VOICE OVER.  But she was in control.  
WOMAN. Well, they’re the characters speaking, or the script itself. I  
           mean, I know it’s me, but I have to get into it. At first it spooked me  
           a little. But now I know when I hear them, it’s a good sign. And I  
          am in control. 
MAN.  I used to think that porno flicks were all pictures and no words—   
                                                                                          (my emphasis; Vogel 260) 
Clyde’s inquiry about “Who’s in control” is crucial here. While Charlene thinks she is in control 
by having the law on her side (restraining order), Clyde barges in; while she thinks she is in 
control in offering to have sex with Clyde, Clyde flies into a rage and kills her. Similarly, the 
Voice-over thinks she is in control of her own body but is forced to act out a “patriarchal script” 
where men kidnap her body for their own use. Vogel’s treatment of Charlene and the play’s 
attitude toward her erotica suggest that female identity is more complicated than Charlene 
understands (that woman is not a pre-given but a construction), and that resistant efforts do not 
advance in a vacuum but are often authorized and appropriated by the constraining controls of a 
male-dominated culture.  
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 Another positive may be found in Vogel’s play, though it appears here more as an 
intimation than a realization.  One key aspect of Vogel’s writing is her fascination with 
desubjectification and a transformation that can follow (I will discuss this dynamic further in my 
analysis of And Baby Makes 7). Numerous instances in Hot ‘n’ Throbbing give the hint of this 
dynamic, as when Charlene experiences a self-division. In this moment we witness a blurring of 
the line between Charlene the scriptwriter and the “Voice-Over,” a dominatrix in control in 
Charlene’s script. While the multiple narrative can give evidence of a masculine discourse 
always at play, this blurring also points to the suspect aspect of any identity whole—it highlights 
the fluid nature of identity and the possibility of identity expansion. While Charlene herself may 
not experience desubjectification, this phenomenon may be suggested by Vogel’s multi-narrative 
technique. With the use of multiple role-playing and myriad voices, the play often puts the 
audience in a confused and disoriented state, unable to determine coherent characters and 
motivated actions. This non-traditional form may point to a fluid or inchoate state of being, what 
Lévinas would term “existence without existents.” 
In some respect Charlene and Vogel share similarities, in that they both are scriptwriters.  
However, Vogel may herself be able to effect a destabilization that Charlene cannot. What we 
see in Vogel’s dramatic strategy is a reluctance to simply reverse or flip the subject-object 
relationship existing in traditional gender patterns, for, as Savran reminds us, “inversion does not 
in itself fundamentally alter oppressive formations” (A Queer 192). Vogel can be understood to 
challenge the postures of the 1970s feminists, in following a tactic different from the outlook of 
the cultural feminists (lesbian-feminists, in particular) who attempted “to produce a uniquely 
woman-centered theater by recognizing that the celebration of formerly reviled characteristics 
simply inverts and thereby perpetuates patriarchal hierarchical structures” (Savran A Queer 192).  
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Rather than celebrating an affirmation of women’s nature (and erotic desires), Vogel 
reveals the misguided thinking of Charlene’s writing, as Vogel herself adopts a Brechtian and 
post-modernist approach. She refuses to give the presentation of an essential (female) 
subjectivity. She instead shows individuals enacting a social script, how women exist as a 
phenomenon constructed by different social and cultural forces. Vogel offers a complicated 
understanding of identitfy construction (one that might offer transformational possibilities 
through the process of desubjectification). 
In the case of Hot ‘n’ Throbbing, Vogel situates Charlene as a woman victimized by 
domestic violence, who is eager to follow feminists’ footsteps in search of an independent 
sexuality/subjectivity. However, Vogel admits that the existing definition of “women” stems 
from the cultural matrix. Instead of denying this and claiming a women-centered theatre, she 
forays into the Self’s/male’s epistemology and foregrounds its coercive aspects, highlighting its 
power and domination. In short, Vogel’s method serves like an X-ray to expose the networking of 
patriarchal social structure.  
While Charlene thinks she is writing from a women’s point of view, she is unaware of her 
assimilation in patriarchal ideology. Vogel, on the other hand, is conscious that she is writing in a 
male-dominated arena which has been governed by a patriarchal perspective. Vogel, however 
works to smuggle in her tactics of resistance. For example, some male playwrights’ works 
romanticize violence toward women; in Vogel’s play Charlene and Clyde play out this basic 
romantic pattern, though Vogel’s imitation of this pattern has the effect of parody. In a basic 
sense, Vogel exhibits the patterns of patriarchy and in the process shows its dangerous nature. 
Vogel’s imitation of male playwrights acts as the necessary means for her disruption (her parody 
works to trouble male discourse). 
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Lynda Hart describes how the theatre has long been a public sphere for men. Traditionally 
women are only there to been seen: “Women have been spectacularized, cast as suffering 
heroines in many canonical playtexts”. Hart notes that “the history of theatre and even the 
etymology of the word have long rendered the woman playwright an oxymoron” (Qtd. in Savran 
A Queer 192). The theatron, is the place for viewing, a public sphere where men watch women, a 
validated location where the masculine Self bends the Other into its own visionary epistemology. 
To correct such a male-dominated sphere, Vogel parodizes its forms. She proceeds through 
mimicry. Savran explains:  
. . . she imitates --with a difference—the strategies that male playwrights have 
long used. In some cases . . . And Baby Makes Seven, she deliberately 
appropriates and reimagines major patriarchal texts: Othello, A Man for All 
Seasons, and Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, respectively. Hot ’n’ Throbbing, 
meanwhile, represents a damning appraisal of the paradigmatically masculinist 
character of literary modernism (from D.H. Lawrence to Henry Miller, James 
Joyce to Vladimir Nabakov), as well as a critique of those playwrights, like John 
Patrick Shanley and David Mamet, whose work romanticizes violence against 
women. And Charlene herself practices a kind of male impersonation. In a play 
that is so clearly about the material effects of writing, it is no accident that her 
pornography represents a parodic redeployment of a genre on which men have 
long held a monopoly, much as Paula’s own playwriting represents a revision and 
repossession of a highly masculinized textual practice. (A Queer 191) 
 
Vogel’s revelatory form of parody avoids the strategy of inversion advocated by the second-
wave feminist movement. Her writing focuses on the coercions and constructions of a patriarchal 
order. Her parody may effect a kind of disturbance that threatens to make male assurance uneasy. 
And while this kind of transformation is not realized in Hot ‘n’ Throbbing, Vogel’s investigation 
of the construction of identity point to the phenomenon of a divided or dispersed self, the 
destabilization of the self that may provide a more healthy and vital female experience.  
And Baby Makes 7          
While Hot ‘n’ Throbbing demonstrates the imposition of dominant narratives, the 
multivocal and inventive style of the play points to a kind of fluid arena and effect. Vogel’s plays, 
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whether topically light or thematically heavy, often present a symbolic, theatrical arena in which 
an anti-social-gravity operates; her dramatic realm can be a kind of outer space where characters 
may be presented in a way that indicates an alternative to certain conditions determined by 
mainstream social notions, and can thus be transformed, viewed  in a positive light. (Such a 
transformation is not depicted in Charlene’s case, who remains constrained by male imposition, 
though the multivocal style of the play points to slippage). This effect and power comes from the 
characters’ experiences involving—in Lévinas’s terms— the alterity of the Other. It is through 
the submitting of themselves before the Other that new forms of subjectivity can be born.  
This emphasis on theatricalizing a new subjectivity stands out as Vogel’s chief strategy; 
she executes parody and non-linear, non-masculinsit forms of characterization, and in so doing 
she presents narrative effects that illuminate what Lévinas calls “existence without existents” to 
re-imagine a subjectivity born from the Other. This new subjectivity abandons a virile Self, as 
Ruth exemplifies in And Baby Makes 7, and subjugates itself to the Other. 
If Hot ‘n’ Throbbing, is more about the operation of patriarchal discourses and their 
treatment as parody,  And Baby Makes 7 gives hint of an overhauled modality, a shift in 
subjectivity, here understood as  “growing up.” In this play, Vogel makes the character Ruth grow 
up—transforming from a virile ego to a “feminine ego,” in Lévinas’s terms, which refers to a 
subject who bows/submits to the Other (different from submitting to male authority) like a 
mother surrenders herself to her baby. In And Baby Makes 7, Vogel again highlights 
desubjectification by having characters enacting their alter egos. The play dramatizes the 
unfixing of identity. Characters’ completed subjectivities are broken into multiple narrative 
voices; hence, their (social) identities are blurred, and we observe a state that may be understood 
as “existence without existents.”  
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In bringing about this dramatization of an unfixed state, the play illustrates a new order of 
time, which can be understood through a Lévinasian lens. In its release from linear time, And 
Baby Makes 7 demonstrates the transformation at work which leads to “existence without 
existents.” Lingis mentions that “time” is the inner structure of subjectivity (in Lévinas EE, 11). 
Time exists because a subject/consciousness is born. In other words, a subject becomes a subject 
because of the awareness of “here and now.” (This formation comes because the existent is 
taking on existence as its own, its own attribute, and its own subjectivity. A rational subject then 
excludes other forms of existence, such as sleep, considering it as a suspension of subjectivity, 
instead of another mode of existence. It equates its own rationality with a certain mode of 
existence and excludes other modes of existence). Lingis writes: 
The work of auto-positing, of contracting identity, of taking on existing as one’s 
own and thus becoming an existent, is also the very process that produces 
presence and the present. But then the present has the form not of a pure punctual 
line of separation between the infinite extension of the past and that of the 
future … but of a pulse of existence that disconnects from the transmission of the 
past, closes in upon itself, and finds itself irrevocably and definitely held in all the 
absolute weight of its being. It has the form of an instant. (in Lévinas EE, 11) 
 
So the subject inhabits the form of an instant, present. This subjectivity imagines the movement 
of time, from its own self-centered perspective, as an infinite extension of the past and future. 
This kind of time is only enclosed within the instant/subject. In other words, the traditional 
notion of (linear) time where the Future automatically flows into the Now is only an eternal 
repetition of “here and now,” the instants of the subject’s own imaginings. The subject is actually 
entrapped in the “stasis of time;” it “closes in upon itself and sustain itself.” It makes the 
universe intelligible by supplying reasons for everything (Lévinas EE, 8). In Lévinas’s 
perspective, this kind of subjectivity is termed rational, characterizing a virile ego (exhibiting a 
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patriarchal epistemology, subjugating the Other to itself).83 As elaborated in my chapter on 
Hwang, Lévinas defines Now as this virile ego and Future as an unknown Other. Only when the 
subject bows to the Other—rather than seeking to control or objectify it--can the subject 
transform (or grow up). 
This concept is key to understanding Vogel’s deconstructionist methodology in And Baby 
Makes 7. Using various theatrical techniques as a vehicle to illustrate the freezing of time, so as 
to zoom in on the diorama of different cultural and social forces working on the individual, Vogel 
is unmaking the “subject” as traditionally defined. In this aspect, Vogel shares Lévinas’s 
temporal concept (the recurrent here and now) by freezing the moment to expose the existent’s 
(subject’s) contingency and constructedness. In other words, she has theatre function as a means 
to freeze the present moment to illuminate the subject’s repetition of “here and now.” 
In the play And Baby Makes Seven, I argue that a new subjectivity takes place, especially 
in the character Ruth, when the family is held hostage by the Other (baby). In embracing an 
inextricable responsibility, one that comes through a bowing of the Self, through a prioritization 
of the Other (the coming baby), a new subjectivity (of parenthood/ family) is born. In a sense, the 
family is maternalized, and new subjectivities are formed. This dynamic corresponds to 
Lévinas’s proposal of “effemination” in Totality and Infinity. Attributing gender attributes to 
rationality/logos, Lévinas discusses the “effeminization” of the virile being, which is equivalent 
to the  “feminization of the ethical” (Chanter Feminist Interpretations, 184). That is, instead of 
                                                            
83 Philosophy and Women's Studies professor Debra Bergoffen describes such a subject in “The Subject 
of Love,” a review article of Family Values: Subjects Between Nature and Culture (New York: Routledge, 
1997) and Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2001), by 
Philosophy professor Kelly Oliver: “The virile subject relates to the world and himself (it is sexed as male) 
through images of "ownness," ownership, and control. It loves what is fixed and fixes what it loves 
(women, truths) in stable, reliable identities. The virile subject is the figure of Hegel's master-slave 
dialectic, of Lacan's economy of sacrifice and of Sartre's sociality of war. It provides the blueprint for a 
cultural imaginary that severs nature from culture, and that images desire as a lack that can only be 
satisfied by domination (either benignly imaged as romantic love or baldly figured as conquest).  (203) 
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following a masculine way of summoning the Other under the Self’s subjugation, the Self should 
bow to the Other, like a mother devotes herself totally to the nurturing of a baby.84  
Lévinas genders the rational ego as male, as a virile ego. So as soon as an existent 
identifies the present, the here and now, as a Self hinged on the virile ego, it forms its own 
interior reality and rejects or forgets the fact that it is itself composed by other existents. In other 
words, it does not consider “existence without existents” as another mode of existence, as a stage 
it has been through, but rejects this state altogether (hence it rejects the Other). So Lévinas is 
proposing that the virile ego should recognize this other mode of existence (when itself relies on 
Others), which he terms as “effemination,” as opposed to virile ego. Vogel’s method of 
desubjectification (of Ruth) equates to this process of “effeminating virile ego.” The analysis will 
specifically focus on Ruth’s transformation from a “virile ego” to a new subject, who knows that 
a real Self is one that recognizes its dependence on others.  
As noted in the Vogel anthology The Baltimore Waltz and Other Plays (1996), And Baby 
Makes Seven has been produced at least three times. It was first produced in January, 1984 by 
Theatre with Teeth at the 18th Street Playhouse in New York City, and was directed by Paula 
Vogel herself. The play was also produced in February, 1986 at Theatre Rhinoceros in San 
Francisco, with Kris Gannon as the director. Later it opened at the Lucille Lortel Theatre in New 
York City, in May, 1993, produced by the Circle Repertory Company with Derek McLane as the 
director. The play appears to have received a lukewarm reception, as critics generally considered 
                                                            
84 I tend to look at the gendering terms, especially “feminine” and “effeminate” as metaphorical usages, as 
“terminological device,” instead of “empirical sex and /or gender,” in Donna Brody’s words. Lévinas’s 
view on women is controversial as his stance reveals a male-centered perspective. See essays in Feminist 
Interpretations of Emmanuel Lévinas edited by Tina Chanter, including Tina Chanter’s Ethics of Eros, Donna 
Brody’s “Lévinas’s Maternal Method from ‘Time and the Other’ Through Otherwise Than Being: No 
Woman’s Land?” and Stella Sandford’s “Masculine Mothers? Maternity in Lévinas and Plato” for more 
details. I also talk about Lévinas’s view on feminine in the Conclusion Chapter. 
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the plot-line too thin to sustain a full-length play. In his review of the play’s 1984’s production, 
Mel Gussow made this point clear:  
As the play swerves between heightened reality and mania, everything flies askew. 
The author does not know where to end her Gothic nursery tale and appears to 
catch the actors, as well as the audience, off guard. In addition, Paula Vogel's 
production is shaky. . . Her brand of nightshade humor would seem to be very 
much in the developmental stage.                                                                       
(“Theatre: ‘And Baby Makes 7.’”) 
 
In regard to the 1993 production, Gussow again writes an unfavorable review, noting the work as 
a regressive sign for the author.  
’And Baby Makes Seven’ operates on a single level and seems regressive, in 
several senses. The work has not markedly grown in the years since an earlier 
version, which was presented by the playwright under a pseudonym.      (“Parents-
to-Be Regress”) 
 
Since these three productions, the play gained another staging-- by Theatre 13 at the Dairy 
Center for the Arts in February of 2008. This production received a much warmer reception, with 
critic Juliet Wittman claiming “Mark Fischer's meticulous set and lighting support the action 
brilliantly, and the direction, by Steve Grad and Charlotte Brecht Munn, is sophisticated.”  
Notwithstanding Wittman’s positive comment, Gussow was on to something with his 
remarks that the hectic household was “far too thin a thread on which to hang a full-length play” 
(“Parents-to-Be Regress”). Indeed, as a whimsical blurring of illusion and reality, the short play 
appears to be a hodgepodge of heavy themes. Despite the negative critical reception, the play 
nonetheless merits attention and an important place in Vogel’s canon, as the play offers a 
provocative and perhaps profitable experience in the shaping of a new ethical relationship. Some 
critics claim that the play touches on the themes of lesbian motherhood, and the redefinition of 
familyhood, as in Gussow’s words, “emotional alliances that transcend matters of sexual 
identity” (“Parents-to-Be Regress”) ; I would assert that the play is more significant for its 
envisioning of an overhauled and alternative female subjectivity. 
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Vogel’s play here gives imaginative investigation to the ethical lens of the Self-Other 
relationship. With the trio of characters maternalized, these characters experience a new 
emotional alliance that leads them into a new definition of family. The transformation of 
subjectivity is accomplished through narrative means (storytelling), which gives expression to 
the matter of “growing up.” While Gussow asserts that“[the] characters—real and imagined—
have never grown up, and will never grow up, stultifying in a never- never land of their fervid 
dreams,” Gussow identifies is the character Ruth “as the most childlike member of the ‘family’” 
(“Parents-to-Be Regress”). Though Ruth does show immaturity, I believe she advances in 
outlook. My analysis focuses on the transformation of Ruth and explores her transition from a 
Lévinasian “virile ego” to a “maternalized” parent. Through various staging and narrative 
strategies, Vogel de-subjectifies the Self, and in this effort we note the phenomenon of 
“existence without existents.” It is in Ruth’s realization of her responsibility towards the Other, 
including her own fragility and the necessity of Others for her survival, that she transforms 
herself and experiences a mature relation with Others; she becomes, in essence, a grownup.   
And Baby Makes 7 is a complicated play, unconventional and whimsical. The play begins 
with a lesbian couple, the pregnant Anna and Ruth, awaiting the birth of a baby fathered by 
Anna’s gay friend, Peter. As the audience waits along with the characters, they witness the 
increasingly involved and agitated relationship between the characters, since Peter chafes at the 
couple’s imaginary games (they pretend to have children already). To appease Peter, Anna 
persuades Ruth to initiate “plots” to murder the imaginary kids: Henri and Orphan (enacted by 
Ruth) and Cecil (enacted by Anna). Vogel’s work is thus heavy on role-playing and split 
identities. 
With a “genius IQ,” the imaginary Cecil is a precocious, mature, and suspicious leader. At 
the beginning of the play, when Henri asks where babies come from, he is able to address this 
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issue with sophisticated answers: “ …a marvel of human technology”; a “thousands of millions 
of sperm are released and swim their way upstream to the egg…. It’s kind of a microcosm of 
Wall Street” (63). Partly because of his maturity and intellect, Cecil appears to be a big brother 
and an arbitrator between Henri and Orphan, who bicker often. With a spirit of camaraderie, he is 
alert and suspicious to any intention outside the “imaginary bro circle”—meaning the realm of 
the performing adults. He talks about giving up his belief in Heaven, and is never receptive to 
any placebo the adults proffer. Vigilant, he is the first one to detect the murder plan directed at 
them, and with profound observation he keenly points out how the adults are changing because 
of the baby. At the time he “has to go,” he is calmer than Peter the executioner (even though he 
“performs” a suicide), taking the story to a “tragic end” after an adult talk (men’s talk) with Peter.  
Orphan (seven-year-old) is the boy raised by dogs. His emotions can become unbridled and 
his behaviors feral. Henri (eight-year-old) presents himself as the hero from the 1950s movie The 
Red Balloon. Ruth can move between these two roles and herself without giving any signals, a 
shift which drives Peter nuts. For instance, in scene four, where Henri and Orphan are fighting 
over a peanut butter-and-jelly sandwich, Ruth initiates a schizophrenic fight within herself. 
However, there are moments heralding intimate (if not odd) familial ties, such as those of Peter 
and Ruth sharing Anna’s breasts, Peter and Ruth practicing the bathing of a plastic doll, etc.  
The plot to murder the imaginary kids takes place early on in the play. 
RUTH.  Look, I want to get my last inch of fantasy out of them.  I can’t just stop  
doing them, just like that. I’ll always be wondering: Will Cecil become a  
geophysicist? Will Henri go back to Paris? Will Orphan become fully  
socialized? 
       ANNA.  So what are you proposing? 
RUTH.  We’re going to tidy up the plots. No loose ends dangling. Starting  
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tomorrow. We’re going to kill them. One by one. First, Orphan. Then  
Henri. Cecil will be the last to go.  (84)                                                                           
Despite this declaration, however, we are not sure what death means here. Does it simply mean 
getting rid of pretend and the element of fancy? Or does this death mean the rehabilitation of 
their emotions through narration/storytelling? As we do not really see any of the children die, 
since they’re “enacted” by the characters, their death per se are less important that the effect 
these imaginary deaths bring to bear.   
When Henri tells Anna that he is the father of the baby, instead of Peter, we get the cue that 
Ruth is dealing with her sexuality and jealousy. While Anna is emotional, with a hair-trigger 
temper, Ruth asks Uncle Peter to take three kids to the zoo. Wittman reflects on the touching 
moment when one has to sever ties with one’s past:   
…the children seem to take on a life independent of their two creators, and it's 
touching when one or the other appears to sense impending oblivion. As it turns 
out, the first death is gruesome, the second lyrical and the third a parody of 
Cassius's suicide at the hand of his servant in Julius Caesar. (This is only one of 
many references to other works, from Hamlet to Tea and Sympathy, the 1950s 
film that attempted to deal with homosexuality without actually mentioning it).                             
(Wittman) 
 
Wittmam here notes Vogel’s propensity for thinking in “dramatic images.” Indeed, the nonverbal 
affections and pranks demonstrate the internal struggles of sexualization, personal jealousy and 
new responsibility. The images produce an uncanny effect and help create the sense of the “stasis 
of time” and the suspension of Future (Other). Interestingly, this “stasis of time” in Vogel’s play 
seems to herald the coming of Lévinasian time. It not only offers a chance to look into the 
reformation of new subjectivity, but also justifies its own timely exigency. As lesbian/gay 
parenthood is now new to society, this play offers an alternative definition of familyhood. 
In a Lévinasian sense, the characters must break the self-referent present and embrace a 
future, in opposition to the constraints of a twentieth-century past/patriarchy, so that their new 
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subjectivites can be born. Only when the individual is aware of this weight and responsibility can 
it embrace alterity, the absolute Otherness that cannot be subsumed into the Same—the 
responsibility that comes from the Other (baby). This is also the moment when subjectivity  
breaks from its own “eternal repetition of instant” and looks toward the future, as entering a new 
relation.   
In And Baby Makes 7, Anna and Ruth appear to be telling the stories of their imaginary 
children, but they are instead telling their own and/or each other’s life stories. By taking a third-
person point-of-view, Vogel desubjectifies the lesbian couple, enabling them to explore an 
alternative sexuality, debate the possibilities of selfhood, and, with the coming of the baby, 
testify to past memories as the basis of a sustainable present. In Relating Narratives: Storytelling 
and Selfhood, Italian philosopher Adrianna Cavarero proposes that the Self is narratable. 
Departing from Hannah Arendt’s notion of “who” someone is,85 Cavarero argues that people 
desire to hear stories about themselves. It is through such stories told by other people that an 
individual’s uniqueness is achieved and its subjectivity sustained.  
 Ruth appears to grow more complicated throughout the imaginary game, revealing her 
convoluted and unbridled desires/personality. It is curious, however, that we never know what 
kind of person she is throughout the play. The performance of Henri and Orphan almost takes 
over her, and the multiplicities are difficult to comprehend. This complex modality parallels her 
social condition. In the triad, she is the most removed from the baby and most reluctant to get rid 
of the imaginary game. She clings most desperately to the storytelling exercise. 
Awareness of this exigency pushes Ruth to employ a very virile strategy—she has Henri 
attempt to replace Peter as “the father.” This is her attempt at control. Throughout the imaginary 
                                                            
85 In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt notes that despite philosophy setting out to describe the human 
condition with its similarities and differences, it shares or departs from other species (what human is)—that is, it 
cannot tangibly grasp the uniqueness of an individual (who someone is).  
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games, Henri stands out as a conspicuous representation of the complicated relationship among 
the three adults. The play unfolds with Henri inquiring “where does baby come from?” Such 
inquiries are not uncommon among children—they here bring out Ruth’s discomfort in 
envisioning Anna and Peter’s “making out the baby.” Therefore, despite Cecil’s use of scientific 
terminology, he insists on jumping to “the good part.” While this episode endeavors to set up an 
appropriate tone with regard to the role-play game, it illuminates Henri’s personality as a 
naughty boy who is curious about sex, and unfolds a new, alternative definition of familyhood, 
revealing Ruth’s awkward position in the household.  
Both Ruth (the adult) and Henri (the eight-year-old) tend to see themselves as virile and 
capable subjects (desire to replace “the father”). This virile ego constitutes her/his selfhood and 
the ethical relationship with other people. In The Gift of the Other: Lévinas and the Politics of 
Reproduction, Lisa Guenther asserts that to be born is to forget one’s birth—that is, to forget and 
deny the times when we were dependent on the Others.86 In other words, there are moments 
when I cannot recognize, or do not identify, the person I am as me, when he/she is dependent 
and/or frail, because to forget one’s birth would be to avoid the apparent humiliation of being 
born “between feces and urine.”87 Whether I am three years old or seventy years old, my self-
image remains the same (as a grownup); this is the virile Self, who seeks completion and 
autonomy. 
In addition to Ruth’s aggressive maneuver to “replace the father,” her subjectivity, 
appearing largely constructed through sexuality, also conveys her “virile ego.” And while Henri 
insists on hearing “the good part,” his harassment of Peter (which apparently has been an issue) 
also points to his/her unruly personality/ sexuality.  
                                                            
86 “[Perhaps] we cannot help but forget—the moment of birth hovers ambiguously on the edge between 
time and anarchy, selfhood and anonymity, existence and nothingness” (The Gift of the Other 1). 
87 This sentence is from St. Augustine. Guenther cited this from Beauvoir (Guenther 1).  
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ANNA.  Henri!! What were you doing to Uncle Peter? 
             RUTH/HENRI.  Nothing. 
           ANNA.  Were you bothering him again? 
           RUTH/HENRI.  No. I didn’t do nothing! 
          ANNA:.  Petey? Was Henri…bothering you again? 
  (Henri appeals to Peter silently.) 
           ANNA. Okay. Because you know, Henri, that we had that talk about no  
                          g-r-o-p-i-n-g. Remember? Not even if Uncle Peter wants you to.  
RUTH/HENRI.  I would like to go to my room, please! 
          PETER.  By all means, be our guest. 
       (Ruth makes sounds of an offended Henri leaving the room, and slamming  
the door…).  (70) 
 Given that sexuality serves as a significant marker of an independent and virile Selfhood, 
this aggression on Henri’s part further reinforces a Selfhood of adult image. American poet 
Gertrude Stein asserts, “Nay we never know ourselves as other than young and grown men and 
women. When we know we are no longer to ourselves as children” (Qtd. in Gunther The Gift of 
the Other 1). That is, when we know ourselves as something other than a grownup, we are 
grownup to ourselves. Only when we recognize that there are moments when we are dependent 
on Others can we realize that we are finally grow up. For Guenther, this means we are prone to 
forget our birth, a time when our existence is tied to the Other. She interprets this in terms of 
understanding birth, time, and ethics:  
If to forget birth is to feel oneself as the ‘young and grown’ origin of  
one’s own existence, then to remember the givenness of birth would be  
both to feel oneself as the child of another and also to feel oneself as  
other than a child: as a self who, more than ‘young and grown,’ is both  
dependent on Others and responsible for them. (2) 
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 Ruth is often more given to enacting Henri and Orphan, rather than enacting herself. 
Despite using aggressive methods to reclaim her territory in the house, Ruth remains ambiguous 
until her long confession before Peter after the baby is born. This confession indicates a moment 
of transformed subjectivity; a new Ruth who “remembers her birth”— a time when she abandons 
her virility and admits the necessity of depending on Others (i.e., Peter, and the baby).  
RUTH.  He looks just like you [Peter]. 
                   (Beat) 
I guess Anna and I really started talking about having a child after our first 
year together. You know how it is, that first year…you spend every 
moment in side glances at your lover, learning this new alphabet—her face, 
her walk, her gestures. . . And I used to imagine that somewhere in the 
United States, there must be a pioneer geneticist, a woman in a lab coat we 
could go to, who would take some DNA from Anna and some DNA from 
me—and she’d combine us in a petri-dish in a little honeymoon culture. . . 
But finally I thought—well, I can always see my own face anytime I want 
to in the mirror. But I could see Anna’s face at birth, Anna in diapers. . . 
Well. I guess I didn’t think this all the way through. Peter. Oh. . . Is my 
face such an awful face? 
(Ruth smiles at him.) 
RUTH. No. it’s a very sweet face.  
(She strokes his face) 
I’m going to have to learn a new alphabet all over again.  (117) 
- 194 - 
 
Here, Ruth chronicles her efforts to participate in the process of being a parent. Having Peter 
involved seems to be the last choice to which she finally acquiesces. (Her reluctance had fueled 
the previous pranks by Henri and Orphan). No longer virile and aggressive, Ruth, in this moment, 
finally admits to and accepts Peter’s role. She understands that Peter is a necessary Other for 
them to form this family. By re-contextualizing the ordinary complexity seen among lovers (i.e., 
jealousy) to other human relationships—mother/son (i.e., Anna vs. Henri; Anna/Ruth vs. the 
coming baby), father/son (i.e., Peter vs. Cecil), friendships, etc.— Vogel depicts human relations 
beyond the constriction of the gender binary. A not uncommon question asked by kids, “Where 
does a baby come from?” leads to a reconsideration of Self-Other relationships. All in all, the 
baby is an ultimate Other. 
Investigating the Lévinasian aspects of reproduction, Guenther elevates the birth event  to 
an ethical level, arguing that we should return the gift (of birth) gained from the Other, to another 
Other-- everyone has the potential to be a Mother. In his book, Otherwise than Being, Lévinas 
compares ineradicable responsibility to the maternal body. For him, ethical responsibility 
demands the Self care for the Other without assimilating it. In the play, the coming baby is the 
Other tethering together the characters’ existence. Not only Anna and Peter, the biological 
parents of the baby, but also Ruth, reconstruct their subjectivity throughout the process of 
gestation. In her article, “’Like a Maternal Body’: Emmanuel Lévinas and the Motherhood of 
Moses,” Lisa Guenther emphasizes the word like and destabilizes the correlation between 
women and mothers, or “even between motherhood and responsibility” (119). She writes that it 
is “…an ethical imperative to bear the stranger as a nursing child, even if I have no reason and no 
capacity to bear him; the very homelessness and exposure of the Other speaks to me in the 
imperative” (120). Thus, the triad of the family (ethical relationship) per se is maternalized. They 
are not only the “host,” but are held hostage to the Other/baby without being able to extricate 
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themselves from the responsibility. As Cecil tells Henri: “They’re not themselves. Ever since that 
baby” (94).  What Cecil indicates and heralds is in effect the enervation/effemination of the ego. 
The title of the play can be interpreted in two ways and points to the theoretical and 
thematic implications of the work. Literally, it signifies the three adults, three imaginary children, 
and the coming baby, which makes 7 (people). It further emphasizes that the coming baby 
reorients the three people and reimagines the traditional notion of parenthood and familyhood. 
Therefore, the baby “makes” 7 and acts to bring about new subjectivities. As the play ends with 
the three gays forming a new family tie, determined by responsibility to the baby, we recognize 
the end of the “stasis of time”—the process of killing the imaginary kids—as Vogel depicts. This 
aspect of the play illuminates the Lévinasian temporal concept of “time,” a release from that of 
rational linearity, which only exists when the subject gains distance from its own identity 
determinants, subjugating itself before the Other—a moment when the Self experiences both the 
burden of responsibility and the difficulty of freedom. 
The phenomenon of “existence without existents” in the play is demonstrated in the  
desubjectification of the characters (especially Ruth)—when Ruth moves back and forth through 
different  self-created stories. She believes she grasps reality through telling stories. At times the 
plots of Orphan and Henri get so complicated  that audiences fail to recognize Ruth as a 
complete subject. During such experiences one notes the  “stasis of time;” the intricacies of 
Ruth’s emotions (jealousy, anxiety, and so on) and her desires for controlling are exposed 
through her enactment of the mischievous boys, the embodiments of her virile ego. It is through 
the process of the imaginary murders that Ruth learns to let go of some desires and compromises 
with some emotions, and it is not until her “adult” talk with Peter that a mature subject is shown 
in front of audience. 
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Arguing against an ontological epistemology, Lévinas’s insight on the ethical understanding 
of time/death helps to analyze Vogel’s And Baby Makes 7 in light of the dialogue and 
relationship between Self/Other and death/rebirth dynamics. The effeminizaton/maternalization 
process of the characters also proposes a set of newly reified social relations that encourage the 
bearing of Others, whom one has “neither conceived nor given birth to” (Qtd. in Guenther “’Like 
a Maternal Body’” 120).  
In conclusion, through the method of desubjectification Vogel presents a theatre of 
defamiliarization and successfully shows the phenomenon of “existence without existents.” This 
technique allows audiences to reevaluate the characters’ situation through a new lens, to 
reappraise women’s existence within a masculine society and to reconsider their subjectivity. 
With Charlene’s story Vogel not only demonstrates the limit of second-wave feminist’s methods, 
but also offers a new possibility of disrupting patriarchal discourse in Hot ‘n’ Throbbing. In And 
Baby Makes 7, depicting the “growing up” process of Ruth, Vogel envisions an alternative 
subjectivity constructed with a new Self-Other relationship. These  two earlier plays actually 
point to the later depiction of Li’l Bit’s healthy transformation and new subjectivity in her best-
known play How I Learned to Drive, where Li’l Bit, through an experience of  “existence 
without existents,” is allowed to conceive her past chapter (childhood abuses) as the Other—an 
indispensable part of her  new subjectivity yet to be born.88   
 
 
 
 
                                                            
88 In his presentation of “How I Learned to Mourn: Assimilating Trauma in Paula Vogel’s How I Learned to Drive,” 
Graley Herren argues that “Li’l Bit’s objective in re-enacting her trauma is not to punish her abuser so much as to 
find an acceptable narrative for assimilating the experience as a closed chapter from her past.” See Herren, Graley. 
“How I Learned to Mourn: Assimilating Trauma in Paula Vogel’s How I Learned to Drive.”   
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Chapter Six: 
Conclusion  
 
This project, with its exploration of different cultural and social concerns, brings recent 
acclaimed dramatists of the American theatre into conversation with Lévinasian theory. As stated 
in the Introduction chapter, the perception of “who we are” in America has been very much 
challenged after September 11, 2001. This attack, however, also has presented us with a chance 
to reexamine who we are and how we see the world. This challenge involves how we view our 
own subjectivity, how we view our position in global politics, and how we see our relationship 
with the Other. The rapid pace of change, with unprecedented innovations in human 
communications, and the effects of an ever-increasing globalization, demand new visions and a 
new model of ethics in the spheres of international relations, interpersonal relations, as well as 
relations between humanity and nature (i.e., animals and the environment).  
As an important venue for studying representations, theatre is uniquely suited to 
examining new visions and new perspectives. It engages the audience in timely reflection of 
political issues and ethics, offering a site for exploration of what Lévinas envisions— an 
encounter between Self and Other and its possible rippling effect, from interpersonal interactions 
to political involvement and activism. This project draws on both the disciplines of philosophy 
and theatre studies, and relates dramatic analysis to the global issues humankind faces in the 21st 
century. My study reveals the connection between theatre as a human representation and the 
fundamental basics of epistemology established in philosophical practice. Therefore scholars 
from philosophy, cultural studies and literature, etc. might find my work helpful in the ways the 
disciplines converse in different contexts in today’s world.  
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The project has examined four dramatists and four different aspects of ethical issues. 
Kushner chapter explores how the playwright frames his Angels in America by juxtaposing 
narratives—that of the grand historical and political level and that of the sensual, bodily and 
ephemeral level. Through this frame I explore the dialogism between politics and ethics in the 
play, arguing that Kushner’s implicit political view, his prophetic politics, stems from an ethics-
oriented vision that is also evident in Lévinas’s ethical theory.  
My chapter on Albee examines the ethical relationship between the human and non-
human world and reflects on how the human constructs itself as a species at the expense of the 
non-human world. This ethical reflection has timely significance given the current struggles 
between economic development and environmental protection. The chapter focuses on the 
analysis of Albee’s  play The Goat, shedding light on how the traditional equation between 
knowledge and being contributes to the human’s “interiority” that grants humans the right to 
objectify (which hence endangers our environment). 
The Hwang chapter looks at racial issues through an epistemological lens. As an Asian-
American playwright, Hwang in his plays explores race and the construction of identity. This 
chapter reveals that Hwang’s early non-racial work The Sound of a Voice can be read as a critical 
take on western epistemology. This play then can serve as a window into Hwang’s race plays in 
90s, as well as his most recent play Yellow Face, a work that particularly demonstrates the limits 
of multiculturalism.  
My Vogel chapter analyzes the Self-Other relationship in gender contexts. Vogel is noted 
for her dramatic technique of defamiliarization, which, together with her narratives, often 
desubjectify characters. This desubjectification gives focus to the cultural drives that work in the 
construction of subjectivity, as seen in such plays as  Hot ‘n’ Throbbing  And Baby Makes 7. 
This chapter argues that through such technique feminist theatre is able to represent women in a 
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way that challenges the status quo, and thus offer insight into a new female subjectivity beyond 
construction in patriarchal society. 
In sum my work is based on the belief that these acclaimed American writers are all 
exploring issues that are crucial to the future of the country (and to the wider global order). There 
works help identify problems in contemporary culture, problems that come from exhausted ways 
of thinking and understanding the world. Each writer gives new images and languages for 
rethinking our human relationship. In this regard, the plays examined here may be seen as 
pointing the way forward. These plays fundamentally explore questions of relation, matters that 
deal with the primal understanding of Self and Other. And it is here where the work of Lévinas 
proves insightful. In may be thought that the playwrights and Lévinas are exploring similar 
questions and addressing similar problems—how to move forward in a new way that assures 
responsibility and care for the Other, for the different, for that which is beyond our knowledge. 
 While this project borrows many insightful ideas from Lévinas’s theories, it also 
recognizes that there are limits to Lévinas’s thought s and challenges to his work. His writing has 
been highly influential in recent scholarship on ethical theory, yet there are issues that critics 
have brought into debate. 
 The most noticeable issue concerns his Other-centered altruism, which implies a total 
elimination of the ego and Self. One of earliest criticisms of Lévinas’s ethics is Paul Ricoeur’s 
Oneself as Another. Ricoeur’s notion of ethics is more symmetrical than that of Lévinas, 
meaning, he believes that the I must hold the Other in esteem, as I hold myself in esteem. This 
relation demonstrates  a reflexive structure in that I treat you equitably  as I treat myself. Ricoeur 
believes that in order to make oneself open, one must in a certain sense belong to one-self (138). 
He goes as far as to suggest that Lévinas’s ethics implies the “substitution of self-hatred for self-
esteem” (221). 
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Following in this line of thinking, in The Self after Postmodernity, Calvin O. Schrag 
highlights the simultaneous affirmation and diminishment of the subject/Self. He points out that 
“one of the recurring ironies of postmodernity . . . is the impassioned call for em-powerment 
alongside requiems eulogizing the passing of the subject as speaker, author, actor - and pretty 
much in every sense conceivable” (61). Recently Oliver Davies has argued that altruism should 
come after a self-possessed Self. He writes: “Self-dispossessive virtue entails a prior state of self-
possession if compassion is knowingly to put oneself at risk for the sake of the other” (8). He 
also points out that “the ‘hostage’ self suffers ‘the violence of alterity’ in ‘oppression,’ 
‘persecution,’ ‘martyrdom’ and ‘obsession’” (31) prevents a Self from forming the subjectivity 
necessary to perform ethics, so “concrete and realized acts of compassion . . . are not enabled 
‘through the condition of being hostage’” (189).  
One notes that Lévinas’s theories have been widely applied in many disciplines, such as 
social science, medical ethics, and rhetorical studies. However, his work has been particularly 
questioned in the fields of feminist studies and animal studies, where Lévinas is criticized for 
retaining a male and human-dominated viewpoint, thus making his unconditional welcome not 
welcome for females and animals. In addition, Lévinas is problematic for legal studies; his 
priority on ethics in which responsibility is rendered active and infinite is in contrast to the 
theory and practice of law, where responsibility is rendered passive and finite. Lévinas’s limited 
knowledge of politics/law and his laconic discourses on related issues have thus sparked many 
controversial discussions. 
The feminine does act in an important term in Lévinasian discourse because it is through 
the mother-baby relationship that Lévinas articulates his trope on the Self’s selfless devotion to 
an absolute Other. However, many feminist theorists note that in Lévinas’s texts, women’s 
existence is tied up with their ability to reproduce. This perspective strictly views women in a 
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traditional patriarchal sense, and thus renders women as the Other, a confinement that Beauvoir 
criticized.   It seems that when Lévinas genders a virile existence and feminized moments, 
including death and eros, he only has “men” as “human” in mind. Women, on the other hand, are 
not included in the category of a “subject” but only designed for metaphorical use. In her 
introduction to Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Lévinas, philosopher professor Tina 
Chanter points out that in Lévinas’s early work Time and the Other (1947) women are “the Other 
‘par excellence,’” while later in his Totality and Infinity (1961) he recoups “the potentially 
transgressive aspect of women’s alterity uncovered in the 1940s” (17). 
Despite these concerns, Lévinas’s notion of virile existence, effemination as an 
alternative ethical relationship, and bowing before the Other for the Self’s ethical experience still 
prove very helpful  in my analysis of Vogel’s plays.  As Chanter reasons that to “read Lévinas 
well would perhaps be not only to read his texts faithfully; it would be to turn away from his 
texts. . . and to ask what they foreclose” (6). 
The controversy of how women function or exist in Lévinas’s texts is paralled in his 
regard for animals. Just as feminists object that in Lévinas’s texts women are excluded from the 
face-to-face encounter, animal advocates claim that animals do not enjoy unconditional 
hospitality either. The European philosophical tradition does not consider animals as beings that 
possess language, reason and ethics. Yet, to counter these views, when Lévinas sees Bobby the 
dog, he did at first try not to look at Bobby through an anthropocentric lens—he tried not to 
allegorize or metaphorize him. Because he recognized that Bobby had done something the Nazi 
captors did not— Bobby recognized the humanity of Lévinas and other detainees—Bobby 
himself was an irreducible being. That is, while Lévinas tried not to look at Bobby as “a mere 
representative of his kind” (Herron 468), he nevertheless went  back to a traditional mode of 
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thinking after the moment passed: Bobbywas  just a dog that “he is "without the brain needed to 
universalize maxims and drives" (152).  
In “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Jacques Derrida recognizes this 
problem that Lévinas shares with many other European philosophers: 
         discourses [on the animal] are sound and profound, but everything 
      goes on as if they themselves had never been looked at, and 
     especially not naked, by an animal that addressed them ... as   
      though this troubling experience had not been theoretically  
      registered, supposing that they had experienced it at all, at the   
     precise moment when they made of the animal a theorem, something  
     seen and not seeing. The experience of the seeing animal, the  
     animal that looks at them, has not been taken into account in the    
     philosophical or theoretical architecture of their discourse. (383) 
 
This see/seen complex indicates a self-centered epistemology. While this complex is also 
recognized in the domain of Lévinas’s theories as problematic, the animal Other for Lévinas still 
does not find a position of welcome and obligation.  
Besides being criticized for his male-dominated and anthropocentric perspective (for 
adopting metaphorical tropes on the feminine and animals), Lévinas has been challenged for his 
view on law and politics. Law professor Marinos Diamantides in Lévinas, Law, Politics points 
out that Lévinas’s weakness on law and politics stems from his limited understanding of these 
fields. First of all, the idea of The Third—the third person that enters into the face-to-face 
relation— demands Lévinas to ponder on “justice as measurement and comparison of 
responsibility” (17). Because Lévinas does not delve deeply enough into the relationship 
between law and ethics, his texts express a limited view of the law, seeing law “as a positive, 
codified, rule-bound structure within the state” (17). Secondly, Lévinas does not solve his 
contradictory definition of ethics and politics. On the one hand, in ethics he claims responsibility 
is asymmetrical and infinite, and is incommensurable with the politics. On the other hand, 
responsibility needs the subject to “definite, finite, rules and moreover is subordinated to the 
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pragmatic demands of the state and social policy” (17). Lévinas then confines politics within the 
domain of the state and institutions, leaving the paradox unresolved. Diamantides remarks that  
Lévinas’s failure to resolve the ethics and the politics is depressing because it “renders 
Lévinas’ss theme of one’s infinite responsibility for the Other vulnerable to romanticisation” and 
“implicitly renders the institution of legality by the state as a regrettable necessity that, in turn, 
forecloses the possibility of an ethical critique of state law and politics that would go beyond 
either negation or mere deconstruction” (17). 
Gillian Rose also shares the view of  Diamantides, believing that Lévinas’s writings 
presents an incompatibility between  ethics and politics. In The Broken Middle: Out of Our 
Ancient Society, Rose points out that the absence of a deep exploration on law, institutions and 
idealities in Lévinas’s texts makes his thoughts problematic. She thinks Lévinas holds a position 
representative of post-modernism, and fails to “conceive a ground of meaning beneath the 
individual and the state, the ethical life and political institutions” (Bergo 258). 
While both Diamantides and Rose point out the weakness in Lévinas’s understanding of 
law and politics, his notion of bodily sensation as the origin of ethics, of proximity and of the 
third can still prove helpful in considering human relations and political systems.  Other scholars 
such as Desmond Monderson contextualize Lévinas’s ethics in empirical juridical experience by 
exploring “why should we care for others? And how much?” (Diamantides 145) and prove that 
Lévinas’s ethical ideas are insightful in improving the system of law/regulations. In addition, 
professor Simon Critchley proposes “a formal theory of political activity inspired by Lévinas’s 
ethics” (Bergo 241). Elaborating on Jacques Derrida’s major works, Critchley points out 
Lévinas’s impact on Derrida and s Lévinas’s notion that ethics should be understood as the 
interruption of a discursive practice. He then argues that Derrida’s philosophy rests upon an 
ethical imperative.  
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While many critics from various disciplines challenge Lévinas’s ethical thinking, his 
theories nonetheless prove to be insightful, especially given the economic, environmental and 
gender issues facing humans today. His refusal to allow the total subjugation of the Other by the 
Self serves to reins in an over-weening individualism, to promote a reconsideration of the Self-
Other relationship and the construction of self-ness. His notion of bodily sensation as the origin 
of ethics also signals a productive way of thinking, checking abstract and universalized 
understandings of law and politics. Further, his emphasis on a face-to-face encounter spurs a new 
ethical practice, from microcosm to macrocosm, and from individual to collective (politics). 
Lévinas emphasizes the rippling effect of ethics, where the face to face encounter serves to 
inform more complex and institutionalized social relations. In final respects, Lévinas challenges 
the present-day world to consider its aims and its trajectory. He puts forward a call to engage the 
Other with responsibility and to behave toward the Other out of obligation. His insights show 
that theatre can transcend the limitations of the recurrent Now/Self and is able to lead us 
past “what we’ve left behind" and on to what we are "dreaming ahead” (Perestroika, 144), thus 
opening up a future for the exploration of a wisdom of love toward the Other. 
While Lévinas’s ethical theory can be inspirational and challenging to many aspects of 
Western rationality, his work is highly complex and not without complications in its proposed 
self-other relationship. Critics have noted the difficulties with Lévinas, commonly targeting his 
perspective on female subjectivity, his abnegation of the self, and his rather ambiguous treatment 
of politics and pragmatic decision-making.  
 In Time and the Other, Lévinas suggests that “female” is alterity itself. She is outside of 
the light/knowledge, and is directly linked to erotic experience. Lévinas analyzes the 
phenomenology of voluptuousness through the “alterity of feminine,” which he describes as 
elusive from the grasp of light. Problems arise when we consider the methodology of 
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phenomenology. Donna Brody, in her “Lévinas’s Maternal Method from ‘Time and the Other’ 
through Otherwise Than Being: No Woman’s Land?,” asks from whose perspective is the 
phenomenon being described? Can the female, as the study object of the phenomenon, also 
maintain the subjective stance? Can female readers identify themselves as the “alterity” that even 
they themselves cannot understand? The fact that Lévinas fails to take female readers into 
consideration points to the weakness of his theory, indicative of how his discourse situates 
women as the Other. While Lévinas explains that his analysis “is not phenomenological to the 
end” (TOAE, 78), feminist criticism tends to view this statement as too thin, unable to explain 
away his ignorance of women. It is of crucial importance in such discourse, where the female is 
employed for metaphorical usage, for Lévinas to connect, reconcile and differentiate between the 
metaphorical female and women in reality. Such a distinction is a way to avoid inscribing 
masculinst values in his idea of the feminine other.  
 Tina Chanter, however, proposes an “infinitely generous” feminist reading of Lévinas in 
the hope that one might “take its cue from the sense in which maternity hesitates between the 
saying and the said” (Time, Death, and the Feminine 259). Chanter holds that Lévinas’s 
philosophy employs the feminine as a strategy, one that he does not completely think through. 
While she reminds us that the feminine still “remains captive to its preparatory role in Lévinas’s 
work” (259), Chanter shifts this criticism from the perspective of ontological women to a 
rethinking of an alternative subjectivity that does not function in thematic or representative terms. 
She argues that Lévinas’s notion of sensibility operates  against a tradition of representation that 
subsumes the Other into the Same and  absolves the distinction between mind and body. She 
points out that it is through renouncing intentionality that sensibility signifies maternality (244), 
as sensibility opens up an ethical relationship with the Other;  such a relationship is an analogue 
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of maternality that helps nurture not only a new self-other relationship, but also envisions a  new 
subjectivity for self-ness. 
 In addition, Lévinas is constantly challenged on his emphasis on self-abnegation, the 
subjugating of the self totally to the Other. The advantage of such drastic renunciation of the self 
(which attempts to subsume the Other into its own epistemological realm) ensures, for Lévinas, a 
sound ethics between self and the Other. By positing the self as an entity constructed after its 
primary relation with the Other, Lévinas seems to claim that a limitation on the self may thus 
diminish the possible violence that the self may enact upon the Other—it ensures a more 
hospitable relationship between self and the Other. The disadvantage of this proposition, as 
criticism generally questions, lies in the impractical aspect of altruism in reality. The emphasis 
on the priority of the Other has incurred criticism that is skeptical of total altruism, which implies 
a nihilism of the self’s subjectivity. Can a person exist without any identity position that labels 
and defines him or herself? Further, is a self-dispossessed hostage aware of his/her responsibility 
toward the Other, as Lévinas proposes? A proposal for a self always put at the mercy of the 
Other risks self-loathing and self-hatred; such a self may avoid a violence done to the Other, but 
is more likely to approach an abandoning and the taking up of the weight of his/her own life. In 
other words, an unsure self is not capable of bearing the responsibility for itself and for the Other. 
Søren Kierkegaard, for instance, argues the “as yourself” component in the Christian love 
commandment “both implies the legitimacy of self-love and puts legitimate limits on self-
sacrifice in response to the command” (Qtd. in Ferreira 444). He argues that “as yourself” 
requires the fulfillment of self-love, and without a you and an I there is not love (Ferreira 444). 
In other words, if a self does not know how to properly love himself/herself, he would not know 
how to love his/her neighbor.  
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While such questioning is certainly valid, I think a focus on the primary order of ethics 
may make Lévinas’s theory less confusing. While prioritizing the Other, Lévinas, I believe, is 
not necessarily opposed to any identity markers. These markers instead should be seen as coming 
after the ethical relationship is set. This stance urges a primary order of ethics to come before 
identity (the label and markers). In other words, a priority of the Other does not necessitate a 
diminishing of a self. Instead, it could act to promote the rethinking of a new subjectivity, and 
hopefully a catalyst for consideration of a new interpersonal, political and inter-national 
relationship—in short, a rearrangement of relationship from microcosm to macrocosm. M. Jamie 
Ferreira, in his “’Total Altruism’ in Lévinas’s ‘Ethics of the Welcome,’” argues that Lévinas’s 
ethics “supports an active and maintained ethical self, which, despite his emphasis on 
‘dissymmetry’ in face-to-face relation, accounts for his affirmations of both equality and justice” 
(445). He traces the idea of host and hostage in Lévinas’s discourses and argues that “[the] 
language of ‘hostage’ that comes in between is not a shift away from his earlier language of 
hospitality; it is an elaboration of it” (445). In other words, the later concept of self as “hostage” 
is not a substitute for the previous notion of “host.” The two notions should be considered as 
working in sympathy and as correctives to each other.  
One should understand that Lévinas’s ethical theory is not solely an aspirational model 
that urges a new relationship between self and other. His notion that the Other comes before the 
self is indicative of Lévinas belief in the way that reality actually functions. The existence of the 
Other foregrounds the self-making process, instead of the other way around. In other words, 
Lévinas is not just trying to give a model of ethical understanding that he thinks should be 
followed. His ethical theory is not a set of morally or ethically sensitive suggestions (responding 
to the violence the self may impose upon the Other). His ethical theory is rather a reminder of the 
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way things are, issuing from a genuine phenomenological account of reality. For him, ethical 
relations actually are a constituent of reality, not an ideal set of aims or targets.  
Why then, if reality is really constructed this way and individuals really do come into 
being as Lévinas understands, is there still domination, power, and injustice? I think we could 
say that even if the nature of reality is constructed as Lévinas holds, it does not necessarily 
follow that individuals in a strictly deterministic way must abide by this rule. Therefore I think 
Lévinas’s theory functions more as a reminder and a corrective to an epistemology that he thinks 
gone awry. It is in this dynamic of the nature of reality and the human’s account of reality that 
lies the internal tension of Lévinas’s ethical theory. Lévinas diagnoses a kind of human 
epistemology that hinges on an aggressive self, and that twists the ethical relationship. In some 
respects, his understanding of the ethical relationship serves as a more fundamental component 
of the self-other relation. 
Applying Lévinas’s theory to practicality, such as politics, is another challenge, as 
politics involves the third, the institutionalization of law and hence (the condemned) totalizing 
effect. Ethics is the generative source of responsibility between the self and Other, while politics 
comes with the third and the pragmatic need to make decisions; politics in some ways always 
short-changes the ethical. Politics can never get the ethical perfect, and any attempt to assert a 
totalizing political vision or ideology will always compromise the ethical. While we still live in a 
world that needs political acts and political decisions, Lévinas is valuable because he suggests 
that ethics can act as a counter force to a totalizing politics. That said, if politics must always 
short-change the ethical, then the ethical always short-changes the political as well. The case in 
point is the rippling effect of ethics. Ethics on the individual level can pose as a counterforce to 
the macrocosm (the grand narrative of politics). Yet, the ethical cannot ever fully be inscribed in 
a political system. Lévinas’s notion of “face” serves as a constant reminder to emphasize the 
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importance of ethics—this aspect functions as something to chide and inspire the political, even 
as the political must always be limited. 
While ethics can serve as a check on any kind of totalizing politics, however, it is still 
necessary in the world to have politics and to make decisions that involve competing interests 
and parties. Can Levinans be used in situations when people want different things? Is he at all 
helpful in the actual practice of politics and conflict resolution? In addition to an overhauled 
rethinking of epistemology and subjectivity, which is fundamental yet may appear overly 
abstract, Lévinas views may influence political practice. Desmond Manderson’s article “Here I 
am: Illuminating and Delimiting Responsibility,” gives a good example of how a priorization of 
ethics can be employed in jurisprudential practice—in effect, embedding an ethical DNA in the 
political occasion and realizing ethics as the first philosophy. Manderson describes how 
Lévinas’s idea of proximity connects to “the High Court of Australia’s explanation of the 
parameters of the duty of care” (Manderson in Diamantides 146). What Lévinas means by 
proximity is “something fundamental to who we are and why we have a responsibility to others; 
something which furthermore cannot be reduced to logic or knowledge or rules. Proximity is an 
experience, emotional and bodily, and not an idea”(146). And this ethical idea of proximity has 
been put into practice by the influential judgments of Justice William Deane. Manderon’s article 
shows that, while politics short-changes ethics, the ethical imperative can also function as a 
shaping force to foreground the ethical concerns in jurisprudence. While the third forecloses the 
asymmetrical self-other relationship (self bows totally to the Other), it is possible for the 
institution/politics to prioritize “proximity” before any set of codified rules. Such an outlook 
necessitates that politics and decision-making will always be contingent, always messy and 
complicated.   
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Given the work already accomplished in the dissertation, I would expand my research on 
Lévinas and literature for future investigation and analysis. This includes paying attention to the 
criticism on Lévinas, including that regarding his understanding of representation (art). Despite 
that feminist criticism holds that Lévinas eliminates female subjectivity in his discourse, in my 
analysis of Vogel’s works, Lévinas’s vision of a subjectivity constructed with the priority of 
ethics may yet prove to be helpful. The way that Lévinas “re-inscribes” patriarchal discourse in 
the notion of feminine, a point often criticized, actually manifests the existence of ontological 
women. Feminist critics are correct in pointing out that women are trapped in Lévinas’s 
discourse as the Other. However, in a sense Lévinas also releases women from this ontology 
(where she was othered) by reimagining a metaphorical feminine. This femininity enervates the 
virile ego, the egoistical attitude which is not exclusive to men, and opens up a new subjectivity 
which, by subjugating itself before the Other, fulfills a new self. In And Baby Makes 7, one can 
see a metaphorical employment of motherhood, where the self bows toward to the Other, a move 
that can be read as a maternalization of  subjectivity, one that reflects the  overhauled female 
subjectivity that Vogel is exploring. 
 In addition to bringing attitudes critical of Lévinas into the dissertation’s play analyses, I 
would also highlight the general problem of bringing Lévinas’s theories into practical application, 
especially as I discuss certain problems facing the 21st century.  For example, I would note the 
problems in applying Lévinas to political discussions, such as the recent conference on climate 
change (i.e., 2009 Climate Conference in Copenhagen), which highlighted the debate between 
various understandings of the relationship between the human and non-human (environment). 
That said, and while it is difficult to connect politics to the realm of ethics, as Lévinas appears to 
propose, an appeal to ethics, I believe, can inform the political debate in the case of ecological 
concerns. Lévinas’s assertion that the self (human) only comes after its relations with the Other 
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(environment) may prove a guiding insight for such conferences. This ethical modification also 
calls for a philosophical change in the way humans view their self-constructedness: Lévinas’s 
belief that the self only comes after the Other, as a given, offers a model for understanding the 
primacy of the environment, prior to the assertions of the ego/self.  
In such conferences, however, there are often conflicts between industry and green 
groups because the two hold drastically opposing stances, as industry aims for endless 
manufacturing while green groups hope to stop the emission of CO2. Lévinas here is helpful in 
demonstrating that human existence must rely on the sustainability of resources, a protection of 
the environment over profit, which is a greedy projection of human success. Such a success, 
however, is built on the exploitation of the natural environment (and cannot be measured from 
the perspective of the environment) In “Ethics and Trauma: Lévinas, Feminism, and Deep 
Ecology,” Roger S. Gottlieb points out that “The face of the other is not an empirical face,” an 
observation that particularly relates to the eco crisis humans encounter today. The progress of 
industry is the representation of a modern epistemology, which may take on the forms of science, 
philosophy, technology or rationality, outlooks that take root in positivism and essentially reduce 
the Other (environment) in service to a human interest. Lévinas’s notion that we must respond to 
the Other’s call gives special insight here, because “only by responding can we give up our 
attitude of domination; but knowledge of the world always involves a comportment of 
domination” (Gottlieb). A conference like this in Copenhagen may be understood as a respond to 
the nature’s call, demonstrating how such efforts might invoke the ethical (even as debate may 
continue over how to practically decide public policies and practical initiatives). 
The relationship between Lévinas and art is a complicated story. First of all, it is known 
that Lévinas is hostile toward representation. Lévinas writes negatively about literature and art. 
For him such a representation is plastic and idolatrous, one that will betray the Face of the Other 
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by risking the imposition of a dominant principle. In sum, the aesthetic is an evasion of 
responsibility that the Self holds toward the Other. However, it is not to be forgotten that, while 
Lévinas’s writings almost exclusively relate to ethics, he in many places explains his views by 
referencing works of literature. The thread of literary influence plays centrally in Lévinas’s 
ethical discourse. Jill Robbins points out that the notion of language or signification itself is a 
precarious aspect in his discourse because it resists “description in terms of our ordinary 
understanding of signification as a reference to something else” (Kosky rev. of Altered Reading 
519). Exploring Lévinas’s hostility toward signification, Robbins analyzes Lévinas hostility to 
art, seeking possibilities of a literary or performative dimension that might address (and lessen) 
his opposition to representation across the board. She suggests that, because Lévinas’s ethics has 
structural similarities with aesthetic experiences (with many literary authors), “the work of art 
[may] give access to the ethical” (76). 
So can one still use Lévinas to discuss art, theatre and representation. In his “Sublime 
Trauma: The Violence of Ethical Encounter,” Leslie A. Wade suggests that the violence 
represented on stage actually functions as a destabilization of a sure ego, one effect paralleling 
the encounter between self and the Other. In other words, violence serves as an analogue of 
ethics that captures a collapsing moment of the self. While this moment is likely to be 
represented as trauma, it brings salutary effects. In a nutshell, there are ways of doing art that 
combat egoist assertion and the kind of art that functions in an arrogant way as an expression of 
“the said.” Lévinas argues that “the said” is “the birth place of ontology” (OB, 42), so art that 
represent egoist assertion is not likely to show any modality beyond its own cognition. What 
invites investigation is an art that speaks to the “face” outside the realm of epistemology, a kind 
of engagement and encounter which highlights the exchange of “the saying” over the closure of 
“the said.” 
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 Different theatrical styles and devices of the plays analyzed in the dissertation may in fact 
invoke moments of the “face,” giving expression to a challenge of authority and the ego in a 
western outlook. In Vogel’s Hot ‘n’ Throbbing, for instance, The Voice functions as the 
dominant ego that imposes its discourse on the Voice Over (the Other). With a real embodiment 
of “the said” we might see how the Self asserts itself in an authoritarian way, how the Other 
(feminine narrative) is interpolated and kidnapped, and how the process is rendered natural and 
valid. The fact that the plot itself is so familiar in the media helps build its validity as well as 
numb our sympathetic and empathetic responses. The theatrical devices, however, provoke a 
reexamination of its legitimacy through the “representation” of the repressed “saying” on stage—
the feminine sexuality that has no mode of utterance (within patriarchal discourse).  
Kushner’s work features characters returning from the past and often renders multiple 
actions onstage in split focus. The presentation of  the recurrent “priors” (ancestors) breaks up 
the illusion of an isolated and powerful ego; this approach not only demonstrates the significance 
of the “past” but also shatters the priority of the “present” (self) and its supposed grasp on the 
future to come (as in Lévinas’s alternative understanding of time). In addition, the designation of 
the encounter of Prior and Harper in their dream/illusion also debunks the heavy mask of identity 
and a fixed reality. This move does not suggest that we do not need identity, or that identity is an 
absolute, bad thing, but that identity is not the only thing that necessarily connects people. 
Suffering and trauma may be a stronger glue that holds people together, as they reveal 
“proximity” in a Lévinasian sense—we identify our humanity through identifying the other’s 
suffering and trauma. Kushner’s stylistics and non-realistic approaches may help highlight this 
feature. 
Even a realistic play, such as The Goat, or Who is Sylvia, can still create a disturbance or 
an interruption in western knowing and confidence. The representation of the goat itself is very 
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symbolic—Sylvia makes her presence evident as a funny smell described by Stevie, and later she 
appears in the play’s coda as a carcass. This symbolic rendering of the human-other highlights a 
kind of human arrogance—as Derrida describes in his analysis of the word “animal” (Qtd. in 
Chaudhuri “(De)Facing the Animals” 10) The smell and the carcass (food) indicate a primary 
reduction. Stevie’s anger, her breaking of plates, vases and bowls, as well as her killing the goat, 
however, point to moments of crisis, moments that are themselves performances of the limit of 
humanity. In an epistemology where the Self-ness of humanity requires a vehement or even 
violent assertion to ground itself, the dramatic destabilization of the self-other encounter can 
produce effects of eruption and dizziness onstage.   
In short, theatrical forms and different theatrical techniques may help work out and 
demonstrate problems that concern Lévinas. Certain theatrical techniques are likely to help 
create an art that produces different or opposing meanings (rather than egoist manifestations), 
and can hence boost a productive dialogue between “the said” and “the saying.” 
Given the criticism and problems with Lévinas, in what way does Lévinas still appear 
useful and valuable? Firstly, I admit that the dissertation might reduce its reliance on Lévinas per 
se. I might situate Lévinas’s work in its historical context in order to better understand how his 
writings address particular issues in a particular time. Besides, I might use Lévinas not as any 
kind of final authority on such matters or issues, but as a guide, as a way to point out and 
understand crucial problems and questions for contemporary humanity. That is to say that 
Lévinas should be used as a helpful catalyst for reconsidering problems, instead of being the 
avatar of final solutions or answers. 
 Given the problems and limitations of his theory, Lévinas’s sanctification of the Other 
above all, however, is still inspiring to today’s world. While this outlook can cause problems and 
difficulties in its application, Lévinas’s work seeks to disallow any kind of future horror that 
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might eradicate the other in service to an arrogant self (such as the Holocaust). Therefore, this 
outlook serves as the ultimate check on whatever politics one follows or wishes to advance, as 
well as to a postmodern relativism or a postmodern reluctance to commit to any ethical position. 
All in all, for Lévinas, ethics is the foundation. 
Finally, Lévinas can be applauded for his efforts to assert ethics in such a way that it 
exists prior to any particular identity (and thus precedes identity politics and power plays). Ethics 
is not thus based on a specific connection or proximity. Again, ethics is prior to the self. While 
this view can be problematic in its application to particular instances, it has the value of not 
basing ethics on any particular identity or identity relation. What this affords is a way of 
considering ethics prior to specific cultural contestations—that is,  something is there, as a 
beacon or a guidance, that cannot be given over to contingency, that cannot be dismissed just 
because any particular interest, group, or identity has the power to enact its will. This new 
definition of ethics functions as a safeguard that is not at the mercy of the powerful. 
Tom Burvill, in his “’Politics Begins as Ethics’: Lévinasian Ethics and Australian 
Performance Concerning Refugees,” offers a case in point. Criticizing the Austraulian 
government’s refusal to honor its responsibility and to provide unqualified hospitality, he uses 
Lévinas’s concepts to explore the rich and varied responses of Australian theatre to this crisis. 
Burvill suggests that the theatrical phenomenon itself is broadly the practice of ethics. In this 
light, theatre functions as a beacon, one that produces an affective rather than an ideological 
transformation. In this instance one sees that theatre can prove to be an “ethical mode of 
embodied discourse” (233), a medium that highlights “the saying” over “the said.”  
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